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Abstract
Perception is a process by which attention and knowledge from long-term 
memory interact. This thesis explored how instantiation of action-schemata 
influence eye-movement behaviour and the development o f representations 
during natural scene perception.
Stereotypical knowledge about actions was found to be consistent 
across individuals, and four action-scenes were created and used in all 
subsequent experiments. In confirmation of previous research (Friedman, 1979; 
Goodman, 1980; Henderson, Weeks and Hollingworth, 1999), action-schemata 
were found to have an effect on eye-movement behaviour and memory for 
those scenes. At scene onset, visual attention was deployed in a manner to 
facilitate scene understanding and this depended on whether action and place 
scene information were correlated. Overall, schema-inconsistent objects were 
looked at more than schema-consistent objects, but only at later stages o f scene 
viewing. This led to differences in memory performance for both types of 
objects. These results were reinforced in a change detection task, where 
schema-inconsistent objects produced earlier change detection performance 
suggesting a connection between attention and online memory representations. 
Furthermore, it was found that attention was critical in incorporating both the 
perceptual detail o f objects and information that was not supported by the 
currently active schema. Finally, schematic effects in memory were observed 
when only a subset of schema-consistent objects were viewed, suggesting that 
the regularities shared by these objects were sufficient to guide perception. 
These effects were particularly emphasised when participants were cued for 
action but not for place, and it was suggested that this could be due to stronger 
action-object contingencies.
The findings reported in this thesis suggest that action-schemata 
mediate dynamic scene perception by means of differential allocation of 
attention and selective encoding of specific information. During this process, 
attention and knowledge from long-term memory play distinct, yet equally 
important roles.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview of this Thesis
The overall aim of this thesis is to contribute to the debate that surrounds current 
issues on scene perception. This thesis investigates the role that memory schemata 
play in the dynamic perception and representation of real-world naturalistic 
scenes. Schemata can be defined as an organised body of knowledge that exists in 
long-term memory (LTM), established firom previous experience of objects, 
scenes or events. Knowledge about the world has been found to influence initial 
scene identification and recognition, object identification and recognition, the 
visual exploration o f scenes, both at scene onset and during the course o f scene 
viewing, and scene encoding and/or retrieval. However, there is still some debate 
as to what happens at early stages of scene viewing, how attention and memory 
interact during scene perception and how knowledge from LTM affects scene 
memory.
This introductory chapter begins by reviewing studies of scene perception, 
specifically rapid scene perception and how scene context affects the 
identification of objects within it will be considered. Next, studies using known 
paradigms to investigate perception will be presented. These include eye 
movements, change blindness, and scene and object memory. The main theme of 
this thesis is covered in a second part o f the literature review. Here, a brief 
overview o f schema theory will be presented and the paradigms and studies 
reviewed in the preceding section will be related to schemata. Empirical work will 
be summarised at the end of this chapter and empirical studies will follow to 
address the issues raised in the course of this review. According to our 
predictions, the rapid instantiation of an action-schema will guide eye movements 
during scene viewing in a way that is consistent with the instantiated schema and 
the information in the scene. The findings in this thesis should also provide 
support for the effect of schemata on the development of online representations of 
scenes and the objects they contain. A relationship between attention deployment
during viewing and scene memory will also be established. Finally, exploratory 
studies into the conditions for schema instantiation and the possibility of 
simultaneous schemata operating in one scene will be presented. The final chapter 
integrates this literature review and the empirical findings which emerged from 
these studies to address four core questions:
• How do action-schemata influence eye movements during scene 
inspection?
• How do action-schemata affect what is subsequently remembered?
• Are schematic effects during scene inspection and subsequent 
remembering independent o f each other?
• To what extent does action-schema instantiation rely on background 
information?
1.2 Scene Perception
Intensive research on scene perception was carried out in the late 1970’s and early 
1980’s, and since then many theories have been developed in an attempt to clarify 
issues surrounding this area o f research. At their most general, studies have shown 
that perceiving a scene involves identifying it and the elements it encompasses, 
attending at it and encoding it. The process by which this occurs is said to first 
involve a rapid gist extraction, which is likely to occur within the first 100 to 150 
ms (Biederman, Mezzanotte and Rabinowitz, 1982; Intraub, 1981; Schyns and 
Oliva, 1994), and which will be subsequently maintained across views. Second, 
abstract object identity can be quickly established, a process that is likely to be 
assisted by the scene’s context (Boyce and Pollatsek, 1992). Finally, the eyes are 
attracted to local and/or semantic properties of objects (Chun and Nakayama, 
2000). During this process, internal representations about the scene and its 
elements are developed dynamically (online), and when the visual input is no 
longer available, a final scene representation will include information encoded 
during the process of perception (Baddeley, 1999; Friedman, 1979). Scene 
perception has thus been shown to involve a combination of low-level.
“perceptual” control and high-level cognitive control (Henderson and 
Hollingworth, 1999). The issues which are central to this thesis concern high- 
level scene perception, where cognition plays a dynamic role. Hence, we ignore 
any attentional phenomena that are not linked to higher cognitive processing, such 
as stimulus or oculomotor-based effects.
The following sections review studies on rapid scene perception and gist 
extraction and the paradigms usually employed to investigate scene perception, 
such as eye movements, change blindness, and recall and recognition memory. 
Later, these will also be reviewed in relation to schema theory.
1.2.1 Rapid scene perception
Despite the variability that exists in real-world scenes (even within the same 
category), people are extremely efficient at recognising them very rapidly. The 
identification of a scene involves an extraction of its spatial structure (layout) and 
its semantics. Research in viewing o f pictures has argued for a two-phased 
process (Buswell, 1935; Antes, 1974; Antes and Kristjanson, 1993). At early 
stages, people broadly survey the picture, and this process is characterised by 
inspection of the most informative areas o f the picture, i.e. the areas o f a scene 
that provide the most information as to the scene’s meaning. In a second phase, 
less informative regions of the scene are surveyed. This suggests that during the 
initial phase, people are engaged in gathering generic information about the 
picture, the scene’s gist. The semantic gist o f a scene can be extracted with one 
single fixation, within the first 100 to 150 ms of scene onset (Biederman, 1981; 
Biederman, Mezzanotte and Rabinowitz, 1982; Gordon, 2004; Hollingworth and 
Henderson, 1998; Hollingworth and Henderson, 2000; Intraub, 1981; Potter,
1976; Schyns and Oliva, 1994). Some researchers have reported values as low as 
75ms (Boyce and Pollatsek, 1992), 70 ms (Renninger and Malik, 2004a), and 
more recently in a go/no-go task participants were very accurate at identifying 
images flashed for only 26 ms (Rousselet, Joubert and Fabre-Thorpe, 2005).
Furthermore, gist extraction is likely to be independent of attention (Fei-Fei, 
VanRullen, Koch and Petrona, 2005; Lampinen, Copeland and Neuschatz, 2001). 
For example, Fei-Fei et al (2005) found that natural scene categorisation may 
require less attention than equivalent tasks involving artificial stimuli such as 
simple arrays o f letters, and suggested that this might be assisted by the 
meaningfulness o f the natural stimuli (even when colour is removed). Friedman 
(1979) claimed that the process of rapid scene perception was based on the 
detection o f salient global structural features, and that the speed at which it occurs 
increases with familiarity or expectancy of the scene. This process was said to 
occur with low expenditure of resources because knowledge is already 
represented in memory and is used for rapid pattern recognition. However, many 
researchers argue that scene processing may be independent of the objects it 
contains (McCotter, Gosselin, Sowden and Schyns, 2005; Oliva and Torralba, 
2001; Schyns and Oliva, 1994), and may rely on image statistics, such as texture 
or coarse blobs. It is accepted by most researchers that the visual system 
segregates objects by relying on visual discontinuities, but this process is likely to 
be based on image statistics rather than on segregation of individual object 
contours, since only a few of them actually belong to objects (Marr, 1982). In 
fact, some areas of the brain, such as the parahippocampal place area (PPA), 
solely dedicated to the processing o f the spatial layout o f a scene have been 
identified (Epstein and Kanwisher, 1998). A similar argument has been proposed 
by O’Regan, Deubel, Clark and Rensink (2000), who proposed that 
predispositions determine which aspects of a scene will be processed and this 
process is modulated by low-level holistic visual factors such as contrast, 
luminance, colour distribution, etc.
Recent work by Renninger and Malik (2004a) proposed a model for scene 
identification based on texture recognition. In their experiment, participants saw a 
brief glimpse (37, 50, 62 and 69 ms) o f a greyscale scene of a specific category 
(for example a “kitchen” or a “beach”), and after a mask participants were asked 
to perform a 2-altemative forced-choice task with two verbal labels o f scene 
categories. Performance varied from 76% (for the shortest exposure) to 93% (for
the longest exposure). A model based on texture recognition performed at around 
76% for all durations. Both the model and humans confused scenes with similar 
textures and the model was able to predict performance and error patterns on 8 out 
of 10 scenes. The authors conclude that texture provides strong clues for scene 
identification and that humans also rely on coarse segmentation of shapes to make 
their judgements (such as the triangle formed by a mountain against the sky). In 
line with these results is the “coarse-to-fine” theory of processing proposed by 
Schyns and Oliva (1994). According to the authors, a coarse scale of the scene 
based on spatial organisation o f conspicuous areas, known as “blobs”, can provide 
holistic clues about the scene’s identity, and this process is likely to occur very 
early after onset. In their study, scenes were manipulated so that some contained 
coarse blobs of a one type of scene (for example, a city) and fine edges o f objects 
of another type (for example, a motorway). These were presented simultaneously 
for two different durations. Participants had to respond whether that hybrid scene 
was the same or different to a test scene presented shortly after. At shorter 
exposure durations (30 ms), participants were using the coarse information to 
make their decisions, whereas at longer durations (150ms), they were using finer 
information instead (but had access to both types of information). In other words, 
at very early stages of scene recognition, people seem to rely on coarse scene- 
based information and thereafter switch to using object-based information. It 
could be that the visual system attends at coarse information first in order to get 
an estimate of the scene’s context and activate the appropriate scene schema from 
memory. A second stage of perception would follow and involve attending at 
finer information in order to guide perception (or refute the initial estimate). The 
theory assumes a top-down guidance o f scene categorisation, because it suggests 
that scene identification bypasses the bottom-up object-based scene recognition.
A similar conclusion was reached by McCotter et al (2005), who found that 
scene-specific spectral information (spatial scale and orientation) is used for fast 
scene categorisation. Likewise, Rousselet et al (2005) found colour to be a 
diagnostic feature in improving performance, although form-based information 
seemed to be sufficient. It is possible that other statistical regularities observed 
across scenes help the rapid extraction of the scenes meaning and contents. In a
study by Chun and Jiang (1999), participants were able to detect objects faster 
when presented with other objects because co-occurrences between them were 
learned. This suggests the possibility that in real-world environments we are able 
to identify scenes rapidly because the structural relationships within scenes have 
been coded into long-term memory.
It has been argued that rapid scene perception is closely linked with the perceptual 
span of the visual system. The perceptual span is the size o f the visual field where 
useful information can be extracted (Boyce and Pollatsek, 1992). In order to 
include detailed information about specific objects the eyes need to be within 
about 2 degrees of the object (Nelson and Loftus, 1980), whereas in order to 
extract the semantic information needed to identify scenes, the eyes can be far 
from fixation. Scene context can be obtained when the eyes are fixating on an 
object and no information about the rest of the scene is visible within the first 3 
degrees o f visual angle (Boyce and Pollatsek, 1992). Fei-Fei et al (2005) found 
that two natural scenes can be categorised in parallel at opposing eccentricities in 
the visual field but the same is not possible when more synthetic stimuli are used. 
Similarly, Nasanen and Ojanpaa (2004) showed that it is possible to process up to 
4 faces with a single 200-ms eye fixation. This suggests that the visual system 
rapidly processes meaningful stimuli with ease.
1.2.1.1 Obj ect identification
Most theories of object identification (within a scene) assume a multi-stage 
process whereby the visual system needs to detect objects based on image 
segregation (Wolfe and Bennett, 1997), process the object’s features to form a 
coherent representation of that object (Lamberts, 2002), categorise it (as an 
animal, or a face, for example) based on previously acquired information about 
categories (Grill-Spector and Kanwisher, 2005; Lamberts, 2002), and identify it 
(as a dog, or a face of a specific person) (Gosselin and Schyns, 2001; Rosch, 
Mervis, Gray, Johnson and Boyes-Braem, 1976).
More traditional accounts of this process place detection (segmentation) before 
categorisation (e.g. Driver and Baylis, 1996). Controversially, recent evidence 
has proposed that object categorisation and detection are not independent, both in 
terms of the time course at which they occur and in terms o f the system that 
governs both processes (Grill-Spector and Kanwisher, 2005). Furthermore, this 
research suggests that it is possible that participants may be using category 
information to facilitate detection. The authors argue that this is possible due to 
access to long-term knowledge acquired from previous experience of objects, 
which speeds the process because it avoids an exhaustive search across all object 
representations. This categorisation process may be coarse and lead to an 
incomplete object representation (Lamberts, 2002), however, but may still be 
enough to facilitate detection. For a more fine-grained identification (it’s a 
German Shepard vs. it’s a dog), more time and resources are necessary. In Grill- 
Spector and Kanwisher’s (2005) study, this process took an extra 65 ms on 
average and success at identification depended on success at detection, which in 
turn relied on matching the incoming stimulus with internal representations from 
long-term memory. In summary, general categories of objects can be determined 
at the time of object detection and image segmentation and identification occurs 
shortly after with extra processing. The speed at which this process occurs 
depends on the similarity of the stimulus features and the content of memory 
about those categories (Lamberts, 2002).
1.2.2.2 Identifying objects in meaningful scenes
When an object’s semantics corresponds to the overall context o f the scene it 
should take less time to be identified (Friedman, 1979). The role o f scene context 
in support of object identification is a well-documented phenomenon (Biederman, 
1981; Biederman, Mezzanote and Rabinowitz, 1982; Boyce and Pollatsek, 1992; 
Boyce, Pollatsek and Rayner, 1989; DeGraef, Christiaens and d’Ydewalle, 1990; 
Friedman, 1979; Palmer, 1975). Pioneering work in this area was carried out by 
Palmer (1975). In his study, participants were presented with a slide of a scene
(for example a kitchen) followed by a brief exposure to a target object, which was 
either a) coherent with the scene (a loaf o f bread), b) incoherent with the scene but 
visually similar to the coherent object (a mailbox), or c) incoherent with the scene 
and visually different from the coherent object (a drum). A fourth condition was 
introduced where no context was provided. After the brief presentation o f the 
target object, participants were required to name the object and rate the level of 
confidence in their response. Overall, contextually coherent objects showed a 
higher correct response rate, followed by the no context condition and finally the 
incoherent conditions. Confidence ratings replicated the response results.
Palmer’s findings indicate that world knowledge about where objects are likely to 
be encountered (scene knowledge) facilitates the identification o f those objects. A 
similar pattern o f results was obtained by Biederman et al (1982), who used an 
equally simple, but persuasive, paradigm. Each trial started with the verbal label 
for a target object. After a brief presentation o f a scene (150 ms), followed by a 
mask with a cued location, participants had to respond whether the object was 
present in the scene at that location. Semantically consistent objects were better 
detected than inconsistent objects, suggesting that contextual coherence between 
the object and the scene facilitated the rapid perception of those items, regardless 
of their lower-level sensory properties. Moreover, when objects were presented in 
unusual locations (such as a sofa floating in the air in a living room), 
identification of those objects was hindered, which suggests that knowledge about 
the possible locations of objects is also stored in memory and used to guide 
identification (see also De Graef et al, 1990).
Because these paradigms do not provide a description of the behaviour that might 
occur in more normal scene viewing conditions, Boyce and Pollatsek (1992) 
carried out a study where participants had direct visual access to the target object 
(by fixating it), which normally takes place in typical real-world situations. This 
was done to prevent an excessive emphasis on context, which may occur in brief 
exposure tasks where eye movements are precluded, thus biasing the results. In 
their study, after a short period of time of scene onset, the target object was 
“wiggled” (moved a short distance back and forth) and participants were
requested to fixate on it and name it. The authors argue that in these conditions 
the time taken to name an object reflects the time to identify it and not to 
memorise it or integrate it with the scene. Overall, naming latencies were shorter 
for objects that were contextually consistent with the scene, which is in line with 
the results obtained by studies reviewed so far. Borrowing this technique. De 
Graef, De Troy and d’Ydewalle (1992) carried out a study where participants 
were not aware of the “wiggle” of a plausible or an implausible object located at 
7.5° from a priming object. They found that people spent less time processing the 
priming object if  the target object was implausible, because plausible objects were 
somewhat more perceptible.
Taken together, the studies described here provide evidence that the recognition 
of objects in scenes is more than a bottom-up perceptual analysis of their features. 
Knowledge instantiated from long-term memory about the likely locations of 
those objects within a coherent scene can guide that process in a top-down 
manner. Context is said to narrow down the possible identities o f contextually 
consistent objects that may exist in parafoveal vision, allowing for a quick 
diagnostic of the features of these objects (De Graef, 1998).
The reasons why this occurs are still unclear but several proposals have been put 
forward. When scenes are viewed, a number of potential candidates in long-term 
memory have to be compared with the current precept for identification. 
According to early work in this area (Friedman, 1979; Palmer, 1975), the criterion 
used during those comparisons is lowered if  the objects in the visual input are 
semantically coherent with the rest o f the scene, because less perceptual 
information about them needs to be gathered. Other researchers have proposed 
that scene context facilitates the construction of perceptual descriptions o f objects 
that semantically agree with that context (Biederman et al, 1982; Boyce, Pollatsek 
and Rayner, 1989). In addition, Henderson, Pollatsek and Rayner (1987) have put 
forward an object-to-object priming hypothesis to explain context effects. In this 
model, the perception of a semantically consistent object would shorten naming 
latencies of a second object. Similarly, the study by Chun and Jiang (1999)
described previously suggests that when objects often co-occur in the 
environment, the mere sight of one object in a scene or on its own may help rapid 
identification of another object. Covariance can decrease uncertainty (Biederman 
et al, 1982) and provide a contextual basis for the guiding of attention. However, 
when additional objects were controlled, the context effect still occurred. 
Moreover, the fact that objects in unusual locations are harder to identify than 
objects in likely places suggests that context facilitation is mediated by a layout­
like representation, akin to a schema (Boyce and Pollatsek, 1992).
More recent research has questioned the facilitation role of scene context in object 
identification (Hollingworth and Henderson, 1998,1999). The reasons for the 
concern expressed by those researchers rest in the paradigms used to reach that 
conclusion. According to Hollingworth and Henderson, object-detection 
paradigms do not control for participants’ response bias. Moreover, cueing for 
location in a scene is expected to provide extra information about the possible 
identity of the target object, since knowledge about the world contains 
information about usual locations of objects in scenes (De Graef et al, 1990). 
Furthermore, providing the target’s verbal label before the scene appears creates 
expectations about what the scene is going to be (Henderson, Weeks and 
Hollingworth, 1999), which in turn provides clues about where the object may 
appear (Henderson, 1992). These factors may inflate the contextually consistent 
object advantage in naming latencies. In an experiment where response bias was 
eliminated, Hollingworth and Henderson (1998) found no consistent object 
advantage. In a second experiment where the target’s verbal label was presented 
after the scene, the authors found an inconsistent object advantage. This result is 
compatible with a robust contextually inconsistent object advantage in memory 
tasks (e.g. Friedman, 1979; Goodman, 1980; Pezdek, Whetstone, Reynolds,
Askari and Dougherty, 1989), in eye movement studies (e.g. De Graef et al, 1990; 
Friedman, 1979; Henderson, Weeks and Hollingworth, 1999; Loftus and 
Mackworth, 1978) and in change detection paradigms (Hollingworth and 
Henderson, 2000, 2003). Finally, to eliminate response bias, a forced-choice 
recognition task between two object verbal labels was introduced after scene
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exposure, and no difference between consistent and inconsistent objects was 
found. In a follow-up study involving the same task but using shorter scene 
exposures, Hollingworth and Henderson (1999) found an inconsistent object 
advantage. Ultimately, they propose a functional isolation model where object 
perception is isolated from stored information about those objects with regards to 
scenes. They do not rule out, however, the possibility that this isolation may occur 
only at the level of conceptual knowledge and object perception and not at the 
level o f stored object information and segregation o f scenes. Object identification 
(initial perceptual analysis followed by matching with stored descriptions) occurs 
in isolation from scene contextual information, and as soon as the object is 
represented, the scene identity may guide attention to and encoding of that object, 
and this process is likely to benefit inconsistent objects. In other words, scene 
context effects could occur post object identification. The reasons for this could 
rest on the architecture o f the visual system, which “eases” the process of 
perception by isolating object identification from scene-object relationships, 
which might generate too much potential information.
1.2.2 Eye movements
1.2.2.1 Overview
Eye movements involve two processes: fixations and saccades. Fixations are 
static (or very slow) and encompass the periods in between saccades. Saccades 
are the quick movements of the eyes in between fixations. A typical fixation lasts 
on average 250 to 300 ms (Deubel, 1996; Kowler, 1995; Viviani, 1990; Yarbus, 
1967) and a typical saccade requires on approximately 30 ms and averages 5° to 
6° in amplitude, in standard cognitive tasks (Russo, 1978). The visual acuity of 
the information presented to the eye decreases with the distance to the fovea (a 2° 
region in the eye situated at the back of the retina), where visual acuity is best. 
The (almost) stationary nature of fixations stabilises each foveated portion of the 
image. Hence, the eyes move in order to bring a stable image to the retina, and
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allow for efficient processing of that image. It is during fixations that information 
is acquired. The spatial distribution of fixations is usually very accurate with few 
fixations not landing in regions where information has to be processed (Antes and 
Kristjason, 1993).
In order to process information, fixations have to be at least 100 to 150 ms long 
(Viviani, 1990), and some authors have reported 70 msec for the perception of the 
layout of scenes (Renninger and Malik, 2004a).
During saccades, visual awareness is very limited or nonexistent. This is due to a 
number of factors such as the fact that when eyes move, the image on the retina 
also moves; the fact that visual acuity is low; and the phenomenon o f saccadic 
suppression -  suppression of the visual pathways during this period (Russo,
1978). Hence, during saccades information acquisition and/or processing is not 
likely to occur. Saccades have been shown to be surprisingly accurate when 
searching for targets, whether the visual stimulus is composed of dots or whole 
objects (Kowler and Blaser, 1995; Melcher and Kowler, 1999). Saccades tend to 
land near the centre of gravity or centre-of-area of shapes and objects, which 
suggests that what guides saccades are full representations of shapes or objects 
and not spatial representations of individual elements that compose that shape or 
object. Saccades are performed after all individual elements of the shape have 
been represented as a whole at the level of ‘object’, so they can land in precise 
locations (Wolfe and Bennet, 1997). This precision allows for systematic accurate 
estimates of object locations near the parafovea within cluttered environments like 
natural scenes.
Scanpaths are often used to characterise pattern of eye-movement behaviour over 
time. A scanpath is a representation of the scanning pattern over a stimulus. It is 
represented by all fixations and the saccades that connect them during inspection 
time. Noton and Stark (1971) proposed that scanpaths were established by storing 
sequences o f fixations in short-term memory in an idiosyncratic way, so when an 
observer was exposed to the same stimulus, their eyes were likely to follow the 
same path. More recently. Stark and Ellis (1981) have argued that fixation
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position depends on previous fixations, so scanpaths reflect statistically dependent 
stochastic processes.
1.2.2.2. Cognitive control of eye movements
Eye movements are obvious low-level reflexes as shown by our immediate 
tendency to flxate an abrupt stimulus that comes into the visual fleld. There is also 
some evidence that lower-level image properties, such as luminance, contrast, 
edge density, etc., can influence eye movements (e.g. Mannan, Ruddock and 
Wooding, 1996). However, most research has shown that eye movements are 
selective, accurate and sophisticated, and reflect higher-level cognitive processing 
during the dynamic interaction with the perceptual world. The focus o f this thesis 
is on cognitive control of eye movements.
During scene inspection, when the eyes stop to flxate, information has to be 
gathered, integrated with information from previous fixations and from long term 
knowledge, parafoveal information has to be processed and a decision about 
where to fixate next has to be made (Antes and Kristjason, 1993). Hence, before a 
saccade is made, the oculomotor system needs to have gathered sufficient 
information about how long the next saccade will be and in which direction it will 
move (Deubel, 1996). The cognitive system is important to make decisions such 
as where to look next and to process the information that is presented to the retina. 
The oculomotor system is responsible for moving the eye to the location 
determined by the cognitive system. During this time, it seems unlikely that the 
cognitive system is idle. In fact, before the stimulus presented to the retina has 
been fully processed, the cognitive system is anticipating where the eye will move 
next (Vaughan and Graefe, 1977). This is clearly shown in experiments where 
identification of an object when it is fixated is faster when it was expected prior to 
fixation (Russo, 1978). In addition, researchers have provided evidence for 
parallel programming o f two consecutive saccades (Becker and Jurgens, 1979), 
and this implies that parafoveal processing of more than one target can occur, a
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process tightly linked to high-level cognitive mechanisms. Typical manifestations 
of this are overshoots. This occurs when an observer saccades over a stimulus and 
returns to it within one or two fixations. Information about that stimulus might 
have been anticipated or the need to fixate it may only emerge by computing 
information about the next stimulus. Besides gathering the information given by 
the stimulus on the retina, the cognitive system uses information from close 
peripheral stimuli (e.g. Rayner, 1975) and information that is stored in memory 
(Zingale and Kowler, 1987). This information can be used to eliminate eye 
fixations by accessing a memory store that already contains the appropriate 
sequence o f saccades to be executed, as when someone is typing or has developed 
expertise on a specific task.
There is some argument amongst researchers about whether this kind of eye 
movement control is based on visual/spatial determinants or whether it is based on 
higher-level cognitive determinants. Using complex stimuli such as scenes,
Yarbus (1967) carried out a well-known study that provided strong evidence for 
the cognitive control of eye movements. He showed that scanning patterns o f the 
same stimulus changed considerably according to the instructions participants 
were asked to follow, whilst viewing a picture o f Repin called Unexpected 
Visitor. For example, when participants were asked to estimate the ages o f the 
people in the painting, fixations tended to concentrate around the faces o f the 
people depicted. Whereas when the instructions requested memorisation o f the 
objects in the scene, fixation distribution was spread out over the whole scene. 
These results suggest that eye-movement patterns are highly dependent on 
cognitive motivations, which select the adequate information for the task at hand.
Other studies that did not manipulate instructions showed that eye movement 
behaviour depends on the cognitive state o f the participant. When presented with 
ambiguous stimuli, the eye-movement scan paths changed according to the figure 
the participant reported perceiving (Stark and Ellis, 1981). Similarly, when using 
fragmented figures Stark and Ellis showed that the participants’ eye-movement 
behaviour changed from the moment a hidden figure was recognised. In
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summary, results showed that scan paths made by the same observer change 
according to their cognitive state and these changes could not be controlled by 
stimulus sensory properties, since these never changed. Eye movements are 
readily observable and provide externalised information about higher cognitive 
processes.
1.2.2.3 Eye movements and attention
Across the eye-movement literature there is a general consensus that eye 
movements are a form of attention, or at least they reflect attention. There is also, 
however, much controversy surrounding the coupling of eye movements and 
attention.
Dynamic scene perception involves an on-line moment-by-moment processing of 
the scene and its elements. In order for processing to occur, attention has to be 
deployed. Although eye movements and attention can be dissociated (e.g. Posner, 
Snyder and Davidson, 1980) there is evidence that demonstrates that attention 
allocation is closely linked with the direction of eye gaze. Work on eye 
movements in reading has provided evidence for this (Rayner et al, 1980; 
Henderson and Ferreira, 1990). Accounts for the asymmetric nature o f the 
perceptual span in reading have proposed that the eyes move according to covert 
shifts of attention that precede fixations. It could be said that covert attention 
precedes overt attention in the form of fixations. Early research to tackle this 
issue was performed by Remington (1980). In his experiment, participants had to 
detect a target stimulus whilst saccading to a pre-determined position o f the 
display. When the target coincided with the direction of the saccade, reactions 
were faster, so Remington concluded that shifts of attention precede saccades. 
More evidence for the coupling of eye movements and attention come from 
experiments using isolated letters targets displayed in the form of a concentric 
circle, such as the Kowler, Anderson, Dosher and Blaser’s (1995) dual-task study. 
Participants had to move their eyes (look) in the direction of a letter and to
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identify (perceive) another letter located randomly within the display. The authors 
showed that these tasks could not be performed independently and that 
performance in one task interfered with performance in the other task. Participants 
were unable to make a saccade to a target whilst paying attention to another 
target. Hence, attention and saccades are not independent and in order to perform 
a saccade to a target, some attention has to be allocated to it.
For the purposes of this thesis, eye movements will be used as a readily 
observable measure o f overt allocation of attention, although we are aware that 
covert attention can play a part in scene processing. In the context of this thesis, 
attention refers to the selection of information at the expense o f other information 
present in the visual display. Eye movements are a “response” of attentional 
modulation o f visual processing. A “response” to one object at the expense of 
another would be a fixation on that object and not on another. Given these 
considerations, it should be noted that throughout this thesis the words attention 
and eye movements will be loosely interchanged, and the term attention refers to 
overt attention, unless otherwise stated.
1.2.2.4 Eye movements in scenes
During dynamic scene perception, our eyes move discontinuously and yet we 
continuously receive a stable image of the world. There are contrasting theoretical 
accounts o f this phenomenon. According to Jonides, Irwin and Yantis (1982), our 
nervous system is capable of merging temporally successive snapshots o f the 
world based on spatial coordinates by a process called “transsaccadic fusion”. 
However, O’Regan and Lévy-Schoen (1983) have shown that this phenomenon 
does not occur, and they support the idea that information is coded semantically 
rather than spatially. The authors argue that the visual system does not code 
specific visual detail or metric distances, unless these are coded semantically. In 
their own words “a blue chair is coded as a “blue chair” and not as an assembly of 
bluish light dots at various points in space” and “position is only retained to the
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extent to which it is semantically coded (“near”, “far”, “in front”, “a few 
centimetres”, etc.)”. The impression of a rich visual environment is provided by 
the image in the retina, accessible at all times. Internal representations, however, 
possess enough information to guide our eyes to appropriate scene locations, 
which can in turn provide accurate pictorial information. Stark and Ellis (1981) 
have provided a similar view of eye movements and defined scan paths as 
“repetitive routes o f exploration” (pg. 214) where representations are 
continuously re-explored and used for confirmation of information already 
acquired.
In complex scenes many objects are potential targets for selection. Many 
researchers have tried to determine which target characteristics are important for 
target selection. Size, brightness, contrast and dot density are examples of visual 
properties of targets that have been shown to affect saccades (Deubel, 1996). 
However, as saccades normally land on the centre-of-gravity o f overall shapes, it 
appears that physical salience may not be the determining factor in target 
selection, since these seem to be perceived holistically. Findlay (1982) coined the 
term “global effect” to define the tendency of our visual system to compute global 
characteristics of objects before saccades are programmed.
When objects are in clutter, as in natural scenes, the visual system has to be 
capable of discriminating objects from the background. Some researchers (e.g. 
Neisser, 1967) believe this is possible by means of pre-attentive vision, which is 
capable of instantaneous texture discrimination and works in parallel over most of 
the visual field. Attentive vision would then be used to bring focus to small areas 
o f the scene pre-attentively identified as a gradient o f texture. In the planning of 
saccades (amplitude and direction), the visual system needs to extract sensory 
information in order to segregate objects from the background (Deubel, 1996). 
Additional evidence for a global processing of more than one object comes from a 
study by Ottes, van Gisbergen and Eggermont (1984), where when two targets 
were presented simultaneously, the first saccade tended to land at their common
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centre-of-gravity (provided they were not separated by more than 45 degrees), 
where more information could be integrated for processing.
Studies on the “useful field o f view” (the section of the visual field where useful 
information for the task at hand can be acquired) have also provided evidence for 
a global scene inspection. Saida and Ikeda (1979) carried out a series of 
experiments in order to determine how far away from the fovea can information 
be used to perceive whole pictures. They showed that the size of the useful field 
of view was a function of the amount of picture that remains visible and not the 
actual size of the visual field. Increasing the visual field did not improve picture 
recognition after a certain point (usually 50% of the picture size). The scan paths 
obtained in their study suggest that whilst scanning a picture, observers make use 
of eccentric global information to guide their next eye movement. The fact that 
visual acuity (and other visual abilities) decreases as eccentricity increases does 
not seem to affect the acquisition of sufficient peripheral information, which is 
used to guide the next eye movement (Shioiri and Ikeda, 1989). Low resolution 
seems to be enough to provide the necessary context information for developing a 
representation of the whole scene and its semantics and guide eye movements.
Analyses o f eye movement behaviour have been widely used in an attempt to 
understand visual exploration of scenes and which elements within it receive 
preference during this process. The first systematic approach to this issue was 
carried out by Buswell (1935). After analysing the distribution o f fixations using a 
large number o f different stimuli, Buswell concluded that eye movements were 
tightly related to the semantic information in the scenes. Since then, other 
researchers such have highlighted this, with very elegant paradigms such as 
Yarbus’s (1967) Unexpected Visitor experiment described above.
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1.2.3 Change blindness and change detection
For the last decade, many researchers have been particularly interested in our 
striking failure to detect substantial changes to objects and scenes (e.g. Aginsky 
and Tarr, 2000; Grimes, 1996; Mondy and Coltheart, 2000; O’Regan, Deubel, 
Clark and Rensink, 2000; Rensink, O’Regan and Clark, 1997; Simons and Levin, 
1998; Triesch, Ballard, Hayhoe and Sullivan, 2003), a phenomenon known as 
change blindness. Poor performance in change detection experiments gave rise to 
many theoretical questions concerning attention and the representation of visual 
information. However, work on a variety o f areas within cognitive psychology 
was the tacit starting point of the current enthusiasm for change blindness long 
before it became a ubiquitous theme in more recent journals. For example, early 
research on visual integration which was concerned with how we form a stable 
image o f the world given that we are constantly moving our eyes, heads and 
bodies (e.g. Irwin, 1991, O’Regan and Lévy-Schoen, 1983), gave origin to many 
studies on change detection, since both areas raise issues about how we store 
information from one view of the world to the next. Moreover, the incomplete 
nature o f memories, which was the focus o f Bartlett’s (1932) work and many 
early researchers (e.g. Friedman, 1979; Hasher and Griffin, 1978; Kintsh and 
Bates, 1977) hinted at the lack of specificity of memory representations which has 
been suggested is at the core of change blindness (Simons and Levin, 1997). 
Although a large number of well-documented behaviours exhibited the same 
patterns as change blindness, active research in this area only began in the early 
90s.
Several experimental paradigms have been used to investigate change detection.
A common basis for all o f them is the fact that changes are difficult to detect 
during a saccade or a blink because there is an interruption on the visual 
continuity o f the input. Any attention-grabbing transient caused by the change 
would be “masked” by the interruption to the overall display. This was clearly 
illustrated in the work by McConkie and Zola (1979) where the ability to detect a 
saccade-contingent change was extremely poor. Based on this assumption.
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researchers have developed several methods to simulate saccades by introducing 
brief interruptions to the visual transient, during which a change would be 
occurring somewhere in the visual stimulus -  induced change blindness (Rensink 
et al, 1997). Early experiments (e.g. Pashler, 1988) using simple arrays involved 
the display of two stimuli (the second o f which changed in half of the trials) 
separated by a brief interval, and participants had to respond whether a change 
had occurred. More recently, Rensink and his colleagues developed the “flicker” 
paradigm, which involves inserting a blank screen o f very short duration between 
the original stimulus and a changed version of that stimulus, usually differing by 
one object feature (e.g. colour, position, presence/absence o f one item, etc.). This 
results in a sequence o f alternated views of each version, with brief interruptions, 
normally for a limited period of time. Often, participants are asked to find the 
change and report it verbally. Other experimental manipulations involve 
separating the original and changed versions of the stimulus by a “mudsplash” - a 
random pattern of dots, which creates transient disruptions on a local level 
(O’Regan, Rensink and Clark, 1999) - or using a forced-choice recognition task 
between the original and the changed versions of the scene (Friedman, 1979; 
Simons, 1996).
Change blindness has been consistently observed across a variety o f stimuli such 
as arrays of objects (e.g. Simons, 1996), photographs of natural scenes (e.g. 
Grimes, 1996), films (e.g. Simons, 1996) and real-world interactions (e.g. Simons 
and Levin, 1998). Most o f these studies found that people are blind to change 
even if their task goal is to look for a change (Simons, 2000). Despite the variety 
in methodological approaches, results have always been extremely robust, with 
many substantial changes going unnoticed, and when they were noticed, 
participants take on average 20 seconds to detect them (Shapiro, 2000). For 
example. Grimes (1997) gave participants a set of photographs to examine in 
preparation for a later memory test. During examination, certain elements in the 
photographs would change when participants’ eyes moved. Even when told that 
they should report whether elements in the photographs changed, participants 
failed to notice 70% of the changes. Similar results using colour photographs of
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scenes were obtained by Rensink et al (1997), where significant changes, such 
deleting a prominent object or changing an object’s colour from blue to red 
(average size of 20 square degrees of visual angle), took an average of 8 seconds 
to be detected and some changes were only noticed after 50 seconds.
Recently, the question of whether the robust findings in change blindness 
literature would extent to real-world interactions was tackled by Simons and 
Levin (1998). In their study, as they were walking on the street, participants were 
stopped by a person who was asking for directions. While they were engaged in 
conversation, two people carrying a door interrupted by passing between the 
participant and the person they were talking to, and a completely different person 
replaced the initial pedestrian. Surprisingly, only 50% of participants noticed this, 
despite the fact that not only the visual attributes o f the two people but also their 
voices were strikingly different.
An important finding of change blindness studies is that performance seems to 
depend on the position o f the changed object within the scene. Changes to 
thematically “central” objects (define the main theme of the scene) are usually 
detected twice as faster than changes to objects in areas of “marginal interest” 
(O’Regan et al, 2000; Rensink et al, 1997). According to this research, because 
central interest areas are likely to receive attention, change detection is likely to 
require attention. Further evidence that attention is important for change detection 
came from a study by Currie, McConkie, Carlson-Radvansky and Irwin (1995), 
who found that change detection increased significantly when the change was 
made to the saccade target. Similarly, O’Regan et al (2000) have shown that 
change detection increased as the distance from the eyes to the change location 
decreased. From any eccentricity above 2 degrees of visual angle, change 
detection remained constant at a value as low as 10%. In line with the previous 
considerations, Rensink et al (1997) and O’Regan et al (2000) have put forward 
the notion that change detection is closely linked to attention, which would lead to 
thematically important areas o f a scene receiving more or earlier deployment of 
attention. However, in some cases, changes to central objects are missed.
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especially in incidental conditions, which indicates that attention (fixations) may 
not be sufficient and that some encoding of the original features is necessary 
(Simons, 2000). Evidence from this comes from a study by Simons (1996), where 
participants were prompted to look for a change within an array of five objects in 
which a change was visible after a blank screen was presented. Results showed 
that when an object switched places with another object or when it was replaced 
by a different object, participants were very poor at reporting a change. The 
findings from this study suggest that attention is not enough for change detection, 
considering the task goal was change detection and that observers were inevitably 
focusing their attention on the objects that could potentially be changed. Similar 
results were reported by Ballard, Hayhoe and Pelz (1995), who found that during 
a task of copying a sequence of blocks presented in a screen, observers rarely 
noticed a block changing colour despite the fact that they were constantly 
assessing the visual input. Similarly, using virtual reality settings, Treisch,
Ballard, Hayhoe and Sullivan (2003) found that even when participants fixate and 
track an object they are picking up to move somewhere else, they often fail to 
notice considerable size changes to that object.
When eye movements were measured in subsequent studies, Simons (2000) found 
that when the primary task was change detection, observers tended to look at all 
the objects in the display, but this proved to be insufficient to detect most 
changes. According to Rensink et al (1997), change detection is mediated by a 
narrow attention bottleneck and only a limited amount of information can be 
attended at. This may depend on the task at hand (Ballard et al, 1995). Similarly, 
Shapiro (2000) argues that to increase the chances (or decrease the detection 
latency) that a changed attribute is detected, attention needs to be directed to the 
specific attribute, rather than just the object where the attribute is changing. 
Furthermore, by examining eye position during changes, O’Regan et al (2000) 
found that even when participants were fixating directly at the location o f the 
change, they failed to notice 40% of changes, a phenomenon the authors defined 
as looking without seeing. According to them it is not the position of the eyes that
22
determine change detection but the aspects o f the scene being perceived and 
changed.
Most explanations o f change blindness rest on empirical evidence from studies 
investigating a variety o f issues, such as the limited capacity o f short-term visual 
memory (e.g. Potter, 1976; Irwin, 1996), the incompleteness of recall (e.g. Spear,
1978), visual integration (e.g. Jonides, Irwin and Yantis, 1982), false or distorted 
memories (e.g. Bartlett, 1932; Kozminsky, 1977), and eyewitness testimony (e.g. 
Loftus, 1979). However, the reasons behind change blindness are still a matter of 
debate.
For some time, researchers believed that change blindness was closely linked to 
the limited capacity of our short-term visual memory (O’Regan, 1992). Rensink et 
al (1997) have disputed this assumption by showing that change detection does 
not depend on memory load. In addition, by providing participants with a verbal 
cue about the change about to occur, performance increased significantly. Many 
explanations o f change blindness rest on the lack of specificity of memory 
representations or the lack of representations altogether (e.g. Irwin, 1991 ; 
O’Regan, 1992). If, as we perceive the world, little detail is abstracted, 
information is easily replaced by a “new” version of that world, as long as 
coherence is maintained. When details need to be verified, we can always probe 
the environment using eye movements. Then again, some researchers (e.g.
Simons and Rensink, 2005) argue that the behavioural outcomes during 
experiments using such paradigm may not necessarily be the result o f a lack of 
representation o f the visual features of the original objects or scenes, which is 
overwritten by the representation of the changed version. Detailed representations 
o f the initial features may be formed but decay rapidly (Rensink, 2000). On the 
other hand, it could be argued that the original stimulus is actually represented 
and stored in a durable form, but the second version fails to be encoded. Evidence 
for this came from a study by Simons (1996) in which participants often failed to 
detect a change but when asked to describe certain objects in the scene, they often 
described their original features rather than the changed features. Furthermore,
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representations may exist but may not be able to be extracted by a method such as 
change detection, which usually involves explicit report.
In summary, change blindness has been linked to attention and the dynamic 
development of memory representations, two processes closely linked to scene 
perception. Hence, many paradigms reported in the change blindness literature 
provide useful tools to a better understanding o f high-level scene perception.
1.2.4 Scene and object memory
The process of scene perception has often been investigated indirectly using 
memory tasks. The assumption behind this method lies in the fact that what is 
remembered after scene viewing can provide insight into what happened during 
scene viewing.
Scene memory
Standing (1973) showed that people are able to recognise a vast number o f 
previously viewed pictures, hinting at a high-capacity episodic memory system 
for visual information. However, the idea o f highly detailed veridical 
representations of the world has been challenged many times over (e.g. Ballard, 
Hayhoe and Pelz, 1995; Henderson, 1997; Hollingworth and Henderson, 2002; 
Irwin, 1991; Jonides, Irwin and Yantis, 1982; McConkie and Zola, 1979; Rensink, 
2000; O’Regan, 1992). For example, Simons and Levin (1997) examined the 
process of memory for pictures and found that observers retain mainly the 
essential more global contents of a picture but not other low-level properties, such 
as spatial location of items within the scene. Furthermore, visual short-term 
memory (VSTM) has been said to hold only 3 to 4 previously attended objects 
(Irwin, 1992) and during scene perception, visual detail is likely to decay and be 
replaced by an abstract meaning-based representation. However, information that
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has been stored may not always be retrievable by the tasks used in many 
experimental paradigms, like the change detection paradigm. Implicit measures 
have been used by some researchers to tackle this problem (e.g. Hollingworth and 
Henderson, 2002; Hollingworth, Williams and Henderson, 2001; Ryan and 
Cohen, 2004), and the results o f these studies suggest that other more sensitive 
measure should be used if  inferences are to be made regarding the detail available 
in visual representations. In fact, recent studies have shown that memory for 
scenes and their elements can be quite good (Castelhano and Henderson, 2005; 
Hollingworth, 2005). Castelhano and Henderson (2005) have proposed that the 
development of representations for scene context is incidental and is likely to 
reflect a natural by-product o f scene perception.
Object memory
A common method used to investigate memory o f objects is the two-alternative 
forced-choice recognition (2-AFC) task (e.g. Hollingworth and Henderson, 2002; 
Goodman, 1980; Mandler and Parker, 1976). Most of the studies that employed 
such method have found that recognition for basic-level alternatives (e.g. kitchen 
vs. living room; Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson and Boyes-Braem, 1976) can be 
quite good, and the same has been observed for object types (e.g. Friedman, 1979; 
Pezdek, Whetstone, Stoeckert and Dougherty, 1988). Recognition performance 
for object categories at the basic level is likely to be faster than at other levels 
because these categories maximise the differences between their constituent 
elements (McCotter, Gosselin, Sowden and Schyns, 2005).
As described in the previous section, many change detection studies have 
demonstrated that people do not form veridical visual representations for objects 
in scenes. Castelhano and Henderson (2005) have argued that change detection 
can improve significantly if the objects are fixated, which suggests memory 
representations about objects improve if  attention is allocated to them. In this 
view, poor change detection occurs not because there are no visual representations
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but because people may only encode the initial version, or the final version of the 
object, or because they may only retrieve the initial version.
Recently, Hollingworth (2005) carried out a study to challenge the common belief 
that memory representations are normally poor. In a typical trial, participants 
viewed a scene for 20 seconds and then a single target object was presented in the 
middle o f the display. When the target object disappeared, participants had to use 
the mouse to estimate their location in the scene they previously saw. In some 
conditions the target was absent from the initial scene and in others it was present. 
A third condition where no scene was presented was also included to ascertain 
how participants’ knowledge o f the world can assist them in estimating probable 
locations for objects, given they saw only one object (target object). Performance 
was measured as the Euclidian distance from the centre of the object in its original 
position to the x and y coordinates of the response and expressed in degrees of 
visual angle. Results show that participants were better at estimating the position 
of the target object when it was present in the scene, followed by when it was 
absent and then by when no scene was displayed. The performance obtained for 
the first two conditions was considered by Hollingworth to be fairly accurate, 
suggesting that memory for objects in scenes is better than thought before. In 
addition, mean error rates for the target absent condition were low (4.5°), which 
indicates that memory for scene layout information was retained in order for 
participants to make estimates of where objects may be found. This is likely to be 
assisted by knowledge about where those objects usually appear (e.g. a toaster is 
normally found on top of counters). However, these results should be considered 
with caution. Memory for location does not necessarily mean memory for visual 
detail. A similar argument can be made o f recall memory, which reflects 
knowledge of presence/absence of objects in scenes. Furthermore, the stimuli 
used in the experiment were fairly simple computer generated images (no 
shadows, textures, etc, as found in real-world photographs), and participants were 
pre-empting a memory test. In incidental real-world situations, object memory is 
likely to be worse. In addition, participants showed systematic bias to position the 
objects towards the centre of the scene, which is likely to reflect strategies to
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reduce error. To test memory in incidental conditions, Castelhano and Henderson 
(2005) carried out an experiment where memory in a visual search task was 
compared with memory in a memorisation task. They found that for objects 
fixated at least once during scene inspection, recognition memory was above 
change. The lowest performances was achieved in the first block of the visual 
search task (64.8%), when the foil was another object of the same basic-level 
category, and in the first block of the same task when the foil was a mirror image 
of the target object (60.8%). The researchers conclude that information about 
objects present in scenes is encoded (and retrievable), even when the primary goal 
o f the observer is not to commit objects to memory, and after observers had seen 
many objects between fixating the probed target and the memory test.
1.2.4.1 Memory tests
Memory paradigms have been widely used in research investigating the 
development o f scene and object representations. In the experiments reported in 
this thesis that involved memory tasks, two methods were used: recall and 
recognition. Many researchers have studied recall and recognition, but the 
underlying mechanisms that control these two processes are still a matter of 
debate. The two tasks share both similar and opposite results. Accuracy in the two 
tests increases with study time, fewer items to encode and shorter delays between 
study and test. However, with word lists, presenting more high frequency words 
increases recall but decreases recognition, and instructions that encourage 
rehearsal increase recognition but have no effect on recall (Nobel and Shiffrin, 
2001). The appeal of using these two methods in the experiments reported in this 
thesis lies precisely on these contrasting results. Free recall and visual recognition 
are considered to be methods of extracting qualitatively different information.
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Free recall
Free recall involves the serial generation o f items in any order from a previously 
experienced episode, such a list o f words, a story or a scene. It is typically 
associated with context and identifiable episodes (Nobel and Shiffrin, 2001). 
These items are subsequently assessed in order to determine whether they 
belonged to the episode or not (Engelkamp and Zimmer, 2001). Free recall 
depends on relational information: when there are strong relationships between 
the items to be recalled (i.e. when they can be grouped categorically), memory 
performance is enhanced (Engelkamp and Zimmer, 2001). According to Cooke, 
Durso and Schvaneveldt (1986) this is due to the fact that memory itself is 
organised in order to facilitate recall. Viewing a coherent scene will immediately 
evoke pre-experiment learned categories especially if the scene contains many 
elements with strong relationships amongst them. When memory is probed by 
reinstating context information, the categories evoked by the scene context will 
activate potential items that naturally occur within them, and these will take 
precedence in firee recall listing. Recalling an item may activate a memory trace 
for a closely associated item within that category (which may or may not have 
been present). Malmberg and Shiffrin (2005) have proposed that during encoding 
of every item, there is a fixed amount of context information that is stored 
simultaneously with the item’s information. When items share strong 
contextual/semantic characteristics, this context is reinstated every time a related 
item is found. Free recall is likely to increase for items that are processed at the 
semantic level (meaning) rather than at feature level (physical characteristics) 
(Malmberg and Shiffrin, 2005). Recall reports are likely to include both 
information based on long-term knowledge and episodic information generated by 
the recently experienced episode. Recalling umelated information is mainly 
episodic because it cannot rely on long-term categorical knowledge and 
associations between recalled items. For this information to be retrieved it was to 
be encoded by means o f a different mechanism than related information. Some 
researchers have proposed that these items are encoded on a basis of the one-off
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co-occurrence with the rest o f the items within that specific episode (Engelkamp 
and Zimmer, 2001).
Recognition
In recognition tests, generation o f potential candidates for retrieval is not 
necessary, since they are provided by the experimenter. Retrieval in recognition is 
said to be a single-step parallel matching process as opposed to a sequential 
search in memory required in free recall (Nobel and Shiffrin, 2001). Recognition 
performance is therefore independent o f context. Because of this, retrieval during 
recognition tasks may depend on how much attention objects have received 
during encoding (Mamlberg and Shiffrin, 2005).
Recognition memory has been widely used as a measure o f processing in scenes 
(e.g. Saida and Ikeda, 1979; Shioiri and Ikeda, 1989). One example is 
discrimination between two objects or scenes, which is said to provide a good 
measure of processing since it involves not only naming but also access to an 
internal representation o f the picture (Loftus and Bell, 1975). These issues will be 
addressed in more detail in later sections.
1.3 The Issues of this Thesis: Schemata and Scene Perception
The apparent ease and efficiency with which we perceive and comprehend 
everyday real world scenes clearly belies an enormous computational problem 
undertaken by the visual system. Some theoretical accounts of this problem 
usually involve a number of key elements which include access to pre-existing 
knowledge (schemata), the distribution o f visual attention and the deployment o f 
eye-movements which combine to employ an efficient strategy to construct a 
putative internal representation of the scene being viewed (e.g. De Graef, 
Christians and d’Ydewalle, 1990; Friedman, 1979; Goodman, 1980; Henderson,
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Weeks and Hollingworth, 1999; Loftus and Mackworth, 1978). A key aspect in 
the efficiency of scene perception, given the well-documented attentional 
bottleneck (Broadbent, 1957) is undoubtedly attention-memory interactions as 
processes based on memory resources that can rapidly direct the allocation of 
visual attention to particular objects.
Results from numerous studies support the idea that scene semantics, expectations 
or schemata mediate the allocation of attention (Loftus and Mackworth, 1978; 
Friedman, 1979; Friedman and Liebelt, 1981; De Graef, Christians and 
d’Ydewalle, 1990; Henderson, Weeks and Hollingworth, 1999) and memory for 
the scene and/or objects within that scene (Friedman, 1979; Goodman, 1980, 
Brewer and Treyens, 1981, Pezdek, Whetstone, Reynolds, Askari and Dougherty, 
1989; French and Richards, 1993). Retrieval of knowledge from long-term 
memory is effortless and is likely to occur at very early stages of scene onset 
(Friedman, 1979). When a scene is displayed, knowledge can be automatically 
activated and mediate the dynamic processing of the world. This process is likely 
to involve differential allocation of attention, and affect the internal 
representations we develop as we perceive that world.
The next sections will deal specifically with the effect o f schemata on different 
aspects of scene perception. An introduction to schema theory will be followed by 
the effect o f schemata on eye-movement behaviour, change detection in scenes 
that instantiate schemata and the effects o f schemata on memory.
1.3.1 Introduction to schema theory
The concept of schema was intensely investigated by Sir Frederick Bartlett in 
1932. In his research on memory for stories, Bartlett defined remembering as a 
reconstructive process built upon knowledge (schema) acquired from past 
experience, which serves as a basis for integrating new knowledge. In order to 
reproduce an event, people have to rely on their long-term stored knowledge and
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on whichever details they can remember from the actual event, a process called 
reconstruction. Whatever information from the actual event is not retrieved will 
be replaced by “probable detail” that exists in the default instantiated (retrieved or 
activated) knowledge. In Bartlett’s view, schemata were used for understanding 
and remembering information, more specifically for reconstructing events. Of 
particular importance to the work reported in this thesis is Bartlett’s definition of 
schema as an active organisation of past reactions and experiences. Similarly, 
Piaget (1971) argued for this notion of action-oriented knowledge by saying that 
"Any piece of knowledge is connected with an action ... [T]o know an object or a 
happening is to make use of it by assimilation into an action schema ... [namely] 
whatever there is in common between various repetitions or superpositions of the 
same action" (pp. 6-7). Many psychologists have used and refined this generic 
concept. A more specific proposal was put forward by Minsky (1975), who 
introduced the concept offrame, which he defined as structural knowledge about 
familiar events containing information about what would be expected to happen 
in an event of a particular kind and in a particular time order. Similarly, Shank 
and Abelson (1977) defined scripts as knowledge about particular events, 
containing more specific information about the contents of that event than a 
frame. Schemas, frames and scripts all share similar mechanisms. The processing 
of information contained in an event is mediated by the activation o f a knowledge 
structure, which extracts mainly the gist o f the event, whereby surface 
information is lost. Interpretation of this information will accord with the 
instantiated schema and be integrated with pre-existing knowledge. Ensuing 
reconstruction o f the event will be once more supported by the active schema and 
include any recently acquired accessible information (Alba and Hasher, 1983). 
Such mechanisms can adequately explain the well-documented incompleteness 
(due to the selection o f only a subset o f the total information available) and 
distortions (due to false memories created by inferences) that occur in memory.
Evidence supporting schema theory has claimed that without the instantiation (i.e. 
activation) of knowledge to provide contextual support, integration of new 
knowledge is impaired and memory is poor (Thorndike, 1977). This was clearly
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shown in a study by Bransford and Johnson (1972, Exp. 1) in which participants 
were provided with highly abstract and complicated passages with no title. When 
asked to recall those passages, participants performed very poorly. Likewise, 
providing cues after stimulus processing has been shown to have the same effect 
as if  no cues have been provided which would correspond to a lack o f a guiding 
schema (Bransford and Johnson, 1973). In addition, without schematic guidance 
information may be difficult to process. In Mandler’s (1978) experiments based 
on firame theory, when participants read stories in which the information was 
presented in an unexpected order, their memory for the stories was impaired. A 
similar result was obtained by Bransford and Johnson (1972, Exp. 2-4). Further 
evidence that schemata provide support for information processing came from a 
study by Pitchert and Anderson (1977) on story processing. They used two 
descriptions of a house that could be seen fi-om two different perspectives 
(potential buyer vs. burglar), and which were mutually exclusive in terms of the 
relevance of the information contained in them. Participants were consistently 
better at recalling information that was relevant to the perspective they had read it 
fi-om. This suggests that only one schema was activated and each specific schema 
guided the processing of the information contained in the story.
In summary, most accounts of schema theory agree that schemata are used as an 
inexpensive basis for perceiving the world to which new episodic information can 
be added. They provide the basis to distinguish two events that instantiate the 
same schema by representing umelated information separately (Friedman, 1979).
Persistent problems with schema theory lie in the original deterministic nature of 
its central assumptions, together with the fact that it’s been loosely used for many 
decades to explain a wide range o f phenomena across different literatures. Despite 
this, modem schema theories still use Bartlett’s concept but they reject its 
functionalism and holism (Brewer, 2000). Currently, schemata are generally 
interpreted as active top-down mediators of processes such as memory, attention 
and perception. Schemata have been show to operate with a variety o f information 
and tasks, such as lists of words (e.g. Bower, Clark, Lesgold and Winzenz, 1969),
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prose (e.g. Pass and Schumacher, 1981), category learning tasks (e.g. Sakamoto 
and Love, 2004), cartoon-like drawings (e.g. Goodman, 1980), 2-dimensional 
complex scenes (e.g. Friedman, 1979), everyday objects (e.g. French and 
Richards, 1993), recorded videos of real-world scenes (e.g. Neuschatz, Lampinen, 
Preston, Hawkins and Toglia, 2002) and real-world 3-dimensional environments 
(e.g. Brewer and Treyens, 1981; Lampinen, Copeland and Neuschatz, 2001; 
Pezdek et al, 1989).
In this thesis, the concept of schema has been borrowed in order to communicate 
the idea of a knowledge structure that holds general thematic knowledge about a 
domain that encapsulates past experience, with highly specific default 
assumptions. No claims about the central assumptions o f the original schema 
theory are intended. The work reported in this thesis aims to use the concept and 
some of the notions contained in the original general theory and apply it to a 
specific scope of research: scene perception. More precisely, the purpose o f this 
thesis is to apply this theoretical framework to perception of scenes depicting 
salient actions, which in turn activate “action-schemata”. Other similar (but less 
known) constructs such as frames or scripts seemed less adequate because they 
incur restrictions that are specific to events that occur in a specific time order. The 
term of action-schema employed throughout this thesis refers to pre-existing 
knowledge about actions, which is activated when the information contained in a 
scene is organised around a well-known action theme, depicted by a salient actor 
performing the action, surrounded by plausible objects. The choice of the term 
“action-schemata” was based on a number of considerations. This concept had 
already been used in previous (but somewhat out-of-date) research (Goodman, 
1980), which did not include some important aspects of perception, such as the 
relationship between the deployment o f attention within a scene and memory for 
the scene. Furthermore, actions offer very little ambiguity about the objects 
associated with them because they are used to assist in the completion of a 
specific goal, whereas objects found in places (Brewer and Treyens, 1981; 
Lampinen et al, 2001), for example, might depend on other contextual factors (the 
objects usually found in a private house’s kitchen may differ from the objects
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found in a kitchen from a bakery store). The more generic a schema is, the more 
propositions it contains (Friedman, 1979). It should be noted that every time the 
concept action-schema is mentioned throughout this thesis, it merely refers to the 
knowledge that becomes active as people see 2-dimensional scenes depicting 
salient actions.
1.3.2 How schemata affect eye movements
Different stimuli characteristics can have different effects on eye-movement 
behaviour. For example, Henderson, Pollatsek and Rayner (1987) showed that 
when the foveated object was meaningless fixations were shorter, and the next 
object to be fixated benefited from additional attention. O f particular interest to 
this thesis are stimulus characteristics that are closely linked with contextual 
meaning or semantic composition, hence with schemata. One such characteristic 
is stimulus plausibility or predictability within a specific context. These concepts 
are closely linked to the concept of informativeness introduced by Mackworth and 
Morandi (1967). They asked a sample o f observers to rate pictures on the basis of 
how easy it to be to recognise them at a later stage. Antes (1974) used 
informativeness as a measure o f the amount o f information provided by a specific 
region o f a scene. Results from these and other studies (e.g. Yarbus, 1967) 
showed that in natural scenes, highly informative regions attract eye movements. 
Because informativeness is a direct measure of how much information is given by 
a particular region about the whole scene, a highly informative region would 
contain information that is important for the understanding of the scene (or for the 
task at hand). This concept, however, is not a property o f the scene but it is related 
to the context of the scene and the inherent expectations of the observer about it 
(Loftus and Mackworth, 1978), particularly because a measure such as 
informativeness depends o f subjective ratings. More recently the concept of 
informativeness has been used to express the semantic consistency of a particular 
area of a scene with the context of that scene (e.g. Henderson, Weeks and
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Hollingworth, 1999; Hollingworth and Henderson, 2000), where informative 
regions are said to contain contextually inconsistent information.
Loftus and Mackworth (1978) carried out pioneering work on the effects of scene 
and object semantics on eye-movement behaviour. They took care in maintaining 
visual informativeness constant by exchanging objects between scenes, i.e. only 
the semantic relationship between the object and the scene’s context could 
account for differences in eye-movement behaviour. They showed that 
semantically informative objects, considered unpredictable within the overall 
context of the scene (e.g. an octopus in a farm), received on average earlier 
fixations, more fixations overall and saccades to those objects were longer than to 
contextually predictable objects. Albeit critical for the development of studies that 
related eye-movement data to schemata, the purpose o f Loftus and Mackworth’s 
(1978) study was not to investigate schematic effects on eye movements. A year 
later, Friedman (1979) carried out pioneering work that related eye-movement 
data directly to a schema-like theory: frame theory. Frames are akin to schemas 
insofar as they represent global knowledge about a domain and are used to guide 
perception. Whilst viewing detailed scenes depicting places, participants’ eye 
movements were recorded. As an object was viewed for the first time and second 
time, fixation durations were on average approximately 300 ms longer for frame- 
unexpected objects (rated on the basis of likelihood) than for frame-expected 
objects. This difference decreased as time elapsed. In summary, these studies 
suggested that eye-behaviour was strongly influenced by the semantic 
characteristics o f the objects present in a scene in relation to the schematic context 
o f that scene.
Since then, many researchers have investigated different eye-movement measures 
in meaningful scenes and reported that eye-movement behaviour during scene 
viewing is influenced by contextual relationships (Antes and Penland, 1981; De 
Graef, 1998; De Graef, Christiaens and d’Ydewalle, 1990; Henderson, Weeks and 
Hollingworth, 1999). Much consensus exists when it comes to eye-movement 
behaviour with contextually consistent and contextually inconsistent objects.
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Shorter total viewing duration (e.g. Henderson et al, 1999), shorter gaze durations 
(e.g. Antes and Penland, 1981; Friedman, 1979; Loftus and Mackworth, 1978), 
shorter first fixation durations (e.g. De Graef et al, 1990; Friedman, 1979) and 
shorter saccadic amplitudes (e.g. Loftus and Mackworth, 1978) have been 
reported for consistent objects when they are encountered in scenes. Overall, 
these objects do not seem to draw attention. On the other hand, refixations are 
likely to occur more often with inconsistent objects (Henderson et al. 1999;
Loftus and Mackworth. 1978; Mackworth and Morandi, 1967) and attention, 
measured in the indices described above is likely to be drawn to or at least 
captured by them. Taken together, the results obtained by the studies reviewed 
here provide support for a knowledge-driven scene inspection mechanism.
1.3.3 Schemata and change detection
As discussed above, the change blindness (CB) paradigm has been used to 
investigate many issues related to perception and the development of visual 
representations. This is because the CB paradigm can provide insight into whether 
processing resources are expended differentially according to the nature o f the 
information present within a scene. Specifically, change blindness provides a 
measure of allocation o f attention other than eye movements (CB as an 
experimental paradigm), and can throw light into the process o f storage o f visual 
information during perception (CB as a tool to investigate specific research 
questions). Thus, a connection between schemata and change blindness becomes 
almost intuitive.
Theoretical conclusions from the change blindness literature suggest a close link 
between the failure to detect change and many phenomena of “incompleteness”, 
such as the attentional blink (Shapiro, 2000) or memory distortions (e.g. Singer,
1979), which are characterised by an inability to fully represent veridical visual 
information, and closely linked to the use of schemata during online perception. 
Furthermore, Ryan and Cohen (2004) have proposed that change detection is
36
affected by both information from long-term memory stores and working memory 
about the current precept and that both work in parallel to guide the online 
encoding and affect subsequent scene processing.
Evidence from change blindness studies suggests that attention is needed for a 
change to be detected. This idea stems from the finding that changes in more 
important or meaningful areas of a scene are detected faster (Rensink, O’Regan 
and Clark, 1997). It is argued that those areas allow for the rapid abstraction of 
the gist (schema) of a scene and are explored at scene onset. “Central” areas o f a 
scene are likely to provide the basis for the abstraction of the contents of the 
whole scene (Simons and Levin, 1997). Schemata provide expectations for those 
contents, therefore are likely to affect where people look, which type of 
information is encoded at different stages of scene viewing, and to which degree 
of specificity.
Change blindness research has been motivated by the idea that only very little of 
what we see is actually retained in short-term visual memory for longer than a few 
seconds (Currie, McConkie, Carlson-Radvansky and Irwin, 1995; Irwin, 1991; 
McConkie and Zola, 1979). It is argued that we are blind to change because we do 
not develop representations with persisting accurate detail about the elements in a 
scene. Many o f these studies have employed change detection paradigms to 
investigate this issue, proposing that change detection depends on maintaining 
information from successive views of the stimulus. O f critical importance to this 
thesis is what factors determine what information is preserved (if any) and what 
type of information is preserved to allow a smooth perception o f the world. Early 
work on visual integration using a reading task showed that changing the case of 
alternate letters (e.g. AlTeRnAtE to aLtErNaTe) during a saccade did not affect 
performance and was not noticed by most of the participants (McConkie and 
Zola, 1979). This finding suggests that the visual form of the words was not 
encoded but rather participants focused on their meaning so that the task o f 
reading was not disrupted. Similar results have been obtained using objects 
(Henderson, 1997). These findings indicate that people are likely to represent the
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gist or the necessary information for the task at hand but not the visual form of the 
elements involved in the task.
In change detection paradigms, representations containing rich detail are likely to 
pertain to attended, unexpected items, rather than to schematically consistent 
objects. Work on scene frames by Friedman (1979) showed that observers were 
more likely to perform better on a forced-choice recognition test of entire scenes 
when the foils contained changes to schema-inconsistent objects. Friedman 
argued that schema-inconsistent information was more likely to have attracted 
attention and been encoded with richer visual detail because it violated the overall 
gist of the scene. Evidence for superior change detection for semantically 
inconsistent objects came from a study by Hollingworth and Henderson (2000). In 
an experiment using the flicker paradigm, participants were faster at detecting 
changes to semantically inconsistent objects (a hydrant in a living room) than 
changes to semantically consistent objects (a chair in a living room). This 
inconsistent object advantage was also observed when only one cycle of the 
flicker was presented. As in O’Regan et al’s (2000) study, Hollingworth and 
Henderson found that this effect was not caused solely by the differential 
allocation o f eye fixations, suggesting that eye movements may not be enough to 
understand attentional mechanisms during perception. Change detection for gist 
should be at chance level. Equally, any change that would not alter the overall 
meaning o f the scene is likely to go unnoticed. Whether the original or changed 
version of the visual percept is encoded, if  the scene gist remains the same, we are 
likely to assume that all visual details remained the same, since detailed visual 
information for gist is likely to be unavailable for comparison. Although we move 
our eyes on average 3 to 4 times per second, the world does not change from one 
fixation to another. Our inability to perceive changes may rely on this kind of 
knowledge rather than on perceptual issues (Simons, 2000). Nevertheless, it has 
been shown that some visual properties o f consistent information are available. 
However, changes to them remained unnoticed and participants often described 
properties of both the original and changed element as if  they were present in one 
scene only (Dmytryk, 1984).
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Taken together, the findings described here suggest that the semantic properties of 
objects (defined by an active schema) may determine what type o f information is 
likely to receive focused attention and is likely to be maintained from successive 
views of a scene. Within the framework o f this thesis, change blindness provides 
a valuable tool to infer on attentional and representational issues of schema-driven 
scene perception.
1.3.4 How schemata affect scene encoding
Schemata mediate encoding of information by selecting part of the information 
available in the visual input, and provide a structure to represent specific instances 
of events. According to Logie (1995) the sensory input activates the long-term 
memory representations first. The information contained in these representations 
becomes available in working memory, which in turn guides on-line processing. 
This section aims to review the research on how schemata affect memory for 
scenes which is most relevant to this thesis.
Most early work within the framework of schema theory claims that information 
that is congruent with an instantiated schema is more likely to be encoded 
(Kozminsky, 1977; Thorndike, 1977; see Alba and Hasher, 1983 for a review). 
This is one of the central predictions of schema theory. Most studies of that time 
(e.g. Bobrow, 1970; Shank, 1972), have proposed that the process of abstracting 
only the information gist (by activating the appropriate schema) leads to irrelevant 
information being lost, which can account for both the well-documented 
incompleteness o f memory and the poor recall of non-typical information 
(together with detail information such as form). In contrast, according to Shank 
and Abelson’s (1977) script theory, typical information does not need to be stored 
because it can rely on the prototypical script, and hence be inferred. In this view, 
non-typical information is more likely to leave stronger memory traces.
Regardless of this debate, schematic activation on stimulus onset is likely to
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reduce the amount o f information stored in short-term memory by relying on pre­
existing knowledge to infer on contextually consistent information. This 
assumption of schema theory has been prone to criticism because some studies 
have provided evidence that memory can be quite accurate (e.g. Kintsch and 
Bates, 1977). However, this and other studies (e.g. Pass and Schumacher, 1981), 
which provided evidence for the richness of stored information, only used recall 
memory performance. It is often found that direct comparisons are made between 
studies using different types of memory (recall vs. recognition). Faced with this 
problem. Alba, Alexander, Hasher and Caniglia (1981) proposed that schemata 
are likely to affect recall (which relies on contextual support o f the activated 
schema) but not recognition (which is independent ft-om context). This viewpoint 
gave rise to the idea that schemata operate only at retrieval and not at encoding, 
challenging the initial schema theory assumptions. Because recall can rely on 
retrieval cues it is likely to increase the accessibility of typical information. This 
suggests, however, that some of the information that is initially selected for 
encoding may never be retrieved because the retrieval mode (recall) has made it 
inaccessible, which could be the case of schema-inconsistent information, and not 
that schematic influences do not occur at encoding. Evidence for this came ft-om a 
study by Anderson and Pitchert (1978), who used a paradigm that changed the 
perspective of a story after it was read and found that information that once 
seemed irretrievable was now available.
One of the most influential studies to apply this theoretical flramework to pictures 
was Friedman’s (1979) study on the effect of frames on memory for pictures 
depicting places. A frame was defined as abstract knowledge, which could be 
physical or semantic in nature, organised into hierarchical systems and 
represented by stereotypical propositions. Friedman proposed that these higher- 
level structures interact with the low-level information incoming from the visual 
scene and are used to interpret that information, functioning as “semantic pattern 
analysers” (pg. 322). In her study, participants viewed pictures containing both 
expected (ftrame-consistent) and unexpected (frame-inconsistent) objects. 
Expected information, in other words, information that is consistent with the
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overall context of the scene, should be perceived effortlessly so the system can 
process unexpected information, which requires more resources. Thus, the 
ultimate role of frames is to provide an inexpensive basis to perceive the world so 
variant information can be used to distinguish events that instantiate the same 
frame. Thus, it is not useful to attend or memorise invariant information, i.e. 
information that is likely to occur in most scenes that instantiate the same frame. 
Friedman called this phenomenon “remembering by prototyping” (pg. 324), 
which in turn will lead to “forgetting by prototyping” (pg. 325). Memory for 
prototypical information is likely to be poor, whereas atypical information is 
likely to leave a strong memory trace. To test memory, Friedman used a forced- 
choice recognition test where scenes were paired with modified versions, where 
only one object had changed (deleted, re-located, or swapped by another object). 
As predicted by the frame theory arguments described above, unexpected objects 
were always better recognised than expected objects. A critical aspect of 
Friedman’s study is the distinction between episodic (whether an object was 
present or not) and descriptive (how did the object look like) information. In 
parallel with what it has been discussed about typical and atypical information, 
descriptive information will only be processed if  useful. That is, detail for typical 
information is likely to be ignored. Processing atypical objects requires more 
resources and involves more interaction between top-down and bottom-up 
mechanisms. Because of that, a representation at the object level (rather than at a 
global level) will most likely include descriptive information about those objects. 
This was confirmed by the results obtained in the recognition task, which depends 
largely on having access to descriptive information.
Most relevant for the purposes of this thesis is the study by Goodman (1980). 
Goodman investigated the role of action-schemata in the visual memory for 
scenes. An action-schema was defined as prototypical expectations associated 
with an everyday simple action (e.g. reading), which contained general 
assumptions about those actions and the objects associated with them, “based 
upon world knowledge of the action” (pg. 474). Hence, an action depicted in a 
scene would organise the information contained in it around the central theme of
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the action, and be used as an internal representation for the efficient perception of 
that scene. For an action-schema to be instantiated, the scene would have to 
contain an agent and at least an object being used to achieve a goal. The main 
hypothesis in Goodman’s study was that expectations pertaining to a specific 
action topic would lead to differences in the retention of information about the 
scene and its elements. She predicted that atypical information would be 
represented in detail based on the results obtained in previous studies (Friedman, 
1979; Loftus and Mackworth, 1978) that showed that elements that do not 
conform to the schema receive high levels of attention. In contrast, typical 
information would be represented according to the expectations generated by the 
schema. Similarly to the above mentioned studies that used text as stimuli, 
Goodman claimed that when information about the scene is not retrievable from 
memory during recall, it will be replaced by prototypical values according to 
default expectations pertaining to the action theme. When this happens, “true” 
information is lost leading to memory distortions. Because research in memory 
for text had established that schema-inconsistent information was not well 
recalled, Goodman introduced a distinction between memory for “presence” 
(episodic information) and memory for “appearance” (descriptive information). 
She argued that although recall o f “presence” memory for schema-inconsistent 
information may be poor, “appearance” information is likely to be well 
represented, and will be encoded separately from the main action-schema 
representation. After viewing the scenes, participants were asked to perform a free 
recall and a visual recognition test. Unlike recall, recognition memory does not 
depend on the activation of long-term knowledge. Results from Goodman’s 
experiments showed that objects that were consistent with the context of the 
action were found to be well recalled but poorly recognised, whereas inconsistent 
objects were found to be well recognised hwX poorly recalled. Using more 
sensitive measures like visual recognition ensured that recall memory for atypical 
information was very likely to be at chance levels. In order to test whether this 
effect was a result o f functional differences between free recall and visual 
recognition and to investigate whether superior recognition of visual detail for 
schema-inconsistent objects could be explained by extra attention alone.
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Goodman introduced a verbal recognition task that required retrieval about 
presence, but would not carry the inherent “problems” of recall, discussed above. 
In this task, schema-inconsistent objects were as difficult to retrieve as with the 
recall task. She concluded that this effect could not be attributable to underlying 
effects of the memory tests used.
Using a more ecological approach. Brewer and Treyens (1981) investigated the 
effect of schemata on memory in everyday settings. By having participants wait in 
room where objects were manipulated in order to be either consistent or 
inconsistent with the overall room schema, they were able to test whether memory 
can be affected by place-schemata in incidental conditions. Results from the 
memory tasks revealed that objects that were consistent with the room schema (in 
this case a graduate’s office in a university) were better recalled both by means of 
written and drawing recall. Additionally, many inferences were observed, 
producing a high rate o f false memories for consistent objects. This is in 
accordance with the central assumption o f schema theory that states that during 
reconstructive memory tests, episodic information gets integrated with schema- 
based knowledge derived from past experience of similar episodes. As in the 
Goodman (1980) study, a verbal recognition task was included to overcome the 
underlying problems of using recall. In this task, schema-consistent items were 
also better recognised than schema-inconsistent items. However, verbal 
recognition is a method o f extracting presence/absence information rather than 
descriptive information and the verbal labels o f the items used in the task can act 
as retrieval cues. This becomes unequivocal when high rates o f false alarms (i.e. 
plausible, but absent objects) are obtained by means of inferences with this task, 
as the one reported in this study (25%). In contrast, in a similar investigation on 
room-schemata, Pezdek, Whetstone, Reynolds, Askari and Dougherty (1989) 
found that recognition was better for schema-inconsistent objects. The difference 
rests on the type o f recognition test used. In Pezdek et al’s study, visual 
recognition relied on retrieval of descriptive detail, rather than presence/absence 
information. In that respect, verbal recognition carries the same problems as recall 
memory.
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In a study examining memory for large spaces (such as a school courtyard) 
Mainardi Peron, Baroni, Job and Salmaso (1990) found that repeated exposure to 
a place lead to poorer recall memory for movable objects in comparison with 
more permanent structurally defining objects, which suggests a schema-based 
representation of the place. In contrast, when participants were unfamiliar with 
the place their memory for movable (less strictly cormected to the place-schema) 
information was better. More recent research by Lampinen, Copeland and 
Neuschatz (2001) on room-schemata focused on the subjective experience of 
memories, using a remember-know paradigm, which was first introduced by 
Tulving (1985). When asked to remember, participants have to provide explicit 
detail about the item (conscious recollection). Making know judgements involves 
recalling whether the item was present in the stimuli presentation but not its 
specific details (subjective familiarity). Lampinen et al (2001) found that 
participants showed more sensitivity and made more veridical remember 
judgements for atypical objects. They also made more veridical know judgments 
and more false memories for typical objects. In addition, as time elapsed, the rate 
o f false memories increased, suggesting that without the reinforcement of 
episodic information, memory for the event became increasingly schema-based 
and more assumptions were made. In a follow-up study, Neuschatz, Lampinen, 
Preston, Hawkins and Toglia (2002) examined effect of schemata on memory and 
the phenomenological experience of memory for videotaped actions during a 
simulated lecture. On a subsequent old/new recognition test, participants’ memory 
was more accurate for schema-inconsistent actions (e.g. when the lecturer 
answered his mobile phone) than for schema-consistent actions (e.g. when the 
lecturer pointed to information on whiteboard). On an ensuing remember/know 
task, memories for inconsistent items contained more experiential content, and 
interestingly so did false memories for consistent items, which in turn were more 
frequent than false memories for atypical items, especially over time. Moreover, 
as time elapsed, fewer remember judgements were made, which suggests that 
detail information fades as the retention interval grows inducing people tend to 
rely on gist-based representations.
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In summary, over 70 years o f research on the effect of schemata in memory have 
produced two seemingly opposing results: one in which memory for expected 
information is better, one in which memory for unexpected information is 
especially vivid. However, for the reasons mentioned above and the results 
obtained with more recent research, these viewpoints are not mutually exclusive 
and the disagreement seems to rest on methodological and conceptual 
discrepancies. Overall, the effects o f schemata on memory produce better recall 
performance for schema-consistent information and recognition memory is better 
for schema-inconsistent information.
Many arguments against schema theory as the underlying mechanism for memory 
have provided alternative explanations for phenomena usually explained by the 
theory. For example, alternative explanations the incompleteness of recall and 
memory distortions have relied on experiments that have reported systematic 
response biases in memory tests (e.g. Johnson, Raye, Foley and Foley, 1981). 
Paradoxically, response biases can be seen a consequence of schemata rather than 
an alternative explanation, and whether recall performance reflects response 
biases (which may be schema-induced) or whether schematic mediation leads to 
differential encoding, the end result is the same: reconstructing events or scenes is 
an incomplete, and sometimes distorted process, regardless of what is stored in 
memory. Another example o f an alternative explanation for superior recall of 
typical information rests on the fact that since typical information constitutes the 
main theme, it is more likely to be rehearsed, increasing the likelihood o f it being 
subsequently retrieved (Alba and Hasher, 1983). Equally, themes are likely to 
contain a hierarchical organisation o f propositions and recall is said to occur in a 
top-down manner (Thorndike, 1977). Information which is more related to the 
central theme is recalled first, which decreases the probability of the information 
that less related to the theme being recalled (Alba and Hasher, 1983). However, it 
is possible that this “output order” effect is confounded with the initial schematic 
instantiation, since schemas may organise knowledge in such a way that would
45
lead to information more closely related to the central theme to prevail over 
information that is more loosely connected to the central theme.
When information is not retrieved by means of free recall, it may be the case that 
it was never encoded in the first place or that it was not encoded thoroughly 
enough to produce a lasting memory trace. Whichever the case, during recall, it is 
unlikely that schema-inconsistent information will be readily accessible for 
retrieval. Regardless of all the debate surrounding recall, we have chosen to use it 
in our experiments partly because o f its high dependence on the generation of 
situationally plausible information. The motivations for this are twofold: first, this 
allows comparisons with results o f most studies on schematic influence in 
memory; second, recall is the process people normally use to reconstruct events in 
natural situations.
In short, a number of alternative explanations to a subset of schema-associated 
influences in memory have been proposed. These non-schema explanations reside 
mainly in the underlying mechanisms of memory retrieval, particularly for prose 
information. Some authors have put forward slightly more sophisticated versions 
to explain memory phenomena usually included under the schema umbrella. One 
such example is the Fuzzy Trace Theory (FTT) by Reyna and Brainerd (1995). 
According to the FTT, encoding of gist (overall meaning and relational 
information) and verbatim (item-level information such as form) information 
occurs in parallel, but at retrieval these two types of information can be 
dissociated. True memories correspond to the retrieval of both the gist and the 
verbatim information or only the gist information so long it is closely matched to 
the original stimulus. On the other hand, false memories occur when no verbatim 
information can be retrieved and responses are based on gist that does not match 
the original stimulus. A critical claim of FTT is that these two types of 
information fade at different rates, with verbatim information fading faster than 
gist information; hence, at test time one or both may be retrievable depending on 
the retention interval. The main theoretical difference between both theories is 
that according to schema theory, gist and verbatim are tightly connected in the
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sense that gist is used to interpret verbatim, whereas FTT posits a separation 
between the two types of information. Still, under these considerations FTT can 
explain memory phenomena usually attributed to schema theory. Similarly, 
Shank’s (1999) Dynamic Memory Model is an attempt to elaborate on schema 
theory. The model suggests that script-type knowledge is used to organise 
episodic information, which automatically remind people o f previous similar 
events, and any information that violates expectations is indexed. Inconsistent 
information should produce strong memory traces containing rich information 
because “they cry out for explanation” (Neuschatz et al, 2002, pg. 688).
1.4 Empirical work
In the following four chapters of this thesis, we present eight experiments 
designed to address a variety of issues concerned with the effect of memory 
schemata on the perception of, and memory for, naturalistic scenes.
Chapter 2 reports two methodological studies (Experiment 1 and Experiment 2) 
that intended to produce valid stimuli for most o f the empirical work reported in 
this thesis. In the first study, knowledge elicitation tasks were carried out to 
extract the stereotypical knowledge people possess about a number of pre-selected 
actions. Four action scenes, two kitchen-based and two lounge-based were built, 
and in Experiment 2 were analysed for a relationship between place and action 
information.
Chapter 3 aimed to assess how action-schemata influence the deployment of 
attention within the action scenes, and memory for those scenes. Experiment 3a 
measured participants’ eye movements whilst they were viewing the scenes, and 
several eye-movement indices were analysed and related to the information in the 
scenes. Experiment 3b involved a thorough analysis o f the time-course o f eye- 
movement behaviour. A refined analysis of the first 300 ms o f scene viewing was 
carried out to investigate issues of early scene perception. Following that, total
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viewing time was divided into quartiles and attention deployment over the total 
course of scene viewing was investigated. In Experiment 3c recall and recognition 
memory tasks were used to assess memory for specific types o f information in the 
scene. Finally, Experiment 4 was designed to investigate whether the results of 
the recognition task used in Experiment 3c were biased, given that discrimination 
occurred in the absence o f scene background.
Chapter 4 examined how action-schemata affect scene processing when viewing 
o f the scenes was constrained. The task constraints were designed to address 
specific questions. Experiment 5 employed a change blindness flicker paradigm 
as a measure of attention alternative to eye-movements. Moreover, change 
detection performance was used to infer on online storage o f specific types of 
information contained in the scenes. In Experiment 6, participants were biased to 
deploy their attention to specific types of information within the scene. This was 
done so a relationship between attention and memory could be established.
The main purpose of Chapter 5 was to investigate the role of scene background on 
the schematic mediation of perception and the possibility that simultaneous 
schemata, one action-based and one place-based, could be operating in the scenes. 
In Experiment 7 all background information was eliminated, including the actor 
performing the action, and different amounts of specific information were 
displayed in a specific order. After that, recognition memory was assessed and 
related to the type and order of information displayed before the memory test. 
Experiment 8 examined the possibility that place could be acting as a alternative 
source of schema-like knowledge, especially in scenes were action and place 
information were found to be correlated (in Experiment 2). Before viewing a 
series of objects, participants were either cued for action or for place and their 
recognition performance was compared.
The final chapter integrates this literature review and the empirical findings which 
emerged firom these studies to address the four core questions identified at the 
beginning of this chapter.
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CHAPTER 2: GENERATING NATURAL SCENES THAT 
INSTANTIATE ACTION-SCHEMATA
2.1 General Introduction
Long-term knowledge stored in memory is organised semantically (Cooke, Durso 
and Schvaneveldt, 1986). The content of this knowledge can be extracted by 
means of experimenter-induced organisation such as knowledge elicitation tasks 
where domains are specified (Cooke, 1994). In the experiments reported in this 
chapter, several tasks were carried out in order to elicit knowledge about actions 
and the places they occur, so meaningful scenes could be generated to be used and 
manipulated in future experiments to test specific hypotheses. These were based 
on the methods used in Goodman (1980). In Experiment 1 participants performed 
a listing task, followed by a rating task and finally a stimuli validation task of four 
action scenes built upon the knowledge elicited by the two previous tasks. 
Experiment 2 investigated the relationship between action and place information in 
the scenes developed in Experiment 1, and the relationship between the objects 
contained in those scenes, with regard to action and place.
2.2 Experiment 1: Stimulus generation
2.2.1 Introduction
As Friedman (1979) pointed out, knowledge about an individual’s world is likely 
to be idiosyncratic, but default knowledge such as that contained in schemata or 
frames is likely to be stereotypical for most individuals. Based on this assumption, 
the purpose of Experiment 1 was to elicit knowledge about actions, so that the 
salient features of particular actions could be specified, and in turn shape the 
development of photographic stimuli for use in later phases of this research.
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Domain-specific knowledge can be elicited by means of knowledge elicitation 
techniques. Knowledge elicitation is a formal method by which relevant 
knowledge about a specific domain is collected from a human source (Cooke, 
1994). Amongst these are concept listings and questionnaires such as the ones 
reported here. Both involve direct verbalisation of knowledge and encourage 
objectivity, reducing the scope and need for experimenter interpretation.
Two considerations guided stimulus generation. The first was that besides an 
actor, the general knowledge we possess about actions includes relationships 
between the action being performed and the objects it involves. The second was 
that objects can be conceptually related both to an action and to each other (e.g. 
kettle and teapot), and are likely to be typically associated with one particular 
action (e.g. ironing board and ironing), i.e. they are highly relevant to the 
performance of one action. Within an ironing action-schema, the object iron is 
schema-consistent, whereas an object such as a newspaper would be classified as 
schema-inconsistent, since it is totally irrelevant for the performance of the action 
ironing. In the tasks reported here, objects were rated for relevance to the actions 
selected. The term “relevance” was used in the tasks for ease of comprehension by 
the participants. In the remaining chapters of this thesis high relevance objects will 
be referred to as schema-consistent objects and low relevance objects will be 
referred to as schema-inconsistent objects.
There were three stages in the generation of the experimental stimuli: a listing 
task, a rating task and a validation task. The listing task required participants to 
write down as many objects as they considered relevant to the performance of a 
specific action. Listings of objects provide a means to measure co-occurrence 
frequencies, which can be considered as a measure of conceptual relatedness 
(Cooke, 1994). From that exercise, a subset of objects was selected and later rated. 
Participants were required to rate the verbal labels of individual objects according 
to their degree of relevance to specific actions. Finally, photographic stimuli were
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constructed based on the rating task, ensuring that each contained the requisite 
number of action related and unrelated objects. The selected actions were well- 
known everyday simple activities, such as reading or cooking. Thereafter, a 
sample of independent subjects performed a validation task, in which after a brief 
presentation of each picture, participants were required to name the action 
depicted. This was done to determine whether our stimuli portrayed recognisable 
actions, given that the degree of familiarity with the selected action themes may 
vary across individuals.
2.2.2 Method
2.2.2.1 Listing task 
Participants
Thirty-nine undergraduate students (30 females and 9 males) from the University 
of Surrey volunteered to participate.
Stimuli and materials
The task sheet consisted of an A4 sheet of paper containing 8 columns, together 
with instructions on how the listing task should be performed. At the top of these 
columns was written the name of eight pre-selected actions: cooking, desk- 
working, dish-washing, ironing, reading, tea-making, teaching and writing.
Procedure
Using the task sheet, participants were requested to generate written lists of as 
many objects as possible they considered relevant to the eight pre-selected actions. 
There was no time limit for the task and the sheet was handed to the experimenter 
when the participant felt he/she had finished (self-paced task).
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2.2.2.2 Rating task 
Participants
An independent sample of eight undergraduate students (5 females and 3 males) 
from the University of Surrey volunteered to participate.
Stimuli and materials
The task sheet consisted of a subset of the objects produced in the Listing task. 
Every object label appeared paired with the 7-point rating scale, where 1 -  the 
object is totally irrelevant to the action, and 7 -  the object is very relevant to the 
action. Instructions for the rating task were written on the sheet provided (see 
Appendix A). Object names appeared in alphabetical order and there was a 
separate sheet for each action.
Procedure
After analysis of the listings, the top ten most frequently listed objects for each 
action were included in the rating task. Participants were asked to circle the 
appropriate number in the 7-point scale. Every object belonging to each action 
category was rated for relevance to all the other actions. The task was self-paced. 
Ratings were averaged for each of the objects, across participants.
2.2.23 Validation task 
Participants
Twenty postgraduate students (11 females and 9 males) from the University of 
Surrey volunteered to participate. These were independent of the two other 
samples who served in the stimulus generation tasks.
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Stimuli and materials
Photographs of four naturalistic scenes portraying everyday actions were taken 
with a Canon Power20 digital camera. Each scene depicted the same person in the 
centre of a typical domestic scene, performing one everyday action (i.e. cooking, 
ironing, reading or tea-making). The actor was dressed similarly in each scene (see 
Figure 2.1). Each photograph also showed an average of 25 situationally plausible 
objects, which varied in the degree to which they were associated with the action 
being performed (as determined in the Rating task). Images were presented at a 
resolution of 1024 by 768 pixels (16 bit colour), on a 19” VGA colour monitor and 
their order was randomised. From the chin and forehead rests used to maintain a 
constant head position during viewing, scenes subtended horizontal and vertical 
angles of 31.3° and 24.5° respectively. Stimulus presentation was controlled by E- 
Prime version 1.1.
Procedure
Four scenes were produced (see Figure 2.1), where the objects to be included in 
each scene were selected based on the rating task. Participants were tested 
individually and were told that they would see pictures of everyday scenes 
depicting an action, which would be displayed for 1 second. Observers were 
presented with pictures depicting the four actions one by one. They were requested 
to simply name the action they saw in the picture, immediately after each single 
display, which was followed by a 5-second mid-grey background. Responses were 
recorded by the experimenter. For each action, the criterion for a correct answer 
was to say the words: “cooking”, “ironing”, “reading”, “tea-making” (or “making 
tea”). In order to score a correct response, subjects had to say the exact word 
defining the action, rather than using other derivative terms such as “stirring” 
(instead of “cooking”) or “pouring” (instead of “tea-making”).
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Figure 2.1 Photographs used in the validation task.
2.2.3 Results
2.2.3.1 Listing task
The pattern of object naming frequencies was similar for the eight actions 
where most participants consistently listed a small group of objects, and a 
larger group o f objects only occurred occasionally, with frequencies of fewer 
than 4 (10% of participants).
Appendix B presents the objects and their frequency of occurrence. In total, 
participants listed 64 (mean = 8.2, std = 3.8) relevant objects for cooking, 35 
(mean = 6.5, std = 2.4) for desk-working, 32 (mean = 7.0, std = 3.2) for dish­
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washing, 25 (mean = 5.0, std = 1.8) for ironing, 28 (mean = 7.2, std = 2.8) for tea- 
making, 26 (mean = 4.1, std = 2.3) for reading, 32 (mean = 6.0, std = 3.8) for 
teaching and 27 (mean = 4.3, std = 2.3) for writing. We then eliminated items that 
were listed by less than 10% of the participants (equivalent to less than 4), across 
each action list, since these were not considered to represent stereotypical 
knowledge about those actions. Additionally, objects that were considered to be 
methodologically inappropriate for manipulation were excluded. Those included 
large-surface items normally associated with the rooms where those actions 
usually take place, such as “fridge” or “bed”. We also eliminated general 
categories of items, such as “stationery”, “food” or “cutlery”. Finally, in order to 
facilitate the subsequent rating exercise, lists were reduced to 10 objects per 
action. A total of 189 objects were not considered. The final listings are presented 
in Table 2.1.
In all, across the eight settings, participants generated 269 objects. On the basis 
described above, 189 were excluded from consideration as possible elements of 
future stimuli because they were infrequent, larger surfaces, generic, etc. After 
these exclusions, the candidate items for inclusion in photographs are presented in 
Table 2.1.
2.2.3.2 Rating task
All object names were rated for relevance to the action which characterised each 
of the eight verbally described scenes. Four of the initial eight actions were chosen 
to be used in the subsequent experiments, where two were kitchen-based actions -  
cooking and tea-making -  and two were room/lounge-based actions -  ironing and 
reading. Table 2.2 shows the objects and selected actions that were depicted in 
each scene and their corresponding ratings obtained in the task just described.
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Table 2.1 Final lists of objects considered relevant to each action by the 39 
participants, and the percentage of subjects that listed each item, across the eight 
actions
Cooking % Ss Desk-working % Ss Dish-washing % Ss Ironing % Ss
Pan 85 Paper 85 Sink/basin 87 Iron 95
Bowl 54 Pen 85 Washing-up liquid 87 Clothes 92
Cooker 54 Chair 72 Dishes/plates 79 Ironing board 87
Herbs/spices 51 Computer 72 Cloth 77 Water (jug/spray) 56
Plate 38 Desk 67 Sponge 54 Plug 21
Utensils 33 Lamp 54 Dish drainer 36 Hanger 18
Knife 26 Book 41 Tap 28 Shirt 15
Spoon 26 Ruler 15 Gloves 23 Starch (spray) 10
Chopping board 18 Reading glasses 10 Brush 21 Table 10
Oven gloves 18 Paper-clips 10 Utensils 10 Chair 10
Table 2.1 -
Cont.
Tea-making % Ss Reading % Ss Teaching % Ss Writing % Ss
Teabag box 95 Book 97 Black/white board 77 Pen 100
Kettle 90 Bookmark 38 Textbook 56 Paper 90
Milk (pack/jar) 79 Reading glasses 36 Pen/marker pen 54 Pencil 69
Sugar (jar/bowl) 67 Lamp 23 Paper/note pad 49 Computer 28
Cup 62 Magazine 23 Desk 38 Eraser 18
Mug 44 Paper 23 Chalk 36 Desk 15
Teapot 36 Newspaper 15 OHP 33 Book 13
Saucer 23 Chair 10 Chair 21 Ruler 13
Lemon 13 Desk 10 Transparencies 10 Note pad 10
Spoon 13 Sofa 10 Pointer 10 Lamp 10
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Given the basis on which these objects had previously been rated, objects in the 
scene with average ratings between 1.0 and 3.0 were considered low relevance 
objects (L) - schema-inconsistent - objects with average ratings falling between 3.1 
and 4.9 were considered to be neutral (N) and objects with average ratings 
between 5.0 and 7.0 were considered high relevance (H) -  schema-consistent - 
objects.
2.23.3 Validation task
In total, of the 80 responses made (20 participants viewing 4 scenes each), only 
two did not meet the requirements to be considered a correct response.
Table 2.2 Results from Experiment 1 : Lists of objects contained in the each of 
the four scenes, and their categories according to their rating. Ratings (1 -  
irrelevant, 7 -  highly relevant) were averaged across participants (standard 
deviations appear in brackets).
Cooking Ironing
Object Rating Category Object Rating Category
Basin 2.0 (0.8) L Basket 5.5 (0.9) H
Bowl 5.7 (0.7) H Chair 4.0 (1.3) N
Candlestick 1.2 (0.5) L Clothes 7.0 (0.0) H
Chopping board 7.0 (0.0) H Hanger 6.0 (0.8) H
Clock 2.9 (1.0) L Iron 7.0 (0.0) H
Cloth 6.0 (0.5) H Jumpers 5.1 (1.4) H
Colander 5.2 (1.5) H Kitchen roll 1.2 (0.5) L
Cooker 6.9 (0.4) H Newspaper 1.1 (0.4) L
Flowers 1.1 (0.4) L Painting 1.0 (0.0) L
Fire blanket 3.2 (1.7) N Plant 1.0 (0.0) L
Gas taps 4.7 (1.8) N Shirt 6.0 (0.5) H
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Knife 7.0 (0.0) H Spray 5.9 (1.0) H
Oil 6.0 (0.5) H Trousers 6.1 (1.0) H
Onion 5.7 (0.8) H White box 1.0 (0.0) L
Oven 6.7 (0.5) H
Plant leaves 1.0 (0.0) L
Pan 7.0 (0.0) H
Salt 7.0 (0.0) H
Sauce 6.5 (0.5) H
Spice rack 6.5 (0.8) H
Socket 4.4 (1.4) N
Spoon 7.0 (0.0) H
Utensils jar 5.9 (1.2) H
Reading Tea-making
Object Rating Category Object Rating Category
Book 7.0 (0.0) H Cheese tub 1.5 (0.5) L
Card box 1.6 (0.9) L Cleaning spray 1.1 (0.4) L
Cushion 2.9 (1.7) L Cuddly dog 1.0 (0.0) L
Magazine 6.0 (0.5) H Glass bottle 2.1 (1.4) L
Lamp 4.0 (1.9) N Kettle 7.0 (0.0) H
Newspaper 7.0 (0.0) H Milk 7.0 (0.0) H
Papers 5.0 (1.4) H Mug 7.0 (0.0) H
Pencil 4.0 (1.9) N Poster 1.0 (0.0) L
Pepper grinder 1.0 (0.0) L Sellotape 1.0 (0.0) L
Picture 1.9 (1.2) L Spoon 7.0 (0.0) H
Plant 1.1 (0.4) L Teabag 7.0 (0.0) H
Reading glasses 6.0 (0.5) H Teabag box 7.0 (0.0) H
Rug 1.2 (0.5) L Teabag bag 7.0 (0.0) H
Speaker 1.2 (0.5) L Teapot 7.0 (0.0) H
Watering can 1.0 (0.0) L Washing-up liquid 1.0 (0.0) L
Water bottle 2.0 (0.9) L
Yoghurts 1.4 (0.5) L
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One participant responded ‘stirring’ when presented with the cooking scene, and 
another participant responded ‘making a drink’ after the onset of the tea-making 
scene.
2.2.4 Discussion
The objective of this experiment was to develop criteria to enable a systematic 
stimulus construction, where objects can be manipulated around a central actor. 
Three tasks were carried out so meaningful action scenes could be used to test 
specific hypotheses in the experiments to follow. In the first one, participants were 
asked to list as many objects as they though relevant for each of the pre-selected 
actions. A subset of the objects generated was subsequently rated on a 7-point 
scale for relevance to a group of pre-selected actions. Finally, photographs of four 
scenes were taken and these were validated by another sample of independent 
subjects. The final scenes contained stereotypical knowledge that people possess 
about the actions selected, and it was hoped would instantiate appropriate action- 
schemata.
According to Cooke (1994), a knowledge structure can be derived from co­
occurrences in textual material, such as the lists produced in the first of the three 
tasks reported here. Examination of the results from the listing task (presented in 
Table 2.1) provides support for the existence of some common associations 
between specific objects and actions. For example, a large number of participants 
considered that ironing should involve an iron, clothes and an ironing board; tea is 
made with tea bags, a kettle and a cup; and writing requires a pen and paper. These 
high frequency objects are likely to form part of the schematic knowledge for each 
of the actions listed, i.e. they are highly likely to appear in scenes depicting those 
actions or being used when those actions are being performed. The level of 
agreement obtained across all the participants supports the viewpoint of the
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existence of an action-schéma. The high counts obtained for some objects in the 
listing task provided an estimate of their relatedness. Ratings obtained in the 
second task confirmed this. For example, the object “pan” in the cooking scene 
was listed by 85.0% of the participants in the listing task and averaged 7.0 in the 
rating task. The same happened with objects in the remaining 3 scenes: “iron”, 
“book” and “teabag box” were listed by 95.0%, 97.0% and 95.0% for the ironing, 
reading and tea-making scenes respectively and received ratings of 7.0 (highly 
relevant with regards to their respective action) by all the participants in the rating 
task. Furthermore, although different individuals can have different degrees of 
familiarity with the actions produced in this experiment, the validation task 
showed that the actions selected were all easily identifiable by the majority of 
participants.
2.3 Experiment 2: Action relevance vs. Place likelihood
2.3.1 Introduction
Naturalistic action scenes will also contain objects and backgrounds that occur 
frequently in the room where the action is taking place, but that are not necessarily 
related to the action. The scenes produced in Experiment 1 contain a number of 
semantically coherent discrete objects plausibly located and a few background 
objects, usually immovable structures, which are likely to be large-scale to 
medium-scale and “define” the scene’s layout (walls, floors, counters, sofa, fridge 
etc.). Given that scene layout is extracted early at scene onset (Renninger and 
Malik, 2004a; Schyns and Oliva, 1994)) and that scene statistics are usually 
created by salient global features, which are likely to be delineated by the room- 
defining large-scale structures (Friedman, 1979; Oliva and Torralba, 2001; Schyns 
and Oliva, 1994), place information is likely contribute to the fast understanding of 
the scene (Palmer, 1975). Furthermore, if rooms are identified quickly, objects
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usually encountered in those rooms may equally be rapidly recognised and this 
could be mediated by place knowledge, rather than action knowledge. Because the 
actions, the objects they involve and the place where those actions usually occur 
might be associated, the issue of whether a place-schema, rather than an action- 
schema could guide perception needs to be addressed. Work on this area has 
provided evidence for room-schemata by showing that the relationship between 
objects present in rooms (e.g. a stapler) and the context of that room (e.g. an 
office) affects memory for those objects (Brewer and Treyens, 1981; Lampinen, 
Copeland and Neuschatz, 2001; Pezdek, Whetstone, Reynolds, Askari and 
Dougherty, 1989).
Actions can take place in many different environments and in the scenes created in 
Experiment 1, two actions occur in a kitchen (cooking and tea-making) and two 
occur in a lounge (ironing and reading). The purpose of Experiment 2 was to 
determine the relationship between action and place information in those scenes. 
Objects present in the scenes were rated with regard to the action depicted in the 
scene and with regards to the room where the action was taking place. Given that 
cooking and tea-making are likely to occur in kitchens, high positive correlations 
between the two ratings were expected for these scenes. In contrast, reading and 
ironing are not strongly associated with a particular place, so correlations between 
action and place ratings were not expected.
Usually, concept listings and ratings involve not only knowledge about the 
concepts but also relations between the concepts, which are mediated by the 
domain specified in the task (Cooke, 1994). Experiment 2 also aimed to establish 
whether objects that were considered to be of low relevance to the actions depicted 
in the scenes showed associations amongst them and could be grouped 
semantically. This could bias the results in the subsequent experiments reported in 
this thesis.
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People are likely to organise information semantically even when that information 
is not deliberately organised by the experimenter (Cooke et al, 1986). Most of the 
empirical work described here is based on the assumption that a schema is 
instantiated and used to guide perception. In Experiment 1, objects were found to 
be either schema-consistent or inconsistent to the action depicted in the scenes. 
However, schema-inconsistent objects were not assessed for semantic similarities. 
If low relevance objects can be associated with each other, then a second “schema” 
or knowledge base could be used to guide perception and affect the interpretation 
of the results of the experiments described in the following chapters of this thesis. 
In order to address this issue, participants also rated the likelihood of objects being 
used for the same action, given that low relevance to the action does not guarantee 
a lack of association between those objects.
2.3.2 Method 
Participants
Twenty postgraduates (12 females and 8 males) from the University of Surrey 
volunteered to participate in the experiment. Participants took part in all aspects of 
the task.
Materials
A booklet was assembled which consisted of A4 sheets of paper with 4 cm^ colour 
images of 16 pre-selected objects for each of the action scenes^ (see Table 2.3). 
These were each paired with a 7-point rating scale. Objects had to be rated with 
regards to an action, to a place or to each other in an action or place setting. 
Instructions for the rating task were written on the sheet provided (see Appendix 
C). Objects appeared in random positions under each action/place heading.
* Two high relevance and two low relevance objects were selected based on the possibility o f  future 
manipulations in the ensuing experiments reported in this thesis. All were o f  similar size and their 
ratings (obtained in Experiment 1) reflected a strong degree o f  relevance/irrelevance.
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Table 2.3 High and low relevance objects used in Experiment 2.
Cooking Tea-making
High relevance Low relevance High relevance Low relevance
Colander Candlestick Mug Cuddly dog
Sauce Clock Milk Sellotape dispenser
Salt Flowers Teabag Box Poster
Pan Leaves Teapot Yoghurts
Cooker Cuddly dog Teabag Bag Cleaning Spray
Oil Lamp Kettle Trophy
Utensils Jar Picture Frame Tea Towel TV
Spice Rack Videotape Coffee Jar Lectern
Ironing Reading
High relevance Low relevance High relevance Low relevance
Spray Kitchen Roll Reading Glasses Watering Can
Hanger Newspaper Magazine Pepper Grinder
Jumpers Painting Books (shelf) Speakers
Iron Plant Open Book Plant
Washing Basket Chopping Board Highlighter Pen Plate
Shirt Hair Brush Folder Fire Blanket
Ironing Board Fish Newspaper Cushion
Plug / Socket Bowl Bookmark Flour
Procedure
Using a scale from 1 to 7, participants were asked to rate the images of objects in 
three different respects: i) Degree of relevance to the action (where 1 -  object is 
totally irrelevant to the action, and 7 -  object is highly relevant to the action); ii) 
Likelihood of appearing in a specific place (where 1 -  object is very unlikely to be 
found in that place, and 7 -  object is very likely to be found in that place); iii)
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Likelihood that objects would be used for the same (specified) action / found in the 
same place (where 1 -  objects are not likely to be used for the same action / are not 
likely to be found in the same place, and 7 -  objects are very likely to be used for 
the same action / are likely to be found in the same place).
Objects that appeared on the cooking and tea-making scenes were rated for their 
likelihood of appearing in a kitchen and objects that appeared in the ironing and 
reading scenes were rated for their likelihood of featuring in a lounge. The task 
had no time limit. Ratings were averaged for each of the objects, across 
participants.
2.3.3 Results
The purpose of this experiment was to understand how action and place 
information relate to each other in the scenes produced in Experiment 1. 
Participants were asked to rate objects selected from the four scenes with regards 
to action and place (ratings i and ii described in the Procedure) in an attempt to 
answer the question of whether action and place information in each of the scenes 
is related. A second question concerning the possibility of low relevance objects 
forming semantic associations was also addressed. This was done by examining 
the similarity ratings for pairs of objects obtained for the likelihood that objects 
would be used for the same action or found in the same place (rating iii described 
in the Procedure). Results referring to these two questions will be presented 
separately.
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Relationship between action and place
Based on their ratings obtained in Experiment 1, objects were separated into two 
main categories: High Relevance (action-schema consistent) objects (with average 
ratings between 5 and 7 inclusive) and Low Relevance (action-schema 
inconsistent) objects (with average ratings between 1 and 3 inclusive).
Treating objects as subjects (Clark, 1973), a repeated measures ANOVA looking 
at the effects of cue (Action / Place) as a within-subjects variable, and scene 
(Cooking / Ironing / Reading / Tea-making) and relevance (High / Low) as 
between-subjects variables, was carried out on the ratings of the objects averaged 
across the participants. Main effects and interactions are reported below.
Cue. Action (mean = 3.83, std = 2.52) generated lower ratings than place (mean = 
4.28, std = 2.20), F(l,56) = 5.873, p < .05. That is, overall, the objects were seen 
as less likely to be used to perform a given action than to be found in a particular 
place.
Scene. There was a difference between the mean ratings for the four scenes: 
Cooking = 4.45 (std = .24), tea-making = 4.37 (std = .24), reading = 3.92 (std = 
.24) and ironing = 3.47 (std = .24), with F(3,56) = 3.562, p < .05. Bonferroni post 
hoc tests revealed that Ironing produced different relevance ratings from cooking 
(sig. = .032) and differences between ironing and tea-making almost reached 
statistical significance (sig. = .064). No other scene was not different from each 
other (all p > .05).
Relevance. High relevance objects received higher ratings (mean = 5.79, std = 
1.69) than low relevance objects (mean = 2.31, std = 1.69), independent of the type 
of cue and picture, F(l,56) = 212.507, p < .001.
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Both interactions between the within-subjects variable (cue) and each of the 
between-subjects variables (scene and relevance) were significant, F(3,56) = 
4.873, p < .005 and F(l,56) = 52.615, p < .001 respectively. There was also a 
significant interaction between the two between-subjects variables (scene and 
relevance) with F(l,56) = 4.551, p < .01. A 3-way interaction between cue, picture 
and relevance was also found to be significant, with F(3,56) = 10.639, p < .001.
Cue X Scene. Using a .05 significance level, post hoc Newman-Keuls multiple 
comparisons revealed that the only scene to produce differences between ratings 
with respect to place (mean = 5.05, std = 2.51) and action (mean = 3.68, std = 
2.58) ratings was the tea-making scene (p < .05). That is, in that scene, the objects 
depicted were seen as highly relevant to the place, but only moderately relevant to 
the action. The difference between both ratings in the cooking scene just failed to 
reach statistical significance (p = .055), where the mean rating with respect to 
place was 4.10 (std = 2.47) and the mean rating with respect to action was 4.82 
(std = 2.33).
Cue X Relevance. Post hoc Newman-Keuls multiple comparisons revealed that 
high relevance items were rated higher with respect to action-relevance (mean = 
6.25, std = 0.81) than to the likelihood of appearing in a specific type of room 
(mean = 5.34, std = 2.00) (p < .05). In, contrast, low relevance objects are rated 
lower with respect to action (mean = 1.41, std = 0.46), but moderately relevant to 
the place (mean = 3.22, std = 1.89) (p < .05).
Scene x Relevance. Post hoc Newman-Keuls comparison tests showed that the 
mean ratings of low relevance items did not differ for the four scenes (2.26 (std = 
1.19) for cooking, 2.38 (std = 1.73) for ironing, 2.35 (std = 1.84) for reading and 
2.27 (std = 1.87) for tea-making). Low relevance object ratings did not differ 
between scenes (p > .05). For high relevance objects, mean ratings were not 
different in the cooking (mean = 6.64, std = 0.37) and tea-making (mean = 6.46,
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std = 1.03) scenes. However, these were different from mean ratings of high 
relevance items in the ironing (mean = 4.57, std = 2.13; both p < .001 when 
comparing with cooking and tea-making) and reading scenes (mean = 5.49, std = 
1.36; both p < .05 when comparing with cooking and tea-making), and these two 
did not differ from each other.
Cue X Scene x Relevance. Newman-Keuls tests for all possible comparisons can 
be seen in Appendix E. For clarity, only the relevant comparisons will be 
discussed here. In both the ironing and reading scenes, ratings for the high 
relevance items are larger for action than for place (p < .001 and p < .05 
respectively). In the other scenes, the objects depicted were equally relevant to 
both action and place (contrast for cooking and tea-making p > .05). Additionally, 
in the ironing scene, ratings for high relevance objects with respect to place were 
reliably lower than in the other three scenes (with p < .001 when comparing with 
cooking, p < .01 when comparing with reading and p < .001 when comparing with 
tea-making), where high relevance objects averaged only 2.84 (std = 1.63) with 
respect to their likelihood of appearing in a lounge. Those objects determined in 
advance to be of low relevance (on the basis of the ratings obtained in Experiment 
1), were considered irrelevant to the action depicted, and of low to moderate 
relevance to the place in which they appeared. Figure 2.2 represents these results.
In summary, high relevance objects in both lounge scenes (ironing and reading) 
were more associated with the action than the place, especially in the case of 
ironing, whereas in both kitchen scenes (cooking and tea-making) that was not the 
case. Low relevance objects were not associated with action and were moderately 
associated with place, in all of the scenes.
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a)
Cooking Scene
5 -
4 -
3 -
□ Action
□ Place
High Low
b)
Tea-making Scene
7
6
5
43
3
2
High Low
□ Action
□ Place
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c)
7 -1
2 -
Ironing Scene
□  Action
Hi^ Low
d)
Reading Scene
3 -
□ Action
□ Place
Hi^ Low
Figure 2.2 Mean ratings with respect to relevance to action and likelihood of 
appearing in the room where the action takes place, for a) cooking scene; b) tea-
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making scene; c) ironing scene and d) reading scene, for both types of objects, 
averaged across participants. Error bars represent ± SE.
In order to explore these complexities, correlations between ratings for both types 
of objects with respect to action or place for each scene (averaged across 
participants) and calculated separately for each scene. These are represented in 
Table 2.4.
Table 2.4 Pearson correlations between ratings with respect to action 
relevance and ratings with respect to likelihood of finding an object in the each of 
the scenes (N =16).
Cooking Action Place
Action
Place .945*
* significant at the .001 level (2-tailed)
Tea-making Action Place
Action
Place .765*
* significant at the .01 level (2-tailed)
Ironing Action Place
Action
Place -.198
Reading Action Place
Action
Place .483
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Ratings of object’s relevance to the depicted action were positively correlated with 
the ratings of objects with respect to their likelihood of appearing in a kitchen for 
the cooking and the tea-making scenes. In the lounge-based scenes these 
correlations were not significant (p > 1 and p > .05 for the ironing and reading 
scenes respectively). In light of these results, the four scenes were collapsed into 
kitchen-based actions and lounge-based actions. Analyses using t-tests showed that 
the mean ratings for action in the two kitchens (mean = 3.88, std = 2.49) do not 
differ from mean ratings for action in the two lounges (mean = 3.77, std = 2.60), 
t(62)= .174, p = .862). However, ratings of an object’s likelihood of appearing in 
kitchen (mean = 3.94, std = 2.39) and in a lounge (mean = 3.63, std = 1.82) were 
different for the two types of room, t(62)= 2.470, p = .016. In summary, action 
ratings did not depend on the type of scene, whereas place ratings appear to be 
affected by whether action and place information are correlated in the scene.
Associatedness o f low relevance objects
Similarity ratings of pairs of objects were obtained by asking participants to rate 
the likelihood of two objects being used for the same action or found in the same 
place. This was done to ensure that low relevance objects could not be 
semantically grouped, i.e. to determine whether low relevance objects for each 
scene were semantically independent from each other, with regards to action and 
place. In addition, high relevance objects are expected to show high similarity 
ratings.
Action. Mean object pair ratings show that all low relevance objects taken from the 
tea-making, ironing and reading scenes were not considered likely to be used for 
the same action (all mean similarity ratings < 3.0). For objects taken from the
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cooking scene only the pair flowers-plant leaves (mean = 5.7, std =1.8) was an 
exception. All high relevance pairs of objects produced high similarity ratings (>
5.0), meaning that high relevance objects are associated with each other when the 
cue action is used (see Appendix D).
Place. When low relevance pairs of objects were rated for their likelihood of 
appearing in the same place, a few moderate to high similarity ratings were 
obtained. The only pair of low relevance objects from the cooking scene to 
produce similarity ratings higher than 5.0 was the flowers-plant leaves pair (mean 
= 5.8, std = 1.4). Two low relevance pairs produced moderate similarity ratings (>
3.0). These were the clock-flowers pair (mean = 4.2, std = 1.4) and the 
candlestick-clock pair (mean = 4.5, std = 1.2). All high relevance object pairs 
produced similarity mean ratings over 5.0. For low relevance objects pairs from 
the tea-making scene, there was one pair to produce a similarity rating over 5.0 
(TV-lectem, with mean = 5.3, std = 1.9), and one pair to produce moderate 
similarity ratings (trophy-TV, with mean = 4.7, std = 2.0). As with objects from 
the cooking scene, all high relevance pairs were considered likely to appear in the 
same place (all mean ratings > 5.0). The pairs plug-jumpers and jumpers-water 
spray (high-relevance, mean = 3.9, std =1.4 and mean = 4.2, std = 1.9, 
respectively), and newspaper-plant (low-relevance, mean = 4.5, std = 1.4) both 
produced moderate similarity ratings with respect to place. All other low and high 
relevance object pairs were rated bellow 3.0 and above 5.0 respectively. Finally, 
two pairs of low relevance objects taken from the reading scene produced 
moderate similarity ratings with respect to place: the plant-plate pair, with a mean 
of 3.6 (std =1.8) and the plate-fire-blanket pair, with a mean of 4.0 (std = 2.0).
In summary, with the exception of flowers and plant leaves, and TV and lectern, 
low relevance objects were not strongly considered to be used for the same action 
or found in the same place, which makes them unlikely to be clustered 
semantically. Some weak associations between low relevance objects emerged but
72
these do not appear troublesome. Overall, high relevance objects are likely to be 
form semantic bonds both with respect to the action depicted in the scene and the 
place the actions occur.
2.3.4 Discussion
Experiment 2 was designed to address two different issues. Firstly, the relationship 
between action and place information in the scenes produced in Experiment 1 was 
investigated. This was done by asking participants to rate a subset of objects on 
how relevant with respect to the four actions (cooking, tea-making, ironing and 
reading) they were, and how likely to be found in a particular place (a kitchen or a 
lounge). Secondly, a similarity rating exercise was included to test for semantic 
relationships primarily between low relevance (schema-inconsistent) objects, 
although data for high relevance (schema-consistent) objects is also reported. The 
latter was intended to address the possibility that schema-inconsistent objects may 
form semantic clusters when viewed in the same scene. Objects were rated in pairs 
with other objects, both with respect to action and to place. The two issues which 
motivated this study will be discussed separately.
Relationship between action and place
With regard to relationships between action and place, the results reported here 
suggest that in the two kitchen-based scenes (cooking and tea-making) objects 
seem to be more associated with the place than the action performed in that place. 
This is irrespective of their relevance to the action depicted in the scene. This 
could be caused by a close semantic connection between kitchen objects and a 
kitchen given that is the place where they are usually found. Cooking can occur in 
other places, such as a garden, but to find kitchen utensils anywhere else besides a
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kitchen is more unlikely. This was supported by the fact that ratings for action and 
for place were correlated in the two kitchen scenes but not the two lounge scenes.
The interaction between cue and object relevance shows that differences between 
high and low relevance ratings (4.84) are larger when objects are rated according 
to their relevance to the action than the differences in ratings for likelihood of 
them appearing in a specific place (2.12). Thus, objects were categorised more 
unambiguously when action is used as the basis for rating. In addition, differences 
between the ratings for high and low relevance objects were larger for the cooking 
(4.39) and tea-making (4.19) scenes than for the reading (3.15) and ironing (2.19) 
scenes. Irrespective of the cue, objects seem more separable into both categories in 
both kitchen scenes (where the action is more tightly connected with the place) 
when compared with the lounge scenes (where the relationship between the action 
and the room where it is performed is more loose).
The interaction between cue, scene and object relevance showed that in the two 
lounge-based scenes (ironing and reading) schema-consistent objects were rated 
more relevant to action than to place than in the two kitchen-based scenes. 
Furthermore, in the ironing scene, schema-consistent objects produced the lowest 
ratings with respect to place, suggesting that in this scene, action-relevant objects 
are not expected to be found in a lounge, loosening the connection between action 
and place even further.
In summary, place and action information may interact to guide perception in the 
two kitchen-based scenes. In the two lounge-based scenes, action knowledge is 
likely to prevail, given that the place where those actions occur provided less 
expectations about what the scene is about.
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Associatedness o f low relevance objects
Results from the similarity rating exercise suggest that the risks of low relevance 
objects being clustered based on semantic similarities is low. Only two object pairs 
showed a high mean similarity rating, one with respect to action (flowers-plant 
leaves) and one with respect to place (TV-lectem). Overall, parallel knowledge 
bases evoked by a group of low relevance objects are not expected. All other pairs 
of objects only produced moderate or low associations. Additionally, high 
relevance objects were rated as similar to each other both with respect to action 
and to place, with a few exceptions where pairs of these objects produced 
moderate associations about being found in the same place.
2.4 General Discussion
Results demonstrate that action-specific knowledge can be elicited by means of 
simple knowledge elicitation techniques such as concept listing and rating (Cooke, 
1994). Knowledge about the actions selected appeared to be highly stereotypical 
across participants. Schema-consistent and inconsistent objects were identified and 
included in easily identifiable scenes. The results from the knowledge elicitation 
tasks support the assumption that the appropriate knowledge base (schema) will be 
evoked every time each of the scenes is displayed (Friedman, 1979). Based on this, 
specific hypotheses about schematic mediation of scene perception can be tested in 
the experiments to follow.
Place information is likely to provide initial holistic cues about the scene’s identity 
(Schyns and Oliva, 1994). The possibility that place information, rather than action 
information, could guide perception cannot be ruled out, particularly in the two 
scenes were place and action information are highly correlated. This relates to a 
distinction made by Mainardi, Peron, Baroni, Job and Salmaso (1990), who
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claimed there are two types of place familiarity: acquaintance familiarity and 
functional familiarity. Acquaintance familiarity refers to repeated exposures to a 
place that people use without a specific room-bound aim. Functional familiarity 
refers to repeated exposure to a place with the purpose of performing a task 
inherently connected with that place. In line with this distinction, a kitchen is 
likely to evoke functional familiarity because actions performed in it are well 
defined and very specific to the place. On the other hand, a lounge will evoke 
acquaintance familiarity since actions performed in lounges are not restricted to 
that type of room. Differences in measures of perception could reflect this 
distinction.
In the scenes produced here, high relevance (schema-consistent) objects were 
found to be associated both with the action depicted in them and the place where 
the action occurred, and to each other (both in terms of being used for the same 
action or being found in the same place). Similarly, low relevance (schema- 
inconsistent) objects were found overall to be irrelevant both to action and place, 
and to each other. This suggests that when scenes are displayed, only schema- 
consistent objects can form a coherent semantic context and evoke a schema. 
Schema-inconsistent objects should violate that semantic context independently of 
each other.
2.5 Conclusions of the Chapter
The findings of the experiments reported here suggest that knowledge about well- 
known everyday actions is consistent across individuals and stereotypical. The 
knowledge elicitation tasks used here were successful at identifying what elements 
should be included in the scenes to be used in subsequent experiments so an 
action-schema is evoked at scene onset. The success of those tasks was confirmed 
by the level of agreement observed between participants in a validation task.
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Four action scenes were produced (cooking, tea-making, ironing and reading). In 
these, objects that were rated as schematically consistent and inconsistent with the 
action theme were situated in plausible locations around a centrally positioned 
actor. With two exceptions, inconsistent objects were found to be semantically 
independent of each other, both with regards to action and place.
Given that actions can occur in different places, the issue of whether our scenes 
could be processed on the basis of action and/or place knowledge was addressed.
In two of the action scenes (cooking and tea-making), action and place information 
were found to be correlated and this will be taken into consideration in subsequent 
experiments. Whether participants use an action or a place schema to guide 
perception will be addressed in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 3: ACTION-SCHEMA MEDIATION OF THE 
DYNAMIC PROCESSING OF NATURAL SCENES
3.1 General Introduction
Most research concerning contextual effects on attention allocation suggests 
that overt attention may not be distributed equally across different types of 
information, but depends on its relation to the stimulus context. More 
specifically, inconsistent information has been frequently shown to receive 
more attention than contextually consistent information (De Graef, Christiaens, 
and d’Ydewalle, 1990; Friedman 1979; Gordon 2004; Henderson, Weeks and 
Hollingworth, 1999; Loftus and Mackworth 1978; Mackworth and Morandi 
1967; Marks, McFalls and Hopkinson, 1992). Schema-inconsistent objects are 
expected to receive more attention because they are semantically salient within 
schematic context of the scene. This differential allocation of attention is likely 
to affect the dynamic encoding of scene information and the final 
representation of the scene. In the following experiments, we examined how 
action-schemata mediate the selective allocation of attention within 
photographs of naturalistic scenes depicting well-known salient actions.
In Experiment 3 a, we recorded and analysed eye movements as participants 
viewed four action-scenes. Experiment 3b investigated if  at initial stages of 
scene onset attention is drawn to specific objects and whether eye-movement 
behaviour changed over the total viewing time. Further, more refined analysis 
examined the attention allocation at early very stages of scene viewing and 
whether it was independent of specific characteristics o f the scenes. In 
summary. Experiments 3a and 3b were designed to shed light on attentional 
patterns during natural scene processing, and how these are affected by scene 
semantics. In Experiment 3c, verbal recall (free recall) and visual recognition 
(2-altemative forced-choice) tests were used to determine whether the 
schematic effects observed in Goodman’s (1980) study on action-schemata 
could be replicated with real-world naturalistic complex scenes, given the
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distribution of attention observed in Experiments 3a and 3b. Since the visual 
recognition task used in experiment 3c (and Goodman’s experiment), presented 
objects disembodied from their original scene (and hence, their original 
context). Experiment 4 was designed to test whether this methodological 
manipulation could affect recognition performance, given the well-documented 
effect o f context in memory (Smith and Vela, 2001).
3.2 Experiment 3a: The effect of action-schemata on eye movements
3.2.1 Introduction
The general aim of Experiment 3a was to determine whether the visual 
exploration o f the scenes produced in Experiment 1 is affected by the schemata 
instantiated by the action theme. It is possible that place-schemata may also 
operate in our scenes, but this issue will be explored in further experiments. 
The same action-schema concept as Goodman (1980) was used to test whether 
action-schemata affect the differential allocation of attention within 
photographs of real-world natural scenes. Several eye-movement indices were 
taken as measures of explicit (overt) allocation o f attention, based on the 
assumption that different indices may reflect different types of processing. 
Dwell time, number of fixations, saccade length fixation duration and pupil 
dilation will be discussed in turn.
Dwell time (sum of all fixation durations on an item) is assumed as the total 
time dedicated to the acquisition of information about an object. Henderson et 
al (1999) found that total viewing duration was shorter for consistent objects 
and longer for inconsistent objects reflecting longer time spent processing 
inconsistent objects.
Dwell time and the number of fixations on an object are likely to be correlated 
(Henderson and Hollingworth, 1998). However, each may reflect cognitive
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processing at different levels. The number o f fixations on an object may reflect 
the amount of interest generated by that item. Likewise, the number of times 
that object is fixated or looked back is likely to reflect repeated attempts to 
process that object with regards to the context in which it occurs or in view of 
the objects seen up to that moment. Refixations may be short and therefore not 
reflect processing difficulty. Alternatively, a larger number of fixations tends to 
land on important and/or “informative” (measured in terms of the amount of 
information provided) regions of scenes (Mackworth and Morandi, 1967), 
which may or may not be semantically inconsistent regions. Most studies 
reported a higher number of fixations on inconsistent objects (Mackworth and 
Morandi, 1967; Loftus and Mackworth, 1978; Henderson et al, 1999).
Saccade length has been used as an indicator of attentional capture. Loftus and 
Mackworth (1978) argued that saccadic amplitudes to incongruent objects 
where long because these captured attention. However, initial saccade lengths 
to inconsistent objects reported by De Graef et al (1990) and Henderson et al 
(1999) were generally short - approximately 3 degrees - as opposed to 7 
degrees-long saccades reported by Loftus and Mackworth (1978). In this case, 
the long saccades might have been the result o f the simplicity of the stimuli 
used by Loftus and Mackworth. Longer saccades could simply reflect longer 
distances between objects and larger empty spaces. In contrast. Antes and 
Penland (1981) reported longer saccades to consistent objects during the course 
of scene vie’wing, claiming that this reflects superior peripheral recognition o f 
objects that are consistent with the overall context of the scene i.e. they provide 
a larger “useful field of view”. De Graef (1998) proposed that this could be due 
to an increased perceptibility of these objects at prefixational stages. 
Nevertheless, most research suggests that first saccades to inconsistent objects 
are not necessarily longer than saccades to consistent objects and report mean 
saccade amplitudes o f approximately 3 degrees (Antes 1974; De Graef et al 
1990; Henderson et al 1999) for both types of objects, which may reflect 
processing of information within parafoveal distance. Given these findings and 
that the stimuli used in our study are rather complex, we expect no difference
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in first (and overall) saccade length bet’sveen schema-consistent and 
inconsistent objects.
Average fixation duration ’was also measured. This is a mathematical 
composite of the dwell time and number o f fixations. Since the early days of 
eye-movement research, longer fixation durations have been consistently 
associated with increased processing difficulty (Buswell, 1935) and hence to 
longer fixation durations. More recently, using concurrent listening tasks 
during picture viewing. Antes and Kristjanson (1993) showed that fixation 
durations on objects increased as the difficulty of the concurrent task increased, 
due to a higher expenditure of cognitive resources. Analogously, as suggested 
by Hollingworth and Henderson (1999), when schema-inconsistent information 
is fixated, durations should increase because of higher processing difficulty, or 
increased time spending interpreting or relating the information presented at 
the retina with the rest of the visual input or an internal representation of it. 
Similarly, according to studies on the perceptual span during reading tasks (see 
Rayner, 1998 for a review) and eye movements in scenes (Nelson and Loftus, 
1980), fixation durations should be smaller for schema-consistent information 
because predictable objects tend to benefit from extrafoveal processing and 
require less time to be identified and/or recognised (Friedman, 1979; Friedman 
and Liebelt, 1981; Palmer, 1975). However, some studies using reading tasks 
have found that fixation times can be longer when the fixated information 
disambiguates the structural ambiguity of a sentence, i.e. contextually 
consistent information (Henderson and Ferreira, 1990). Therefore, in the study 
reported here, we might expect to find that some consistent objects receive 
longer fixations since they disambiguate the context of the scene. This should 
be particularly true if  conflicting (schema-inconsistent) information was 
previously encountered during scene viewing.
Research has shown that fixation duration may not reflect the processing o f the 
currently fixated object since it may include anticipation and planning o f the 
next fixations (Deubel, 1996). It may also be that when the eyes move to a new
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stimulus, the current stimulus has been fully processed. Thus, fixation duration 
may reflect partial processing of the current stimulus (since it may already have 
been processed parafoveally before it was fixated) plus the time it takes to plan 
the next fixation and partially process the next stimulus. In fact, there is some 
indication that fixation durations tend to be uniform during the course o f a 
cognitive task (Russo, 1978). Other eye-movement indices may be more 
appropriate to draw conclusions about selective allocation o f attention. In this 
experiment, average fixation duration is not expected to differ for the two types 
of objects, especially given that viewing time is fairly long (15 seconds).
First fixation duration was included as a measure that reflects the processing of 
an object as it is looked at for the first time. Some studies in reading report an 
effect on first gaze duration, with high frequency^ and easy words receiving 
shorter first gaze durations than low frequency and difficult words, but other 
studies have not found an effect of word frequency on first fixation duration 
(Henderson and Ferreira, 1990). However, in Henderson and Ferreira’s study, 
first fixations on syntactically easy words were shorter than on difficult words. 
In summary, evidence about first fixation duration is somewhat conflicting, and 
differences found between studies may lie in the distinction between difficulty 
and frequency. How much inconsistent information in scenes is difficult to 
process is a problematic issue, especially since longer fixations in these objects 
may reflect attempts to plan the next fixation. In face of unexpected 
information, the visual system might take longer to decide where to go next. In 
studies investigating first fixation duration in objects within scenes, evidence 
appears to be equally ambiguous. For example, Friedman (1979) reported 
longer first fixations on inconsistent objects than on consistent objects, and 
argued that this reflected an increased difficulty in processing inconsistent 
information when encountered for the first time. However, subsequent research 
from Antes and Penland (1981) and Henderson et al (1999) reported no effect
' Word frequency refers to the amount o f  times a word naturally occurs in normal speech 
(written English language), where high-frequency words occur on average 150 times in every 
million, and low-frequency words occur on average 5 times in every million (Francis and 
Kucera, 1982).
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of semantic informativeness on first fixation duration. Based on this, we do not 
expect first fixation duration to be different according to objects’ semantic 
consistency with the scene.
Pupil dilation was also investigated as a measure of processing difficulty. For 
example, Kahneman (1973) showed that when more cognitive resources are 
needed for the performance of a task, pupil diameter tends to increase. This 
was illustrated in a study by Antes and Kristjanson (1993) investigating the 
effect of concurrent listening tasks in eye-movement behaviour during picture 
viewing. The authors showed that pupil diameter increased as the difficulty of 
the concurrent listening task increased. Since schema-inconsistent objects are 
semantically salient within the context of the scene, more cognitive “effort” to 
process them may be necessary, and this might lead to an increase on pupil 
diameter when those objects are encountered.
In summary, eye-movement behaviour in the scenes used in our study is likely 
to depend on the semantic characteristics of the objects in relation to the 
overall schematic content o f the scene. We expect more time will be spent 
looking at schema-inconsistent objects (both measured in total viewing time 
and number of fixations), but this may not necessarily involve longer fixations 
(first and overall) or saccades to those objects. In addition, mean pupil diameter 
is expected to be larger for information that is inconsistent with the schema.
3.2.2 Method 
Participants
Twelve (7 males and 5 females, with a mean age of 25.7 years) postgraduate 
students from the University of Surrey volunteered to participate in the 
experiment. All subjects reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
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Stimuli and materials
The four photographs depicting everyday actions produced in Experiment 1 
(i.e. cooking, ironing, reading and tea-making) were used. For each scene, four 
objects were selected as target objects according to ratings obtained in 
Experiment 1 : two were relevant to the action depicted (schema-consistent 
items) and two were not (schema-inconsistent items; see Table 3.1). Targets 
were similar in size and distributed spatially across the scenes so they would be 
positioned in a natural position in typical real-world scenes. Mean target object 
eccentricity varied from 4.5° to 10.1° for schema-consistent objects (mean = 
6.6°, std = 2.1) and from 4.9° to 12.1° for schema-inconsistent objects (mean = 
9.2°, std = 2.2)^. Images were presented at a resolution o f 1024 by 768 pixels 
(16 bit colour), on a 19” VGA colour monitor (75 Hz). From the chin and 
forehead rests used to maintain a constant head position during viewing, scenes 
subtended horizontal and vertical angles of 31.3° and 24.5° respectively.
Table 3.1 Schema-consistent and schema-inconsistent target objects for 
each of the four actions and their respective ratings (obtained in Experiment 1), 
averaged across participants. Standard deviations are presented in brackets.
Action Object
Consistent Average rating Inconsistent Average rating
Cooking Sauce 6.5 (0.4) Candlestick 1.2 (0.6)
Sieve 5.2 (1.1) Clock 2.9 (1.1)
Ironing Hanger 5.5 (0.9) Kitchen roll 1.2 (0.6)
Spray 4.9 (1.3) Newspaper 1.1 (0.3)
Reading Reading glasses 6.6 (0.3) Watering can 1.0 (0.1)
Magazine 5.9 (0.7) Pepper grinder 1.0 (0.1)
Tea-making Mug 6.9 (0.1) Cuddly toy 1.0 (0.1)
Milk 6 .4 (0 .3 ) Sellotape dispenser 1.0 (0.1)
 ^Because first fixations are likely to occur near the centre o f  the scenes, a repeated measures 
ANOVA carried out on target object eccentricity revealed a main effect o f  object category, 
F (l,8 ) = 5.434, p < .05, with schema-consistent target objects being, on average, situated closer 
to the centre o f  the scene. N o main effect o f  scene or interaction between object category and 
scene were found (both p > .05).
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From the chin and forehead rests used to maintain a constant head position 
during viewing, scenes subtended horizontal and vertical angles of 31.3° and 
24.5° respectively. Ambient light was minimal. Stimuli presentation and data 
collection were controlled using E-Prime version 1.1. Participants’ eye 
movements were recorded using a head-mounted ASL Eyetracker Optics, 
controlled by a Model 5000 portable control unit. A built-in camera operating 
at 40Hz recorded the scene viewed by the subject through a portable SONY 
Video Walkam (25Hz). Eye-movement scan paths were produced and analysed 
using Eyenal 5.45 and FixPlot 1.2 software tools. Duration and eye position 
changes criteria for a fixation were set at 100 milliseconds and 0.5° of visual 
angle.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually and their eyes were calibrated (using 
Eyenal 5.45) before the experiment started. They were then told that they 
would see pictures of everyday scenes which would be displayed for 15 
seconds, and that some questions about them would be asked after viewing a 
total of four scenes. During scene display they should look naturally at the 
pictures. They were also informed that during this process, their eye- 
movements would be recorded by the head-mounted optics. Each scene only 
appeared once. On-screen instructions also warned participants that a 2-second 
central fixation cross on a mid-grey background would precede each scene. At 
each scene onset, participants were asked to fixate on that cross. The first 
fixation on scene onset was eliminated due to it being the result o f the fixation 
on the cross. Presentation order was offset, i.e. the first participant viewed the 
scenes in the order 1,2, 3, 4, the second participant viewed the scenes in the 
order 2, 3 ,4 , 1, and so on.
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3.2.3 Results
This experiment was designed to examine the effect of scene schema on eye 
movement behaviour within scenes that depict well-known actions, where 
some objects present in them are action-schema-consistent and some are 
action-schema-inconsistent. Several eye-movement indices were measured and 
analysed in order to provide a clear picture of the overall distribution of 
attention across the scenes and the objects they contain, over the course of 15 
seconds of viewing time. Analyses will include the total amount of time spent 
on each type o f object, the total number o f fixations on each object category, 
individual fixation duration, saccade length and pupil dilation. The following 
analyses included the target objects only. Later, all objects in the scenes will be 
analysed in order to determine whether the target objects are particularly 
discriminable.
Dwell time and number o f fixations
Repeated measures ANOVAs performed on the eye-movement indices 
revealed a main effect of schema-consistency for dwell time (F (l,l 1) = 13.402, 
p < .005) and for number of fixations (F (l,l 1) = 10.562, p < .01). Overall, 
participants spent more time looking at (and fixated more often on) target 
schema-inconsistent objects than target schema-consistent objects. Dwell time 
per object was on average approximately 2 seconds longer for schema- 
inconsistent objects (mean = 4.98, std = 1.94) than schema-consistent objects 
(mean = 2.96, std = 1.42) and the former were also fixated more often (mean = 
12.8, std = 4.76 for schema inconsistent objects and mean = 8.50, std = 3.63 for 
schema-consistent objects). Results for these two eye-movement measures are 
shown in Figure 3.1.
Saccade length
Average saccade length and first fixation post-saccadic length did not depend 
on object’s consistency with the scene schema (both F < 1).
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Figure 3.1 Results from the eye-movement measurements. Total dwell time 
spent in each object in seconds is represented on the left of the graph, and total 
number of fixations on the right. Both measures are shown as a function of the 
object schema-consistency, collapsed across scenes and averaged across 
participants. Error bars depict ± SE.
Fixation duration
Average fixation duration was computed for both object types and subjected to 
a repeated measures ANOVA. Although fixations on schema-inconsistent 
objects were longer on average (mean = 410 ms, std =150) than on schema- 
consistent objects (mean = 340 ms, std = 54), this difference was not 
statistically reliable (F (l,l 1) = 1.533, p > .05). Likewise, first fixation duration 
did not differ for the two types of objects (F < 1).
The pattern of results obtained for dwell time and number of fixations is 
illustrated in Figure 3.2, which represents the scan path on the ironing scene 
obtained for one participant. The scan paths show overall longer and more 
frequent fixations in schema-inconsistent target objects when compared with 
schema-consistent target objects.
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Pupil dilation
There was also no effect of schema-consistency in pupil dilation for either the 
first fixation on an object or the subsequent fixations on that object (both F < 
1).
Figure 3.2 Eye-movement scan paths of one observer. Scan paths are 
superimposed on the ironing scene produced in Experiment 1. Both schema- 
consistent and schema-inconsistent target objects are signalled by a rectangle. 
Lines represent saccades and circles represent fixations. Numbers correspond 
to fixation sequence during viewing. Larger markers represent longer fixation 
durations.
In the analyses reported so far, we have only considered the pre-selected target 
objects to allow direct comparisons o f eye-movement behaviour with 
subsequent memory performance. In order to determine whether the same 
effects observed for the target objects would extend to all the consistent and
88
inconsistent objects present in the scenes, each picture was fully coded and the 
same analysis (as for the 4 objects per scene) was conducted for all objects^. 
Results of the ANOVAs carried out on dwell time and number of fixations 
showed the same main effect o f schema-consistency for both eye-movement 
indices (F ( l , l l )  = 6.301, p < .05 and F ( l , l l )  = 5.113, p < .05 respectively).
Table 3.2 Dwell time and mean number o f fixations per object, for target 
objects and for all other objects in the scene, averaged across scenes and 
participants. Standard deviations appear in brackets.
Dwell time (s) Fixations per object
Target objects
Schema-consistent 2.96 (1.42) 1.1 (0.5)
Schema-inconsistent 4.98 (1.94) 1.6 (0.6)
All other objects
Schema-consistent 2.61 (1.21) 1.7 (0.6)
Schema-inconsistent 3.78(1.33) 2.0 (0.7)
Dwell time and mean number of fixations per object for the target objects and 
all scene objects are presented in Table 3.2. There were no main effects of 
scene with either measure (both p < .05).
Given that the main effects with these two measures maintain when all the 
other objects in the scene are included, we can be assured that the pre-selected 
target objects were not perceptually salient, i.e. more discriminable, than the 
rest of the objects present in the scenes.
 ^Objects were considered small-scale moveable units. Large-scale structural, usually room- 
defining surfaces such as floors and kitchen counters were not considered as “objects” and not 
entered into the analysis.
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3.2.4 Discussion
Consistent with previous work, the present results suggest that during the 
viewing of complex natural scenes, allocation o f overt attention appears to be 
mediated by the activated schema. Overall, schema-inconsistent objects 
received more visual scrutiny (reflected by longer dwell times and more 
fixations). With regard to these two measures, our results support the findings 
o f many researchers (e.g. De Graef et al, 1990; Henderson et al, 1999; Loftus 
and Mackworth, 1978; Mackworth and Morandi, 1967). This suggests that 
inconsistent objects capture attention. As suggested earlier, refixations can be 
said to reflect the amount of “interest” generated by an item. The refixation 
results reported above are also in accordance with work with word stimuli 
reported by Rayner, Warren, Juhasz and Liversedge, (2004), who showed that 
when objects violate the overall semantic context, they are likely to be 
refixated. Friedman (1979), however, found no difference in fixation density 
between fi-ame-consistent and frame-inconsistent objects. The reasons for this 
contrasting evidence may be twofold. Firstly, in her study, participants were 
explicitly told to expect a difficult memory test, which might have led them to 
distribute fixations evenly between all the objects in the scene. In the study 
reported here, participants were told they would be asked questions about the 
scenes, but these were not specified. Secondly, some objects defined as 
inconsistent were based on ratings such as “somewhat unlikely to appear in the 
scene”, whereas in our study inconsistent objects were perhaps more 
anomalous, leading to a starker contrast with consistent objects.
As predicted, there was no difference in the average fixation duration on both 
types o f objects. This contradicts evidence reported by early studies (Antes and 
Penland, 1981; Friedman, 1979; Loftus and Mackworth, 1978). Explanations 
for this rest on the relationship between fixation duration and the “difficulty” of 
the information presented at the retina (Henderson and Ferreira, 1990). In other 
words, fixation durations can be indicative of the “amount” o f information that 
needs to be processed. Similarly, in a more recent study by McDonald and
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Shillock (2003), fixation durations on words were affected by transitional 
probabilities between them. They found that when two words are likely to co­
occur, fixation duration on the second word is shorter than when the two words 
are not likely to co-occur. Extrapolating these results to scenes would imply 
that second fixations on schema-consistent objects, which are likely to co­
occur, would be shorter. On the other hand, this would not occur for schema- 
inconsistent objects since these are not likely to co-occur within that context. 
This would lead to a difference in the average fixation duration between both 
types of objects.
In our study, however, fixation durations on schema-inconsistent objects were 
not different fiom durations on schema-consistent objects, which challenges 
the notion that inconsistent objects are more difficult to process. Furthermore, 
the amount of information to be processed foveally may include information 
about where to look next, thus not reflect the characteristics o f the foveated 
object. An example of this comes from reading studies where fixations at the 
end of lines have been consistently shown to be shorter than fixations at the 
beginning of a phrase, regardless of the characteristics of the words presented 
at the fovea (e.g. Leisman, 1978).
Moreover, the validity of this measure as an indicator o f cognitive processing 
is debatable. Russo (1978) has argued that fixation durations tend to be 
uniform over the period of a given visual task. This would stem from the use of 
anticipatory strategies. The amount of time the eye rests on a target is not a 
direct consequence of the information given by the target, but can also reflect 
processing of the previous or the next stimuli. If  this is true, then fixation 
duration should not be taken as a valid measure of processing time for the 
current stimulus. Similarly, some authors (e.g. Just and Carpenter, 1976) have 
argued that ‘gaze time’ or dwell time (sum of all fixations on a target) is a 
better reflection of cognitive control of eye-movement behaviour and that the 
individual durations of the fixations can be meaningless. Fixation duration may 
reflect processing of information at the fovea, at the periphery or both
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(Henderson and Hollingworth, 1999). Taking all these factors into 
consideration, the lack of a significant difference with average fixation 
duration is not surprising. The result of an average smoothes any fluctuations 
in the size of the fixations. Furthermore, given enough time, fluctuations will 
most likely decrease as inspection of the scene progresses. Average fixation 
durations obtained in this study (340 ms and 410 ms for schema-consistent and 
inconsistent objects, respectively) are, however, in accordance with typical 
values for pictorial information reported by most researchers (Henderson and 
Hollingworth, 1999).
In contrast to Loftus and Mackworth (1978), Friedman (1979) and Henderson 
et al (1999) but in accordance with De Graef et al (1990), first fixation 
durations on schema-consistent and inconsistent objects did not differ. This 
questions once more the validity of fixation duration as a measure of 
attentional capture or information processing and the notion that schema- 
inconsistent objects are more “difficult” to process. This is supported by the 
lack of a reliable difference in average pupil dilation for both objects.
However, this may depend on the level of object inconsistency with the scene’s 
context. Furthermore, initial stages of scene processing may involve an active 
scene understanding rather than a more refined object-based analysis, which 
could lead to even first fixation durations. Likewise, schema-inconsistent 
objects did not seem to attract attention, since saccades made to these objects, 
both at early stages and during the course o f scene viewing, were not longer 
than saccades made to schema-consistent objects. This result is in accordance 
with the findings of most studies (Antes, 1974; De Graef et al, 1990;
Henderson et al, 1999) but in contrast to Loftus and Mackworth (1978), most 
likely due to the simplicity o f the stimuli used in their study. When scenes do 
not contain many objects saccades are likely to be long because the objects are 
further apart and peripheral processing of inconsistent objects is easier. Longer 
saccades may also simply reflect longer distances between objects.
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In summary, the results reported here provide support for a schematically- 
driven scene inspection, where objects that are inconsistent with the currently 
activated scene action-schema are likely to receive more scrutiny overall. 
However, these objects do not seem to “pop-out” or be especially “difficult” to 
process, since the average magnitude of saccades, the average fixation duration 
and the average pupil diameter during fixation did not differ for schema- 
consistent and schema-inconsistent objects. Furthermore, at initial stages of 
scene inspection, both objects appear to generate the same amount o f interest. 
This issue will be further explored in Experiment 3b.
3.3 Experiment 3b: The effect of action-schemata on the time-course of 
eye-movement patterns
3.3.1 Introduction
An attempt to characterise overt attention on coherent scene inspection should 
address not only on what is looked at and for how long, but also when it is 
looked at. A reanalysis of data from Experiment 3 was carried out in order to 
investigate the schematic mediation o f attentional patterns during the time 
course of dynamic scene perception. For that purpose, we investigated whether 
at initial stages of scene onset (within the first 300 ms) attention is drawn to 
specific objects depending on their relationship to the schematic context of the 
scene. We also examined whether eye-movement behaviour changed over the 
total viewing time. Inspection of the resulting scan paths revealed that the 
distribution of attention across the different types of objects varied during the 
first half of the viewing time. A more refined analysis was carried out for a 
closer examination of the attentional changes that occurred during that time 
interval.
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Eye movements at scene onset
Many researchers have demonstrated that natural scenes can be perceived very 
rapidly and effortlessly (e.g. Potter, 1976; Biederman, 1981; Biederman, 
Mezzanotte and Rabinowitz, 1982; Hollingworth and Henderson, 1999;
Intraub, 1981) even after exposures as brief as 70-75 ms (Boyce and Pollatsek, 
1992; Renniger and Malik, 2004a). Not only can observers be very fast at 
categorizing or identifying scenes, but also they are able to extract information 
about objects present in those scenes, within a single eye fixation (Grill- 
Spector and Kanwisher, 2005; Loftus and Mackworth, 1978; Van Rullen and 
Thorpe, 2001; Gordon, 2004; Hollingworth and Henderson, 2000). In fact, 
Wolfe and Bennett (1997) have proposed that preattentive processing o f scenes 
divides them into objects. In addition, Grill-Spector and Kanwisher (2005) 
have shown that object categorisation occurs simultaneously and is governed 
by the same perceptual analysers as object detection, which in turn occurs as 
figure-ground segregation occurs. This is said to be possible due to a rapid 
matching process between the incoming stimulus and template-like image 
fragments containing information about the spatial location o f an object (as 
opposed to background) plus information about the object’s category, learned 
from experience with objects.
Both rapid scene and object perception has been attributed to our ability to rely 
on internal knowledge based on past experience, i.e. schema (Friedman and 
Liebelt, 1981). However, which objects receive initial scrutiny is still 
controversial. Loftus and Mackworth (1978) claimed that inconsistent objects 
attract attention after just a single fixation and that observers tend to fixate on 
these objects at very early stages o f scene viewing. However, these results were 
not replicated by De Graef et al (1990), who found that inconsistent objects 
were fixated on average 8 fixations after scene onset. Similarly, Henderson et 
al (1999) reported that initial saccades are usually made to contextually 
consistent objects. In addition, as shown from the results in Experiment 3a and 
in accordance with recent research, initial saccades to contextually inconsistent
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objects are not necessarily longer than saccades to contextually consistent 
objects. This suggests that inconsistent objects do not “pop-up” instantly and 
receive early attention, as initially claimed by Loftus and Mackworth (1978).
Inconsistencies observed in the literature have been attributed to task 
instructions and stimulus complexity. Many paradigms have been used to 
investigate the role of attention in scene representation. Recently, Henderson 
and his colleagues (1999) used line drawings of real-world scenes in two 
different tasks, which are typically found in similar studies. In the first task, 
participants anticipated a memory test and in a second experiment, they 
performed a self-terminated visual search task. In both cases, the authors found 
no evidence for an initial capture of attention by inconsistent targets (no effect 
in saccade length, probability of fixating target on and 2"  ^saccade or 
number of fixations in other regions of the scene up to the point of target 
fixation). In our study, participants were pre-empted with a memory test. 
However, we did not specify what questions would be asked or whether they 
would be about the scene, the presence of objects, object colour or relative 
positions, or the actor. Thus, participants did not know which type of 
information it would be more advantageous to process.
Gordon (2004) has examined attentional processing during the first fixation on 
a scene using a different measure of allocation of attention, claiming that eye 
movements provide little evidence o f attention allocation before the first 
saccade to an element within the scene. Gordon used the same spatial-probe 
technique introduced by Hoffman and Nelson (1981). In a typical trial, 
participants viewed a scene that was interrupted by a probe stimulus and their 
reaction time to detect the probe was measured. Within 150 ms, participants 
were consistently faster with probes presented at inconsistent object locations, 
implying that within a single fixation, attention allocation is influenced by 
object semantics. Gordon argues that during initial stages of scene viewing, 
attention might be influenced by semantic factors rather than visual factors and 
that inconsistent information takes precedence during this process. This result
95
contrasts with Henderson et al’s (1999), although this should be viewed with 
caution since different measures of attention were used in both studies. 
However, the result obtained by Gordon is consistent with the one obtained in a 
later study by Hollingworth and Henderson (2000), who showed advantage for 
change detection on semantically inconsistent objects within a single fixation. 
This suggests that that covert attention was drawn to these objects at very early 
stages of scene perception.
In summary, it remains unclear what happens immediately after information is 
available for perception. In order to clarify this issue, we examined the amount 
of fixations that landed in both schema-consistent and schema-inconsistent 
objects during the first 300 ms o f scene onset, using photorealistic complex 
stimuli.
Eye movements over the course o f total viewing time
The time course of picture inspection over long scene exposure (larger than 10 
seconds) has been widely investigated (e.g. Mackworth and Morandi, 1967; 
Antes, 1974; Loftus and Mackworth, 1978; Friedman and Liebelt, 1981; De 
Graef et al, 1990; Henderson et al, 1999). However, research in this area has 
reported some contrasting evidence. Mackworth and Morandi (1967) showed 
that the distribution of fixation densities on informative (consistent) and 
uninformative (inconsistent) scene regions remained constant over time. In 
contrast. Antes (1974) and Friedman and Liebelt (1981) demonstrated that the 
distribution o f fixation durations on contextually likely and unlikely objects 
changed over the time course o f scene viewing. Moreover, in Antes’ (1974) 
study, informative regions were fixated earlier than uninformative regions but 
Friedman and Liebelt (1981) found no evidence for this. Differences between 
the studies can be attributed to task instructions (preference judgment in Antes’ 
experiment vs. preparation for a difficult memory test in Friedman and 
Liebelt’s) and/or to differences in stimulus complexity (simpler drawings were
96
used by Antes). With this experiment we intend to resolve some of these 
conflicts and provide a comprehensive analysis o f changes in eye-movement 
behaviour over the course of viewing naturalistic complex scenes. We predict 
that the visual inspection of scenes changes over time in a manner that is 
consistent with a schema-driven mechanism.
3.3.2 Method 
Participants
Participants were the same as in Experiment 3a.
Procedure
The first 300 milliseconds of viewing time were analysed in terms of number 
of observers looking at each category of object consistency for each action 
scene.
For a comprehensive analysis of eye-movement behaviour during scene onset, 
total viewing time (15 seconds) was divided into quartiles and dwell time and 
number of fixations were examined for each quartile. This analysis was further 
refined to include the first 20 fixations only, and the number o f observers 
looking at the highest frequency objects (looked at by the majority of 
observers) in each category was taken as the dependent variable.
3.3.3 Results
Eye movements at scene onset
The analyses reported here include all objects in the scene. To investigate what 
happens at very early stages after scene onset (first fixation) we carried out a 
repeated measures ANOVA on the ordinal position of the first fixation and
97
found a main effect o f schema-consistency (F (l,l 1) = 11.448, p < .01). 
Participants tended to fixate on schema-consistent objects on average 4.5 
fixations earlier than on schema-inconsistent objects. Analysis o f the durations 
o f the first fixations revealed that first fixations on schema inconsistent objects 
were longer than on schema-consistent objects but this difference failed to 
reach statistical significance (F (l,l 1) = 3.767, p = .078). Presumably this 
happens because some of the longer (inconsistent) fixations are truncated by 
the 300ms threshold.
An analysis o f the first 300 ms (typical duration o f a fixation (see Hollingworth 
and Henderson, 2002) and average duration obtained in Experiment 3a) of 
scene onset on each individual scene, was carried out by dividing time in 50- 
ms bins. Each scene was split into four categories of potential targets for 
fixation: schema-consistent objects, schema-inconsistent objects, actor and 
other (objects that are neither schema-consistent nor schema-inconsistent, and 
large-scale “structural” elements, such as floor, cupboards, counters, etc.). 
Figure 3.3 shows the percentage o f observers that were fixating on each o f the 
four types of scene element, for each o f the four scenes, at specific moments in 
time. Overall, in the first 100 ms, 38.7% of observers fixated on schema- 
consistent objects whereas only 6.2% fixated on schema-inconsistent objects 
(averaged across the four scenes). These values remain fairly constant until 250 
ms. After 300 ms of scene onset, 24.0% of observers were fixating on schema- 
consistent objects while 9.4% were fixating on inconsistent objects. However, 
as can be seen from the graphs, the overall eye-movement behaviour in the first 
300 ms is far from uniform.
Schema-consistent objects receive more scrutiny on both kitchen-based scenes 
(cooking and tea-making), with more than half of the participants fixating these 
objects in the first 300 ms of viewing these scenes.
Schema-inconsistent objects are never fixated in the first 300 ms in the cooking 
scene and not until 250 ms in the reading scene- whereas in the other two
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scenes, they receive attention from the beginning, although only by a small 
amount of participants (12.5% in both cases).
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Figure 3.3 Percentage of participants fixating on schema-consistent 
objects, schema-inconsistent objects, the actor and the remaining objects 
(neutral and large-scale surfaces) in the first 300 milliseconds of scene onset, 
(a) cooking, (b) ironing, (c) reading, and (d) tea-making. Error bars represent 
minimum and maximum percentage of participants in each time point.
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The actor attracts attention for most of the observers in the two lounge-based 
scenes - ironing and reading (average of 69.1% and 75.7% respectively) - but 
not in the two kitchen-based scenes (25.7% in the cooking scene and 10.0% in 
the tea-making scene).
The remaining objects and large-scale surfaces (defined as ''othef') were never 
fixated in the first 300 ms in the ironing scene and in the remaining three 
scenes these objects/surfaces were fixated by less than 30% of participants 
throughout the 300 ms.
Overall, the results indicate that during the first 300 ms of scene viewing, most 
observers were fixating on both the actor and schema-consistent objects. In the 
kitchen-based scenes (i.e. where action and relevance ratings were found to be 
correlated in Experiment 2) schema-consistent information appears to be the 
main focus of attention, whereas in the lounge-based scenes (where action and 
place ratings were uncorrelated) actor information dominates.
Eye movements over the course o f total viewing time
The following analyses aimed to examine the distribution of eye movements on 
schema-consistent and schema- in the remaining viewing time. For that 
purpose, total viewing time (15 seconds) was divided into four quartiles o f 
3750 milliseconds each. Two analyses of variance using percentage o f total 
dwell time and percentage of total number of fixations that treated quartile as a 
repeated measures factor with four levels (first, second, third and fourth) and 
schema-consistency as the within-subjects variable with two levels (consistent 
and inconsistent) were carried out. The results for dwell time showed no main 
effect of schema-consistency or quartile (both F < 1), and no interaction 
between the two (F(3,33) = 2.191, p > .05). However, when the dependent
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variable was number of fixations, there was a significant interaction quartile x 
schema-consistency (F(3,33) = 3.663, p < .05).
(a)
50.0 1
45.0 -
40.0 -
g  35.0-
. |  30.0 -
I  25.0 -
I  20.0 -
15.0 -
10.0 -
0.0
2nd Quartile1st Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile
-*— Schema- 
consistent
Schema-
inconsistent
(b)
50.0 -1
45.0 -
40.0 -
g
35.0 -I
I 30.0 -
( w0
1 ,
g 20.0 -
o 15.0 -
10.0 -
0.0
1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile
■ Schema- 
consistent
• Schema- 
inconsistent
Figure 3.4 (a) Percentage of total dwell time, and (b) percentage of
fixations on both categories of object consistency over the four quartiles of 
viewing time. Error bars represent ± SB.
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No main effects of quartile (F < 1) or schema-consistency (F (l,l 1) = 1.592, p > 
.05) were found. Results are represented in Figure 3.4.
In the first quartile there was a preponderance of fixations on schema- 
consistent items (mean = 34.4%, std = 6.5) when compared to schema- 
inconsistent items (mean = 21.4%, std = 8.4)"^ . Newman-Keuls post hoc tests 
(see Appendix F for all Newman-Keuls comparisons for this analysis) revealed 
that this difference was reliable (p = .05). In the second quartile, the attention 
shifted to schema-inconsistent items (32.0% (std = 10.2) vs. 26.4% (std = 8.1) 
for schema-consistent items) although post hoc tests revealed that this 
difference did not reach statistical significance (p > .05). In the third and fourth 
quartiles, fixations were equally spread (both p > .05) between both categories 
o f object consistency (29.6% (std = 8.3) of fixations on schema-consistent vs. 
28.9% (std = 9.9) of fixations on schema-inconsistent in the third quartile, and 
29.4% (std = 10.2) of fixations on schema-consistent vs. 27.0% (std = 9.9) of 
fixations on schema-inconsistent in the fourth quartile). Results show that 
attention shifted from schema-consistent objects to schema-inconsistent objects 
at some point during the first two quartiles (first 7.5 seconds) of scene viewing, 
and for the remaining time, fixation density is similar for both types of objects. 
Both a 8.1% decrease in number of fixations on schema-consistent items from 
the first quartile to the second quartile and a simultaneous 10.6% increase in 
number of fixations on schema-inconsistent items were reliable (both post hoc 
Newman-Keuls p = .05).
Dividing viewing time into quartiles is somewhat arbitrary and had different 
temporal bins been used, these effects may have emerged at different time 
stamps. Nevertheless, the data suggests that there was a shift of attention at 
some point during scene viewing and that it is most likely to happen within the
The remainder of fixations landed on the actor, on large uninformative structural surfaces or 
furniture objects such as cupboards, floor, sofa, etc. and on a very small proportion of other 
objects, which were not classified as consistent or inconsistent (neutral objects).
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first or second quartiles (first 7.5 seconds or approximately 20 fixations). To 
investigate this issue, we carried out a more refined temporal analysis on the 
first twenty fixations. A subset of objects from both categories was selected 
based on the number of observers that have looked at them in those 20 
fixations (see Table 3.3). In total, 22 objects in the cooking scene, 19 objects in 
the tea-making scene, 18 objects in the ironing scene and 13 objects in the 
reading scene were excluded. The percentage of participants fixating on the 
selected objects can be seen in Figure 3.5.
Table 3.3 Objects from both categories o f schema-consistency selected for 
the refined temporal analysis, for each action scene. Numbers refer to the total 
number of observers that looked at each object in the first 20 fixations. The 
upper part of the table shows schema-consistent objects. Schema-inconsistent 
objects are listed in the lower part of the table.
Cooking Tea-making Ironing Reading
Object No. Object No. Object No. Object No.
Ss Ss Ss Ss
Pan 10 Kettle 10 Jumper 9 Newspaper 10
Spice rack 9 Teapot 8 Spray 8 Books2 10
Salt 7 Teabag box 8 Basket 7 Main book 8
Cooker 6 Milk 6 Iron 6 Reading glasses 6
Utensils jar 6 Mugs 5 Hanger 5 Magazine 6
Teabag bag 3 Books 1 4
Flowers 7 Cuddly dog 9 Newspaper 11 Watering can 9
Candlestick 4 Poster 8 Plant 8 Cushion 1 8
Clock 4 Yoghurts 8 Painting 7 Cushion2 7
Plant 2 Sellotape 6 Kitchen roll 6 Cushion3 7
Basin 1 Cleaning spray 6 White box 1 Plant 6
Cheese tub 5 Pepper grinder 4
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For each fixation, the number of observers that were looking at eaeh of the 
selected objects was counted. These numbers were plotted into a diagram as 
shown in Figure 3.5.
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d) Tea-m aking scene
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Figure 3.5 Diagram o f  the distribution o f  the first 20 fixations on the 
highest frequency objects in both consistent and inconsistent categories, for the 
a) cooking scene; b) ironing scene; c) reading scene; and d) tea-m aking scene. 
Empty eells represent zero or one participant. F illed ce lls represent tw o or 
more participants. The darker the cell, the higher the number o f  observers that
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were fixating that object. The objects in bold where used in the recognition 
task. Note that towards the end of the diagram (17 -20^^ fixations) some 
participants were already in the 3"^  ^quartile, which accounts for a lower 
numbers o f participants in those cells.
An equal number of schema-consistent and inconsistent objects are represented 
to allow for direct comparisons. In both categories, the objects that received the 
most fixations were selected. The fixations on the remaining objeets o f each 
category were accounted by the ‘other’ category (for schema-consistent objects 
this is represented in the top row, whereas for schema-inconsistent items it is 
represented in the bottom row).
The diagrams show that overall, schema-consistent items were fixated 
throughout the period containing the first 20 fixations on the scene to a greater 
or lesser extent, whereas schema-inconsistent objects received more sporadic 
allocation of attention. The earliest these objects received attention was on the 
2"^ fixation in the tea-making scene, 3"^  ^fixation in the cooking and ironing 
scenes and 4* fixation in the reading scene. In addition, these objects did not 
receive attention continuously. After looking at them once or twice, 
participants spent some time focussing only on schema-consistent information. 
Around the 7* to 10^  ^fixations, participants returned to schema-inconsistent 
objects for around 2 to 4 fixations. The next 4 or 5 fixations were once again 
on schema-consistent objects. Towards the end o f the first two quartiles 
(fixations 17 to 19), participants refixated on schema-inconsistent objects.
In order to clearly compare the distribution o f attention between the two 
categories of object consistency, the number of observers looking at each 
category was calculated and transformed into percentage o f total number of 
observers, for each action scene. These were plotted as seen in Figure 3.6. 
Figure 3.6 shows that the pattern of fixations in the first two quartiles is far 
from consistent across the four action scenes. However, the distribution of
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fixations on schema-inconsistent objects appears to be typically tri-modal. 
Attention shifts to these objects sometime between fixations 3 and 4, between 
fixations 8 and 12 and sometime between fixations 17 and 19. The results 
suggest that during the first two quartiles, attention shifts to schema- 
inconsistent objects more than once.
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Figure 3.6 Percentage of observers that looked at each object category 
during the first twenty fixations, in each of the four action scenes.
During this time, the distribution o f fixations on schema-consistent information 
does not follow a steady pattern. During this period o f time, fixations on
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schema-consistent objects tended to decrease at the expense of the increase of 
fixations on schema-inconsistent objects.
3.3.4 Discussion
This experiment aimed to investigate effects o f object schematic consistency 
on eye-movement behaviour both at early stages of scene viewing (first 300 
ms) and over the course o f total viewing time. These will be discussed 
separately.
Eye movements at scene onset
Analyses of eye movements within the first 300 ms of scene onset showed that 
most participants fixated on both objects that are schema-consistent and the 
actor, who is inevitably consistent with the schematic content of the scene. 
However, it is possible that in the case of the two lounge-based scenes, the 
actor’s face has attracted attention. Furthermore, schema-consistent objects 
were usually situated near the centre of the scene, where participants were 
fixating at scene onset. Nevertheless, schema-inconsistent objects were fixated 
much later, which supports the view that early scene inspection is characterised 
by a survey of consistent information. This is in accordance with the results 
obtained by De Graef et al (1990) and Henderson et al (1999) but in contrast 
with Loftus and Mackworth (1978). However, in the latter study, the extreme 
simplicity of the stimuli may have accounted for the immediate attentional 
capture for inconsistent objects, because these could be easily processed 
parafoveally. Our results are also in contrast with those obtained by Gordon 
(2004), who reported faster reaction times to inconsistent objects as early as 
150ms. However, our results show that the target o f the first saccade is rarely a 
schema-inconsistent object. It could be that these objects are processed 
preattentively (Wolfe and Bennett 1997), but they are not necessarily fixated.
In other words, even if participants “see” the inconsistent object(s), they might
108
choose not to fixate on it (them) early in scene viewing. Instead, initial scene 
exploration appears to reflect a purposeful attempt at understanding of the 
context of the scene, which then evolves to a more refined inspection of what 
the scene contains, given that participants have some time to do so (Deubel,
1996). It is also possible that objects that are covertly attended at during the 
first fixation will not be targets for the first saccade due to inhibition of return 
(Tipper and Driver, 1988), whereby objects that have been attended may be 
suppressed and attention is not likely to be drawn to them subsequently. This 
phenomenon has been recently associated with the object’s identity, rather than 
with its location (Kessler and Tipper, 2004). Furthermore Kessler and Tipper 
propose that when the object is re-encountered at later stages, recognition is re­
activated, in other words, retrieval of prior processing of those objects is 
possible.
The different result obtained by Gordon (2004) may be based on the choice of 
paradigm (i.e. spatial probe), which was based on criticisms about the validity 
of eye movements as measures o f attention. Indeed, research has shown that 
eye movements and attention can be separable, since shifts o f attention can 
occur prior to eye movements (Posner, Snyder and Davidson, 1980). However, 
it is well established that fixations reflect visual-cognitive processing and that 
attention precedes saccades to objects (Henderson and Hollingworth, 1998), 
i.e. an object can not be fixated if it has not been attended to previous to the 
saccade that lands on that object. Furthermore, decisions about the next 
saccade target are made during fixations (Antes and Penland, 1981). Thus, we 
maintain that the first saccade made on scene onset is a valid indicator of 
people’s attentional behaviour at early stages of perception and that schema- 
consistent objects are the most likely targets of saccades at scene onset.
Similar results to Gordon were obtained by Hollinworth and Henderson (2000) 
who used a paradigm that also relies on reaction time and found that 
participants were better at detecting changes to inconsistent objects when they 
were allowed one fixation only. Although initial saccades are not naturally
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directed to schema-inconsistent objects, these may have been perceived within 
one fixation and changes to these objects may be detected early due to their 
semantic saliency. Furthermore, when visual input disappears eye movements 
can continue (Brockmole and Irwin, 2005) and participants may be able to 
“fixate” on schema-inconsistent objects in the “mind’s eye”.
Work by Hawley, Johnston and Famham (1994) propose a schema and popout 
explanation, where novel nonsense symbol strings where better localised in all­
familiar arrays than in all-novel arrays, and familiar strings produced lower 
accuracy in a one-novel array than in all-familiar arrays. These results suggest 
both novel popout and schema-driven familiar “sink in”. According to Hawley 
and colleagues, the first glance at a scene is likely to produce enhanced 
semantic processing of schema-consistent objects and hindered visual 
processing of the same objects, plus enhanced visual processing of schema- 
inconsistent objects. This could explain the results obtained by Hollingworth 
and Henderson (2000) and Gordon (2004). It is also possible that objects that 
are covertly attended at during the first fixation will not be targets for the first 
saccade due to inhibition of return (Tipper and Driver 1988).
Although it seems that at the start o f scene viewing attention is primarily 
directed to consistent information, these effects should not be generalised 
without caution. The different scenes used in our experiment did not generate 
the same eye-movement behaviour in the first 300 ms of scene onset. In the 
kitchen-based scenes (cooking and tea-making) most participants were fixating 
on schema-consistent objects and in the two lounge-based scenes (ironing and 
reading) the actor received more attention. This might have been caused by a 
lack of connection between place and the actions performed in the living room, 
unlike those performed in the kitchen-based scenes, given that cooking and 
making tea usually occur in kitchens. The initial distribution of attention 
towards the actor in the other two scenes may reflect an attempt to understand 
what the person is doing since they could be doing a number of things (for 
example, watching television). Thus, early scene inspection may depend on
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scene characteristics, which in turn may be related to complex interactions 
between schemata (action and place). Alternatively, the actor’s face in these 
scenes may have attracted attention. Furthermore, it is possible that the time- 
course of scene inspection may be heavily affected by individual differences.
Eye movements over the course o f total viewing time
Results obtained for the whole viewing time revealed that overt attention was 
distributed differentially across both types of objects. The mean ordinal 
position of the first fixation on consistent and inconsistent objects was 4.7 and
9.2 respectively, suggesting early processing of schema-consistent information. 
At initial stages of scene viewing, participants were engaged in inspecting 
objects that were action-schema-consistent in preference to inconsistent items. 
The quartile analysis revealed a shift o f focus to the inconsistent items, which 
dominated until attention was equally spread by both types o f objects. The data 
is in accordance with the results reported by De Graef et al (1990) and 
Henderson et al (1999). This pattern of results suggests that the initial stages of 
visual inspection are guided by schema-related information, that is, more time 
is spent looking at objects that are consistent with the general content o f the 
scene. However, the data suggest that after an initial understanding o f gist of 
the scene, which is confirmed by the consistent objects that have been fixated, 
attention is drawn to schema-inconsistent objects. Since the average number of 
fixations in the first quartile varies between 9 and 11 across the four scenes, 
and the average ordinal position of the first fixation on schema-inconsistent 
objects is 9, it seems reasonable to think that attention starts to shift to these 
objects within the first quartile (first 3.5 seconds or the first 10 fixations). This 
finding is similar to the data reported by De Graef et al (1990), which showed 
that inconsistent objects were not fixated on average before the fixation on 
the scene.
I l l
The reasons for this shift of attention are still unclear. It could be that after a 
certain number of objects that confirm the scene’s context have been 
processed, the observer can now focus on objects that are somewhat odd within 
that context. The prolonged dwell times and refixations on schema-inconsistent 
objects observed in Experiment 3a could reflect attempts to understand their 
presence within that context and/or to connect those objects with the overall 
schematic content of the scene, suppressing schema-consistent objects. On the 
other hand, it is also possible that schema-inconsistent objects attracted 
attention simply because the eyes were somewhere in their proximity. 
According to Findlay (1980), foveal proximity is the most important predictor 
of target salience. When schema-inconsistent objects are close to the point of 
fixation they may attract attention because of their implausibility (De Graef,
1998), and the eyes may dwell longer on them (Hollingworth and Henderson,
1999). When inconsistent objects are fixated, they should receive more scrutiny 
because they violate the initial scene understanding and hence are more 
difficult to process.
Results also show that after the first half of the viewing time, participants 
distribute their attention more evenly across both types of objects. Given there 
is some time left, there is no reason why scene inspection should not continue. 
At this stage, participants know what the scene is about, that it contains both 
consistent and inconsistent objects, and are now free to inspect at will. The 
strategies used during this period are unknown and may vary from person to 
person. However, the equal spread of attention across both types of objects 
suggests an attempt to commit the scene and its elements to memory, since 
participants were told they would be asked some (unspecified) questions about 
the scene at the end of the viewing period.
In summary, at early stages of scene viewing more schema-consistent objects 
and the actor are fixated. A shift o f attention to schema-inconsistent objects 
occurs within the first 20 fixations on the scene. After this time, fixations are 
distributed evenly across both types of objects.
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3.4 Experiment 3c: The effect of action-schemata on memory
3.4.1 Introduction
The purpose of Experiment 3c was to examine how action-schemata affect 
memory for naturalistic scenes depicting actions. Many studies have claimed 
that pre-existing default knowledge (schema or frame) influences the encoding 
of information about scenes (e.g. Brewer and Treyens, 1981; Friedman, 1979; 
Goodman, 1980; Lampinen, Copeland and Neuschatz, 2001; Neuschatz, 
Lampinen, Preston, Hawkins and Toglia, 2002; Pezdek, Whetstone, Reynolds, 
Askari and Dougherty, 1989). A common suggestion from studies of the role of 
semantic consistency in memory is that information that is schema-consistent is 
normally better encoded than schema-inconsistent information (see Alba and 
Hasher, 1983, for a review). Few of these studies have used photorealistic 
images of real scenes. Furthermore, as outlined in Chapter 1, when reviewing 
research on how schemata influence subsequent memory for scenes, we found 
that results are far from consistent.
Using a real-world environment. Brewer and Treyens (1981) found better 
memory for objects that are consistent with expectations of what is likely to be 
found in a specific room. In contrast, Pezdek, et al (1989), using the same 
experimental protocol, found that inconsistent items were better remembered, a 
result supported by the work of Friedman (1979) and Goodman (1980). 
Similarly, using remember-know judgements, Lampinen et al (2001) also 
found that memory for atypical items was more vivid and included more detail 
than memory for typical items. Disagreement between the results obtained by 
different researchers has been attributed to various methodological issues, such 
as type of stimulus used, scene complexity, type of instructions and type of 
memory test. For example, most studies (e.g. Brewer and Treyens, 1981;
Pezdek et al, 1989) differ in how recognition memory was measured (e.g. 
recognising names of objects that might have appeared rather than showing 
participants pictorial examples of objects that may have been present) and used
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few controls during the viewing epoch, so their outcomes cannot be compared 
directly. One way to overcome these problems is to use different memory tests 
according to the type of information they are designed to extract. In this 
experiment, we used the same verbal (free) recall and visual recognition 
(discrimination) tests as Goodman (1980). Free recall involved the generation 
of lists o f objects that participants remembered appearing in the scenes. Visual 
recognition involved the presentation o f a target object together with an 
ontologically matched foil. In this case, the participant was asked to identify 
the target in a paired-forced choice (known as two-altemative-forced-choice,
2AFC) paradigm. Hollingworth and Henderson (1999) found that inconsistent 
objects were better recognised in a forced-choice token recognition task, which 
involved the presentation of two object tokens (same type but visually 
different). The use of object tokens ensures that comparison depends on 
perceptual information since tokens are conceptually equivalent.
Recall performance by means of verbal listing is related to the 
presence/absence of objects in the scene, therefore mediated by expectations 
about objects being found within a specific context. Hence, recall is likely to be 
assisted by the topic o f the action-schema. When cued to recall items that 
appeared in a specific action scene, participants should perform well with 
schema-consistent objects. In contrast, a correct visual recognition requires that 
the visual detail o f the objects is retrievable, and this is independent of the 
scene’s schematic context. Accordingly, Goodman found that objects 
consistent with the schematic content of a scene were well recalled, but poorly 
recognised, whereas objects that are schema-inconsistent were found to be well 
recognised but poorly recalled. In the experiment reported here, we used 
photographs o f real-world complex scenes as opposed to the cartoon-like 
simple line drawings depicting actions used by Goodman. By definition, real- 
world scenes are less controlled than line drawings, but they carry much 
greater ecological validity. Line drawings have been shown to produce faster 
identification times than detailed photographs due to the fact that they 
emphasize thematic and global content (Friedman, 1979). In addition, a
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comparison between responses to outdoor scenes and photographs of those 
scenes revealed that, as long as the photograph contained most of the variation 
observed in the real-world equivalent, there were no differences in participants’ 
descriptive language with either stimulus (Shafer and Richards, 1974).
Based on the arguments presented above, there is enough evidence to predict 
that inconsistent objects will not be well recalled, but their visual detail is 
likely to be retrieved in the visual recognition task. In contrast, the currently 
active schema will support recall o f consistent objects, but recognition 
performance for these objects is likely to be poor.
3.4.2 Method 
Participants
Twenty-four adults, twelve female and twelve male (mean age 31.1), 
volunteered to participate in the experiment. Half o f these also participated in 
Experiments 3a and 3b.
Stimulus and materials
The same four stimuli used in experiment 3a were used. Images were presented 
at a resolution of 1024 by 768 pixels (16 bit colour), on a 19” VGA colour 
monitor positioned at a constant distance of 25” (31.3° x 24.5° visual angle).
For the recognition task, stimuli consisted o f pairs of targets and ontologically- 
matched distractors positioned in the centre of the screen, against a white 
background (see Figure 3.7). Both objects were equidistant from the centre of 
the screen and each subtended approximately 9° x 3° visual angle. The distance 
between the centre of each object and the centre of the screen was 
approximately 6°. Target objects and distractors are listed in Appendix E.
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Procedure
Initial instructions and presentation of the four scenes were identical to 
Experiment 3a. After the final scene was presented, on-screen instructions 
described the recall or recognition task participants were to perform next. For 
recall, participants were cued scene by scene using the label of the action 
depicted (e.g. “cooking scene”), and were asked to name as many objects as 
they could remember seeing on the scene, with a time limit o f 40 seconds.
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Figure 3.7 Example of the two-altemative-forced-choice visual recognition 
task display, for the two schema-consistent and two schema-inconsistent 
objects from the ironing scene.
Responses were recorded by the experimenter and the recall score for each 
category of object consistency was the total number o f objects that were
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correctly named by the participant, in each consistency category. For the 
visual recognition task, participants were required to make a forced choice 
between two objects, using the mouse to indicate which object had appeared in 
the earlier scenes. Targets and distractors were shown in isolation in the centre 
of the screen, and grouped by scene. The time taken to make a decision 
between the two objects was also recorded by E-prime 1.1. Scenes were 
presented in the same order at initial viewing and during the cued-recall and 
visual recognition tests. This was determined by a Latin Square, and order of 
presentation of object pairs during recognition was randomised within each 
scene. The order o f the recall and recognition tasks was counterbalanced across 
participants. For each participant, scores in each of the four action scenes were 
added.
3.4.3 Results
The purpose of this experiment was to compare memory performance with 
schema-consistent and inconsistent objects. After 15 seconds of viewing time, 
two tasks were carried out: a free verbal recall and a 2-altemative forced choice 
visual recognition test.
Preliminary analyses o f variance indicated that there were no order effects of 
memory test (p > .10), that is, scores were not affected regardless of whether 
participants performed the recall task followed by the recognition task or vice- 
versa, so the data for all subjects was collapsed into one group.
Recall
Inferences (plausible schema-consistent objects that were not present in the 
scene) and intrusions (schema-consistent objects present in one of the other 
three scenes) were also recorded during the free recall task. Results for the 
recall task are shown in Table 3.4. It is difficult to ascertain which proportion 
of the correct responses were guesses based on the likelihood of those objects
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being present in those images. Nonetheless, the reduced rate o f inferences 
obtained in this experiment (as shown in Table 3.4) suggests that observers 
were reluctant to guess when performing the verbal recall task.
Table 3.4 Percentage of correct recalls, intrusions and inferences (or false 
memories) for the recall task, across the four action scenes.
Cooking Tea-making Ironing Reading
Correct recalls 15.6% 17.2% 20.7% 27.9%
Intrusions 0.9% 0.8% 1.1% 1.3%
Inferences 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Recognition
Reaction times for recognition decisions showed that participants took on 
average 400 ms longer to make a decision about schema-consistent objects, 
although this difference did not reach statistical significance (F(l,23)= 3.194, p 
= .087).
Recall and recognition
To facilitate integration across scenes and contrasts between recall incidence of 
schema-consistent and schema-inconsistent items (which were necessarily 
more or less prevalent within the different scenes), scores were converted to 
percentages of maximum possible correct recall. Recognition performance was 
also transformed into a percentage of maximum correct recognition for the four 
scenes (8 responses).
Figure 3.8 illustrates the results from both memory tasks. When asked to recall 
the objects in the scenes, participants performed better with schema-consistent 
objects (mean = 38.5%, std = 19.1) than with schema-inconsistent objects
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(mean = 27.1%, std = 22.0). On the other hand, when performing a forced- 
choice recognition test, participants performed far better with schema- 
inconsistent objects (mean = 81.8%, std = 12.2) than with schema-consistent 
objects (mean = 59.9%, std = 20.5).
Two ANOVAs carried out on recall scores and on recognition scores revealed 
a main effect of schema-consistency in both cases, with F(l,23) = 6.838, p <
.05 and F(l,23) = 24.679, p < .001, respectively, although results were 
asymmetric as can be clearly seen in Figure 3.8. The results show that the 
instantiation of an action-schema affects the selective eye-movement behaviour 
within scenes depicting the actions and the memory for elements within those 
scenes. In order to investigate whether the differential allocation o f attention is 
responsible for differences in the process of encoding of those scenes, we 
carried out further analyses.
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Figure 3.8 Memory performance in the recall and recognition tasks (in 
percentage of maximum possible performance), averaged across scenes, for 
both categories of object schema-consistency. Error bars represent ± SB.
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Both total dwell times and number of fixations were divided by the number of 
objects in each category in order to provide an average per item. Paired- 
samples t-tests were used to test for differences between the amount of time 
spent looking at objects that were subsequently correctly recalled or recognised 
and the time spent on objects that failed to be recalled or recognised.
Recall
There were significant differences between the time spent looking at correctly 
recalled and unrecalled schema-inconsistent objects, in both eye-movement 
measures used (t(l 1) = 2.728, p < .05 for dwell time, and t(l 1) = 2.304, p < .05 
for number of fixations). Longer dwell times were observed for correctly 
recalled schema-inconsistent objects (mean = 0.9 s, std = 0.5) than unrecalled 
schema-inconsistent objects (mean = 0.5 s, std = 0.2). Results for number of 
fixations where in the same direction, with mean = 2.0 (std = 1.3) for correctly 
recalled schema-inconsistent objects and mean =1.3  (std = 0.5) for unrecalled 
schema-inconsistent objects. However, no reliable differences in dwell time on 
correctly recalled and unrecalled schema-consistent objects (t(l 1) = 1.334, p > 
.05, or for number of fixations (t(l 1) = 1.066, p > .05) were found.
Recognition
None of the differences in dwell times were reliable (t(l 1) = 1.475, p > .05 for 
schema-consistent objects and t(l 1) < 1 for schema-inconsistent objects). 
However, the more often an object was fixated, the more chance it had of being 
correctly recognised. This was the case for schema-inconsistent objects (mean= 
1.7, std = 0.8 for correctly recognised schema-inconsistent objects and mean = 
0.8, std = 0.9 for incorrectly recognised objects, t(l 1) = 2.207, p < .05) but not 
quite the case for schema-consistent objeets (t(l 1) = 1.947, p = .078).
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3.4.4 Discussion
In this experiment, we examined the effects of schemata on the amount and 
type of information that is retrieved after scene viewing, which in turn can 
provide insight into what happened during scene viewing.
Results from the memory tasks fully endorse Goodman’s (1980) work on 
action-schemata and provide evidence for an action schema-driven encoding of 
information during the processing of photographs o f natural scenes depicting 
actions. It appears that when scenes represent well-known simple activities that 
organise information around them, the physieal detail o f objects typically 
associated with those actions is not incorporated (or not retrievable) in the 
representations of the scenes depicting them. Information that violates the 
schematic context of the scene is likely to be encoded explicitly with rich 
visual detail because inconsistent objects cannot be reconstructed from the 
instantiated schema. Alternatively, because schema-consistent objects are 
easily identifiable (Biederman, Mezzanote and Rabinowitz, 1982; Boyce, 
Pollatsek and Rayner, 1989; Friedman, 1979), they are expected to “sink in” 
and schema-inconsistent objects will be processed further. This is in 
accordance with the results obtained by Hollingworth and Henderson (1999), 
who report better recognition performance for inconsistent objects is a token- 
discrimination task as the one used in our study. Recalling which objects were 
present in the scenes produced the opposite result. Participants were generally 
better at recalling schema-consistent information, even though schema- 
inconsistent information is, by definition, somewhat odd within the context of 
the action scenes.
Our results are, however, in contrast with classic work by Brewer and Treyens 
(1981), who found better memory for schema-consistent objects. As discussed 
in Chapter 1, many of these inconsistencies seem to originate from direct 
comparisons between results obtained using two different memory tests. Often, 
these tests have equal designations but require access to qualitatively different
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types o f information, a typical example being recognition. Visual recognition 
(as used in Goodman, 1980) implies that a good performance relies on the 
retrieval of visual detail about the objects in the scene. In contrast, performance 
in a verbal recognition test (as used in Brewer and Treyens, 1981) depends on 
remembering the content of a scene, but not the visual detail o f its elements.
Alternatively, the results obtained in the memory tasks may not be attributed to 
schematic effects at encoding, but to underlying mechanisms within retrieval 
memory. The gist or general theme of events has been shown to take 
precedence during free recall tasks (e.g. Thorndike, 1977) and this has been 
attributed to a hierarchical method o f encoding, where typical (i.e. schema- 
consistent) information takes precedence. This suggests that after recalling a 
certain number of schema-consistent objects, participants could not access 
further information. Poor recall o f schema-inconsistent objects may occur 
because the more items are recalled, the less likely it is for the remaining items 
to be recalled, even if they were encoded (Spear, 1978), particularly if  the time 
available for recall is limited (as it was in this experiment). Alternatively, it is 
also possible those items were not encoded. For information that is supported 
by the active schema, the encoding method may be inherently different from 
the encoding method used for information that was not represented in the 
schema in the first place. The same may happen at retrieval stages. For 
example, asking someone to recall objects that were present in a specific scene 
(which will evoke eategorised knowledge) cues them to search for potential 
candidates in the appropriate location in memory and generate lists o f probable 
targets. In contrast, probing for visual detail may involve access to an isolated 
short-term memory trace, especially if  it concerns unexpected items. As 
Baddeley (1999) convincingly argued: “Anything that is not standard will be 
encoded separately, and these pointers provide the mechanism for 
reminding...'’ {p. 155).
Schema theory suggests that failures in recall o f schema-inconsistent 
information may be due to it not being selected for storage or it not being
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included in the gist during the reconstructive process because there is no 
connection vdth the main theme of the event (Alba and Hasher, 1983). In fact, 
by adding a recognition test that required memory for presence/absence by 
using discrimination between names (hence in the absence o f visual detail), 
Goodman (1980) showed that inconsistent objects were still poorly recognised. 
This suggests that poor retrieval of schema-inconsistent information is due to a 
lack of connection with the active schema, at storage and this effect cannot be 
aceounted by output order effects at retrieval, which are inherent to free recall 
tasks.
It is also possible that the superior recall performance o f schema-consistent 
information is due to response bias (Johnson, Raye, Foley and Foley, 1981). 
However, some research has shown that when anticipating a memory test, 
response bias is likely to be reduced (Lampinen et al, 2001). Furthermore, 
when examining the rate of false alarms obtained in our experiment, it seems 
unlikely that participants were biased in their responses. The extremely low 
rate of inferences (incorrect recalls of plausible objects) is also surprising under 
the predictions of schema-theory that during the reconstructive process, a 
considerable number of inferences is expected. For example. Brewer and 
Treyens (1981) reported false memory rates o f 26% for written recall and 31% 
for drawing recall. In their study, participants had up to 30 minutes to perform 
each task and in our study they were told they only had 40 seeonds. Hence, the 
low inferences rate obtained in our study may be due to time limitations on the 
recall task. False memories may depend on the amount of time given to 
produce them. Other researchers have reported the same lack of inferences (e.g. 
Lampinen et al, 2001; Singer, 1979) and Israel and Schacter (1997) found that 
pictures tend to produce low rate of false memories and false remember 
judgements, which might be caused by the fact that having access to visual 
(experiential) detail o f consistent objects suppresses any false memory about a 
similar item (Lampinen et al, 2001). In addition, most alternative explanations 
o f schema-driven representations cannot explain poor recognition performance
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with schema-consistent objects, which according to critics of schema theory 
benefit from rehearsal during processing (Alba and Hasher, 1983).
3.5 Experiment 4: The effect of context in recognition performance under 
action-schema mediation
3.5.1 Introduction
The recognition task used in experiment 3c involved disembodying the objects 
from their original scenes and presenting them in isolation with a paired foil 
(see Figure 3.8). It is not clear whether this could have produced an effect on 
performance, since memory might depend on context effects. Here a brief 
review of the relevant literature is presented followed by an experiment 
designed to test whether that was the case.
The effect o f context on memory has given rise to many studies that date back 
to 1925 and robust effect sizes have been reported since (Smith and Vela, 
2001). Relevant to this experiment are those which focused on context 
reinstatement effects, i.e. whether the provision of context at time of test 
improves memory given that participants have access to contextual cues that 
were present at encoding (e.g. Godden and Baddeley, 1980; Smith, Vela and 
Williamson, 1988). Most research in this field has used environmental context 
manipulations, by changing information about the place where the learning 
took place at test time. The main theoretical question posed by researchers in 
this area is whether during an event, because people are likely to encode 
information about the environment where the event occurred, changing 
environmental information at test is likely to affect memory performance.
Recall memory has been robustly shown to be sensitive to context 
reinstatement effects, where matching the learning and test contexts usually 
produce better performance (e.g. Humphreys, Bain and Pike, 1989). In other
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words, when memory is tested with recall, encoding context elements together 
with the to-be-remembered item and retrieving those context elements usually 
facilitate the retrieval o f that item. However, in many studies on recognition, 
performance was not found to differ whether or not the learning context was 
reinstated at test time. For example, Godden and Baddeley (1980) found no 
effects o f context reinstatement on recognition for word lists when scuba divers 
were tested on land or underwater.
A well-known explanation for this phenomenon is the “outshining” hypothesis 
(Smith, 1986), which holds that during retrieval, when the memory trace for 
the test item is very strong, no effects of context on memory should be 
observable. Item strength is likely to increase if  during retrieval, the 
environment is suppressed (Smith and Vela, 2001). Because recognition tests 
usually provide cues that reinstate associations which were present at learning, 
memory performance is likely to be less affected by the environment at test. 
Other researchers have failed to confirm this prediction. For example, Mumane 
and Phelps (1995) manipulated item memory strength by increasing item 
repetitions, study time and level of processing and found context effects in all 
conditions, regardless of item strength. “Overshadowing” refers to the same 
effects of context suppression during learning, and it is likely to be a 
consequence of added conceptual and /or associative processing of test items, 
at the expense o f environment information (Smith and Vela, 2001).
Context can be also reinstated mentally, normally via task instructions, and 
reinstatement effects on memory have been shown to occur in a similar way as 
when context is physically reinstated (e.g. Krafka and Penrod, 1985). Similarly 
to the outshining hypothesis, the mental reinstatement hypothesis poses that 
remembering will be independent of context effects because the environment is 
suppressed when mental reinstatement takes place during retrieval (Smith and 
Vela, 2001).
125
Many theories of memory have claimed that when an item is cued at test, other 
items belonging to the original episode are equally activated (e.g. Murdock,
1997), a phenomenon designated “global activation” (Mumane and Phelps, 
1995). In contrast to this view are theories that claim that a recognition 
decision about an item is made in isolation from other items that might have 
been encoded together with the test item (e.g. Mandler, 1980). The 
representation of the test item would be accessed immediately with 
presentation of two alternatives of that item and guide decision. In this case, no 
context effects are expected.
This experiment involved recognising objects on their own (single condition) 
or embodied in the original scene (embodied condition). In view of the fact that 
most studies using recognition memory found negligible context effects on 
memory performance, it is expected that recognition for both schema- 
consistent objects and schema-inconsistent objects will be independent of the 
testing condition. Consequently, it is predicted that the effect obtained in 
Experiment 3 c will extend to this experiment.
3.5.2 Method 
Participants
One hundred and twenty seven psychology undergraduates from the University 
of Surrey participated in the experiment as part o f a Cognitive Psychology lab 
class.
Stimulus and materials
The same four action scenes presented in Experiment 3a were used. During the 
recognition task, two types of stimuli were used depending on the condition. 
The single condition used identical stimuli as the ones used in recognition task 
in Experiment 3c. The embodied condition involved a choice between the 
original scene and a scene where the target object was replaced by a distractor.
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The same target object and distractor pairs as in the single condition were used. 
The scenes subtended 12.5° x 9.8° and were equidistant from the centre of the 
screen. The distance between the centre of the screen and the centre of each 
scene was 8.4°. The same apparatus was used.
Procedure
Participants were divided into two groups according to the type of recognition 
task they were to perform (single or embodied). Scene presentation and 
subsequent recognition task were essentially the same as that used in 
Experiment 3c as described in section 3.2. Instructions were also identical.
3.5.3 Results
A mixed ANOVA, with schema-consistency as the within-subjects variable 
and condition (single vs. embodied) as the between-subjects variable, was 
carried out on the number of objects correctly recognised. A main effect of 
schema-consistency, with F(I,125) = 25.345, p < .001, indicated that 
recognition performance differed according to object category. There were 
more correct recognition decisions of schema-inconsistent objects (mean = 
79.8%, std =18) than correct recognitions of schema-consistent objects (mean 
= 70.2%, std = 16). This is illustrated in Figure 3.9. More importantly, there 
was no main effect of condition and no schema-consistency x condition 
interaction (both F < 1). Whether objects were presented in their original 
context or disembodied from the scene during test phase had no effect on 
recognition performance for both types of objects.
In summary, regardless of the type of objects, participants’ recognition 
performance did not differ whether they had to decide between individual 
objects or whole scenes. Furthermore, results show the same recognition 
advantage for schema-inconsistent objects observed in Experiment 3c, in both 
single and embodied conditions.
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Figure 3.9 Recognition performance for schema-consistent and 
inconsistent objeets in both experimental conditions. Error bars represent ± SE.
3.5.4 Discussion
This experiment was designed to investigate whether presenting items in 
isolation from their original scenes had an effect on recognition memory. 
Performance in this task was compared with performanee in a reeognition task 
where the original scenes were presented in pairs with foil seenes (where only 
the test object is changed). Results show that tasks using forced-choice 
recognition of objects, which depend on remembering the spécifié visual 
features of objects originally presented within a eontext, do not depend on 
contextual information. The provision of the original context (which included 
information about spatial organisation and relative position of objects) in which 
the objects where encountered during scene viewing did not alter the results 
obtained in the single condition and in Experiment 3c (where no contextual 
information was provided). Similar results with recognition memory were 
reported by Godden and Baddeley (1980) and Smith et al (1988). Given that
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during learning items were encoded within in a coherent semantic context, 
associations between items were likely to have been encoded (Smith and Vela, 
2001). Even in the absence of the original context, participants in the single 
condition could have mentally self-generated the entire scene and perform 
recognition decisions in a similar situation as the participants in the embodied 
condition. This is a realistic possibility since recognition tests usually provide 
many cues that encourage mental reinstatement o f the original context (Smith 
and Vela, 2001).
Our results contrast, however, with the findings o f a study by Mumane and 
Phelps (1995) where non-global (confined to the computer screen and not the 
global physical environment) context manipulations were used. Mumane and 
Phelps (1995) found screen-context-dependent effects in recognition 
performance even when time strength was increased. In their study, stimuli 
were isolated pairs of words and the context manipulations involved 
background and foreground colour and location o f the test items. In this 
experiment, stimuli were objects situated within a complex semantic context. 
According to Smith and Vela (2001), if  during leaming semantic processing of 
items is encouraged (“overshadowing”) via either instmctions or verbal cues, 
context effects on memory at test time are likely to be negligible. In the scenes 
used in this experiment, inter-item semantic associations are inherent to the 
nature of the stimuli. Furthermore, in the environmentally mismatched 
condition (single condition), participants were aware that the test objects came 
from a specific context because they were given the verbal label of the scene 
prior to test. Although context was not reinstated visually, it was verbally (and 
probably mentally), and that might have been sufficient for any context- 
dependent effects on memory to disappear. Other explanations for the different 
results obtained by Mumane and Phelps (1995) could rest on issues like 
stimulus complexity and stimulus exposure duration. When a larger number of 
items is present during leaming, environmental effects on memory tend to 
decrease and the same happens when stimuli are inspected for longer (Smith 
and Vela, 2001). The stimuli in Mumane and Phelps’s (1995) study were
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simpler and were studied for shorter time intervals than the stimuli used in the 
experiment reported here.
According to the “outshining” hypothesis (Smith, 1986), when memory 
strength for items is increased, context should have no effect on recognition 
performance. If  that was the case then we might have expected an interaction 
between context and item schema-consistency. In other words, given that 
memory traces for visual information of schema-consistent objects are weaker 
than those for schema-inconsistent objects, recognition performance for the 
former objects would be different for the embodied and single conditions. 
Conversely, because visual detail o f schema-inconsistent objects is easily 
retrievable, changing context during test should not have any effect on 
performance. However, the results from this experiment show that recognition 
did not change in either case. Semantic processing during leaming was 
sufficient to suppress any context effects at retrieval and produce strong traces 
for both schema-consistent and inconsistent objects.
Similarly, global activation theories (e.g. Murdock, 1993), cannot account for 
the results, since more information is activated in the embodied condition than 
in the single condition, which according to those theories, would lead to 
differences in recognition performance in the two conditions. In actual fact, it 
could be that given that in the single condition participants read the verbal label 
of each scene before making any recognition decisions about the objects in that 
scene, mental reinstatement of most of the information contained in the original 
scene would be enough to activate the same amount of information as in the 
embodied condition. Nevertheless, theories that sustain access to isolated 
representations of the test item (e.g. Mandler, 1980) could be more appropriate 
to account for the results obtained in this study. In the light of these theories, 
whether the item is presented embodied in its original context or on its own 
would not affect recognition performance because decisions are made based on 
the item in isolation. In the embodied condition, after locating the target object
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in the scene, comparisons may ensue as if  the “old” and “new” versions were 
presented disembodied from the scenes.
In summary, the strength of the memory representations for both objects could 
have masked any context-dependent recognition effects. In addition, the 
provision of a verbal label during test could have reinstated the original 
context, despite the fact that participants could not see the original scenes and 
the objects in their original locations. Alternatively, during recognition tasks, 
representations for objects are accessed in isolation from those o f other objects 
that occurred in the original scene. Whichever the case, the type of test used in 
Experiment 3c produced robust results with regards to differences in memory 
performance for schema-consistent and inconsistent objects, and these results 
were not an artefact of disembodying the original objects from their scenes at 
test time.
3.6 General Discussion
Results demonstrate that action-schemata directed perception of the stimuli 
used in our experiment, supporting the work from other researchers (Brewer 
and Treyens, 1981; Friedman, 1979; Goodman, 1980; Pezdez et al, 1989). 
Schema-inconsistent objects received more scrutiny overall and produced 
visual representations with richer detail. Schema-consistent objects were 
generally well recalled but representations about those objects were poor in 
visual detail. During the course of scene viewing, sehema-consistent objects 
and schema-consistent information such as the actor receives more attention 
early during scene viewing. In scenes where action and place are not strongly 
correlated (ironing and reading), early fixations tend to land on the actor, 
probably as an attempt to understand what the scene is about, given that other 
actions are equally plausible to occur in a lounge. Attention shifted to 
inconsistent information at later stages, which could account for the differences 
in memory performance. Finally, recognition performance did not depend on
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the context where objects initially appeared. Performance when the original 
scenes were presented at test did not differ from when decisions were made on 
single objects. The reasons behind this are most likely tied to the nature of 
recognition tasks, since enough cues are produced at test time to allow for 
mental reinstatement o f the original context. Furthermore, semantic processing 
of items during leaming, which are inevitable in the scenes used in the 
experiment, may mask any context effects that could occur.
Eye movements at scene onset
It is well known that the speed of scene categorisation and object identification 
relies on the fact that strong associations between the elements present in the 
scene already exist in memory (e.g. Palmer 1975). Using event-related 
potentials (ERP), Van Rullen and Thorpe (2001) found that participants 
performed semantic analysis of scenes and their objects as soon as 160 ms. 
Similarly, Gordon (2004) found that attention is guided by semantic effects at 
150 ms after scene onset. Furthermore, in an experiment carried out by Thorpe, 
Gegenfurtner, Fabre-Thorpe and Biilthoff (2001), participants were capable of 
detecting the presence of an animal in a photograph of a scene after exposures 
of just 28 ms and at eccentricities o f 70.5°. This result is supported by Grill- 
Speetor and Kanwisher (2005), who demonstrated that accuracy for detecting 
an object (for example a car, and animal or a musical instmment) and 
categorising is above chance in exposure durations lower than 50 ms. 
Furthermore, in order to perform a subsequent correct identification o f an 
object, only 65 ms on average were necessary.
Early scene viewing appears to be dominated by schema-consistent 
information, which could be accounted by the effect of scene context in the 
identification of objects (Biederman, Mezzanotte and Rabinowitz, 1982; Boyce 
and Pollatsek, 1992; Boyce, Pollatsek and Rayner, 1989), where contextually 
consistent objects produce shorter naming latencies after a brief scene
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exposure. An important theoretical framework has given rise to the notion that 
early scene viewing is guided by perceptual rather than semantic factors. 
Henderson et al (1999) proposed a model of eye-movement control based on a 
‘saliency map’. They based their model for eye movement control on the 
Schyns and Oliva (1994) concept o f coarse-to-fine (’’blobs to boundaries”) 
evolution during scene processing. Schyns and Oliva’s theory is based on the 
idea that when a scene belongs to a category it contains a typical spatial 
structure, which is characteristic of that scene. The authors argue that fast scene 
reeognition, which may take place before object identification, is due to 
attention to a coarse scale (principally made of spatial relations), which 
provides a rough estimate o f the input, and can lead to the instantiation of 
schemata. According to Schyns and Oliva (1994), coarse structural blobs 
activate schemata. When scenes contain actions, how are they categorised? 
Since our objects were classified in relation to the action, not to the scene, a 
typical structure for our scenes would be hard to predict, especially in the 
reading and ironing scenes, which involve actions that take can place in a 
variety of places. Nonetheless, some spatial information may need to be 
extracted before it can be indexed to any knowledge in long-term memory.
Stemming from this model, Henderson et al (1999) propose that at initial stages 
of scene viewing eye movements, i.e. initial fixation placement and fixation 
duration are controlled by visual factors rather than semantic ones. However, 
more recently, Tatler, Gilchrist and Rusted (2003) proposed a time course of 
abstract representation where scene gist is extracted within the first second of 
scene viewing and that spatial layout can only be extracted within the first two 
seconds after scene onset. They showed that other properties such as object 
colour and shape are not extracted at the initial exposure of a new scene. This 
conflicts with Henderson et al’s “saliency map” theory. Moreover, in 
Henderson et al’s study it is not clear what is meant precisely by “initial 
stages” of scene perception. Mannan, Ruddock and Wooding (1996) have also 
argued that initial fixation position in a scene is guided by perceptual rather 
than semantic factors, although only edge density was found to be a reliable
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(but weak) predictor of initial fixation position. It could be argued that 
perceptual factors may guide initial fixation position when stimuli are 
manipulated to an extent that semantic information is difficult to extract. It 
appears that immediate scene perception is predominantly holistic. However, 
holistic features, provided by a perceptually-guided mechanism, can only 
become useful if  some form of top-down schema-driven processing puts them 
together and guides attention to more fine information.
What happens in the first fixation remains difficult to measure, but by 
integrating results from the literature described here, we can estimate that scene 
categorisation should occur at least within the first 100 ms after onset and that 
ftirther semantic analysis o f objects within that scene should occur at least 
within the first 160 ms. Evidence has shown that spatial layout based on 
structure alone can be extracted in the first 37 ms (Renninger and Malik 
2004a). Whether these are independent processes which occur consecutively 
remains uncertain. So far, the extent to which attention selects an object based 
purely on visual salience and then processes the object’s semantics has not yet 
been ascertained. However, Grill-Spector and Kanwisher (2005) have showed 
that object detection and categorisation occur simultaneously and require the 
same amount of processing. In order for explicit (overt) attention to select an 
object, it has to be segregated from the background, a process that will most 
certainly depend on image statistics such as texture, luminance, contrast, etc. 
(Deubel 1996). However, if  scenes are in fact perceived on the basis o f a 
perceptual saliency map, the time scale for this process should be infinitely 
small. It is argued that texture can be extracted preattentively and that object 
positions can be discriminated instantaneously (Deubel 1996). According to 
Grill-Spector and Kanwisher (2005), the category to which the object belongs 
can also be extracted at this point. After this, focal attention can be directed 
based on this information for further processing. Whether the spatial layout of 
the scene can be extracted in such short amount of time is not known. It seems 
plausible to think that any global feature information that is immediately 
extracted from the scene can provide clues as to what the scene is about or
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what it may contain. If this is the case, some information about spatial layout 
could be extracted together with semantic information.
Eye movements over the course o f total viewing time
Less disagreement exists about the semantic guidance of eye movements at 
later stages o f scene viewing. The results obtained here suggest that 
inconsistent information is likely to receive more attention after some scene 
exploration has taken place. Refixations on inconsistent objects may simply 
reflect a greater “interest” generated by them or an attempt to resolve the 
conflict originated by the lack of contextual relationship between them and the 
scene. Similarly to other studies (Goodman 1980; Friedman 1979; Henderson 
et al 1999), our participants were pre-empted with a memory test. Thus; in this 
case, the most efficient strategy during viewing would be to distribute attention 
equally across the scene and its contents. Still, attention was drawn to 
inconsistent objects, both in terms of total dwell time and number of fixations. 
Schema-consistent appear to be perceived holistically, without the need for re­
confirmation. Nonetheless, the superior retrieval of the schema-inconsistent 
objects’ visual attributes could also be caused by other covert attentional 
mechanisms besides selective gaze direction (e.g. “pop-out” originated by 
covert attentional shifts). This idea was pervasively supported by Loftus and 
Mackworth (1978). Many studies following Loftus and Mackworth’s (1978) 
did not find fixation precedence for inconsistent objects (De Graef et al, 1990; 
Friedman and Liebelt, 1981; Henderson et al, 1999). Inconsistent popout is 
unlikely to occur. Instead, visually driven processing of these objects is most 
certainly a cause rather than a consequence o f attention dwelling for longer in 
these objects (De Graef, 1998). Still, attention is likely to be captured hy these 
objects, due to an increased need for foveal processing. De Graef goes on to 
propose that these objects are more salient and are likely to be the target of 
voluntary rather than involuntary gaze shifts, because processing of these 
objects in extrafoveal vision is difficult. Conversely, consistent objects are
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easier to discriminate extrafoveally because they belong to the activated 
schema. In most paradigms and in real-world situations, given that consistent 
objects are likely to outnumber inconsistent objects, they are also likely to be 
nearer each other. It seems plausible to think that when objects are closer, thus 
allowing for parafoveal processing, there is no need for refixating on them. 
However, the features o f inconsistent objects need to be analysed more 
intensely but they do not necessarily attract attention. In the study reported 
here, average saccade length was the same for both types of objects, which 
suggests that inconsistent objects did not attract overt attention. In addition, 
first fixation durations were independent of object schema-consistency. It 
appears that as an object was encountered for the first time, participants did not 
seem to engage in further processing of objects of either type. The same results 
have been reported in the studies by De Graef et al (1990) and Henderson et al 
(1999).
Memory tasks
The results obtained in the memory tasks suggest that schematic mediation of 
scene viewing may also be responsible for differences in memory 
representations o f the elements present in the scene. Once only the relevant 
information from the environment is extracted, the gist is abstracted and most 
of the superficial low-level characteristics (visual detail) o f that environment 
will be lost (Simons and Levin, 1997). This could be the cause for poorer 
recognition of schema-consistent objects. Reproducing a previously attended 
scene would involve accessing any temporary traces of the recent input 
together with existing long-term knowledge (schema). Since schema- 
inconsistent objects are not initially part of that long-term knowledge, encoding 
will most likely be temporary leaving a strong trace rich in visual detail, which 
would account for good recognition performance.
136
In summary, during the recall task in this experiment, participants may be 
accessing long-term memory traces, which mainly contain schema-consistent 
information. But during recognition, they may be accessing temporary memory 
traces, which mainly contain schema-inconsistent information.
Low-level features of information that is consistent with pre-existent 
knowledge about the scene appear to be encoded holistically. In an ‘ironing’ 
scene and iron is likely to be encoded as an ‘iron’ rather than an iron with a 
particular colour or shape, provided the real features o f the object are normal 
within the context o f previous experience with those objects (as opposed to a 
red iron, for example). In the case of well-known everyday actions, low-level 
information about objects involved in those actions is not essential for the 
coherent understanding and/or performance of those actions. A similar 
argument was presented by French and Richards (1993), in a study 
investigating schema-driven errors that can occur with everyday objects such 
as clocks. In their experiment, participants mistakenly assumed the Roman 
numeral equivalent to ‘4 ’ to be represented by ‘IV’ in clock faces, when in fact 
it is normally represented by ‘IIII’. Because this is irrelevant to telling time, 
observers drew the clock according to their schematic knowledge o f Roman 
numerals, failing to encode the physical features of the individual numbers. For 
unnecessary differences to be retrievable, they may need active deployment of 
attention to remain in memory, which may lead to subsequent incorporation 
into the schema. That is, default specifications about schema-relevant elements 
may prevail until sensory input is actively processed, temporarily updating the 
representation. The new sensorial input is integrated with pre-existing 
knowledge to form the representation of the scene. If physical aspects of 
schema-consistent objects are not actively processed, the lack of information 
about visual attributes of those items is inferred by using assumptions about the 
probable detail o f the object in question.
In summary, what is remembered on retrieval is only a subset of the total 
information stored and is most likely the gist or meaning (Alba and Hasher, 
1983; Simons and Levin, 1997). Retention of low-level detail about objects is
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likely to be supported by temporary memory (Logie, 1995). This can be 
integrated with existing knowledge to create a representation o f a scene/event 
(Bartlett, 1932). When memory is tested in the absence of the input/scene, 
information can be retrieved both from long-term and temporary memory 
storages. The presence of schema-consistent information is more likely to be 
accessible than other type of information, as it is able to rely on long-term 
memory.
The eye-movement results obtained in Experiment 3a may be responsible for 
the differences obtained in the memory tasks. Longer dwell times on objects 
allow for longer processing times, increasing the changes of information 
prevailing for longer in memory. Similarly, refixations on objects are likely to 
reinforce the information contained in them (Mamlberg and Shiffrin, 2005). 
Hollingworth and Henderson (2002) claimed that representations about objects 
persist for some time after attention has been withdrawn from them. When 
information is revisited (refixated) it may leave a stronger memory trace. Scene 
re-inspection is a form of rehearsal (Brockmole and Irwin, 2005). During the 
15 seconds participants had available, the type o f information that was revisited 
more often was schema-consistent information. This may account for superior 
recall o f schema-consistent objects but does not explain why recognition of 
these objects is poorer than recognition of schema-inconsistent objects. The 
results obtained for recall suggest that having looked at an object for longer 
and more often increased the chances o f it being subsequently recalled, but 
only in the case of schema-inconsistent objects. The fact that participants spent 
twice as much time on average fixating on schema-inconsistent objects that 
were subsequently recalled (dwell time = 881 ms and number of fixations = 
2.09), than on schema-inconsistent objects that were not recalled (dwell time = 
484 ms and number of fixations = 1.32) indicates that overt allocation of 
attention may be critical for inclusion of schema-inconsistent objects in the 
final representation of the scene. The same is not true for schema-consistent 
items. As for recognition, it appears that in order to make a correct recognition 
of schema-inconsistent items attention had to be allocated to them (extra
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fixations) and this might also be the case for schema-consistent objects. These 
issues will be explored further in Chapter 4.
3.7 Conclusions of the Chapter
The results reported here, in conjunction with previous research, provide 
evidence for a schema-driven perception of natural scenes, which affects the 
time-course o f attention allocation during scene viewing and the encoding of 
information contained in those scenes. More specifically, once an action- 
schema was activated, expectations pertaining to each specific action topic led 
to differential allocation of attention within the scene and to differences in the 
encoding and/or retrieval of information about the objects contained in it. 
Causality between these two results cannot be fully established yet. This 
hypothesis will be addressed in Experiment 6.
Early scene perception is characterised by a brief exploration of information 
that is contextually consistent. Shortly after, attention is drawn to information 
that violates the overall schematic content of the scene. What happens during 
the first fixation on a scene is still unresolved. Nonetheless, results reported 
here, in conjunction with previous research (e.g. De Graef et al, 1990; 
Henderson et al, 1999), indicate that perception is mainly guided by semantic 
factors, but before that information is used to guide subsequent saccades, the 
spatial layout of the scene may need to be extracted.
The results also suggest that the way that attention is deployed during initial 
scene understanding depends on whether or not two predominant (potentially 
instantiated) sets of knowledge (action and place) are correlated. The 
robustness of action as a prevailing schema will be investigated in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 4: ACTION-SCHEMATA WHEN SCENE 
VIEWING IS CONSTRAINED
4.1 General Introduction
In the experiments reported in this chapter scene viewing conditions are far 
from natural. Two different experimental paradigms were used to address the 
same theoretically motivated questions. A change detection task and a visual 
search task were used to investigate the role of attention during scene viewing 
and memory for objects in scenes. In both tasks memorisation of object detail 
was incidental.
The results of the experiments described in Chapter 3 suggest that attention is 
allocated differentially according to the type of information present in the 
scene and this appears to be the cause for differences in memory performance. 
This follows from the assumption that in order for an object to enter a durable 
memory store, focused attention has to be allocated to it. However, some 
information about “attended” objects seems to be unavailable during retrieval. 
This may depend on the method of retrieval or on the level of attention that 
was allocated to that information. The change blindness paradigm used in 
Experiment 5 presents an alternative way to measure focused attention and to 
assess the specificity of memory for objects developed during the task. In 
Experiment 6 aimed to examine what is the effect of attention on memory 
about the scene and its objects, and how long-term knowledge might support 
this process.
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4.2 Experiment 5: Action-schemata and change detection
4.2.1 Introduction
It has been argued that eye movements may not be a reliable indicator of 
attention allocation (e.g. Gordon, 2004; O’Regan et al, 2000). Since some 
studies have shown that attention is necessary for change detection, change 
blindness can provide an alternative to eye movements in the investigation of 
attentional phenomena in scene perception. Change blindness is also linked to 
memory in the sense that encoding of visual features is needed for any 
comparison between the original and the changed stimulus (Ryan and Cohen, 
2004; Simons, 2000). In Chapter 3, we showed that attention in the form of eye 
movements is allocated differentially to semantically different objects 
(Experiments 3a and 3b), which may lead to different memory performance for 
those objects (experiment 3c) and for the entire scenes containing them 
(Experiment 4). Based on this, information that is coherent with the schematic 
content of the scene is likely to receive “less” attention and to be represented 
with little detail and is therefore more likely to show poorer change detection 
performance in a change blindness paradigm.
Object semantics has been shown to affect change detection. In recent studies 
by Hollingworth and Henderson (2000, 2003), changes to objects that were 
semantically inconsistent with the scene (defined by the authors as 
“informative”) were detected faster than changes to objects that were 
semantically consistent with the scene (“non-informative” objects). In addition, 
results from Experiment 3a have shown that schema-inconsistent objects 
appear to capture attention and results from experiment 3c indicate that these 
objects are likely to be represented with rich visual detail. Hence, schema- 
inconsistent objects would have an a priori advantage over schema-consistent 
objects in a change detection task.
141
Early work on the role of scene context on object identification (Biederman, 
Mezzanotte and Rabinowitz, 1982; Boyce, Pollatsek and Rayner, 1989) 
proposed that the identification of schema-consistent objects is facilitated 
because they are expected within that context. However, when response bias 
was eliminated, no advantage was found for consistent objects (Hollingworth 
and Henderson, 1998). Furthermore, identifying one object in a scene is not the 
same as representing its visual characteristics, and so Biederman et al’s work is 
not in contradiction with the present predictions. In fact, rapid detection of 
scene meaning and the objects that are coherent with that meaning is likely to 
lead to poor detection performance for those objects because, although their 
presence is rapidly ascertained, their visual detail is poorly represented, 
because matches are found quickly. Conversely, if  more perceptual information 
needs to be gathered for schema-inconsistent objects (higher criterion) then 
more detail is likely to be stored. Other experimental paradigms using memory 
tasks have provided support for the inconsistent object advantage (e.g. 
Friedman, 1979; Goodman, 1980).
As discussed in Chapter 1, section 1.2.5, the ability to detect changes as been 
shown to depend on numerous factors, such as the location o f the objects 
within a scene (Rensink et al, 1997). Many studies have also revealed that 
differences in detection performance rely heavily on the type o f change (e.g. 
deletion, rotation, position, colour, size, etc.). In the first study reported below, 
changes involved altering an object’s colour, deleting an object and swapping 
and object for another. Object swaps involved same-category swaps, i.e. 
replacing a schema-consistent object with another schema-consistent object 
and replacing a schema-inconsistent object with another of the same category; 
and a different-category swap where a schema-consistent object was replaced 
with a schema-inconsistent object. Changes were performed independently in 
both types of objects and time to detect the change was taken as a measure of 
performance. The different types of change employed here were chosen based 
on “perceptual” and “semantic” considerations. Testing the impact of 
perceptual vs. semantic (conceptual) changes is a way of exploring what kind
142
of memory stores representations of schema-inconsistent objects (Hollingworth 
and Henderson, 2003).
Colour is typically a low-level property of objects; hence, as long as colour 
changes make sense in the world as we know it (a pink banana would naturally 
stand out because it conflicts with our knowledge of bananas), they would not 
constitute a semantic upset of the scene. Deletion is likely to fall into a low- 
level disruption given that the scenes contain many objects. Since only one 
object is deleted, the rest o f the objects are likely to sustain a meaningful scene. 
However, it is possible that by deleting a highly relevant object, some semantic 
disruption may take place. Object swaps involving the same level of 
consistency are also considered low-level “perceptual” changes, because the 
overall meaning of the scene is maintained. In contrast, when object swaps 
change the object’s relevance to the action depicted in the scene, a semantic 
upset occurs. The visual disturbance caused by both types of swap is assumed 
to be roughly the same, as long as the size o f the object tokens is kept constant, 
so comparisons between detection performance in both types of swaps may 
provide an indirect measure of semantic processing.
We will now present a brief review of some work illustrating the effects of 
each type o f change on detection performance in order to make specific 
predictions about the results of our experiment.
Deletion has been consistently shown to produce shorter detection times than 
other types of change. For example, Mondy and Coltheart (2000) found that 
deletion produced better change identification and detection than addition, 
spatial location and colour. Similar results were obtained by Hollingworth, 
Shrock and Henderson (2001), who showed that participants were faster at 
detecting when an object has been deleted than when it has been rotated 90° in 
depth. In view o f these results, we predict that deletion changes will be 
detected faster than colour changes because deleting an object not only causes 
the disappearance of some local information, but also whatever was being
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occluded by it to become visible. Whether it also alters the global semantic 
configuration of the scene is questionable, given the complexity o f these scenes 
and the total number of object present in them. Nevertheless, it is possible that 
deletion may upset both the initial visual configuration o f the scene and its 
semantics. When compared to deletion, object coherent-colour changes are 
perceptually less conspicuous, and do not alter the scene’s overall semantic 
content. The same applies to same-category object swaps, which have been 
found to be detected faster than left-right orientation changes (Hollingworth 
and Henderson, 2000). These in turn, are likely to be detected faster than 
colour changes since swaps involve a change on more than one visual attribute 
besides colour, such as shape, luminance, etc. Hollingworth (2003) tested the 
effect of replacing an object by another object token and found that detection 
performance did not differ from when objects were rotated in depth. However, 
in the present experiment, objects were replaced by a visually and conceptually 
different (although of equal consistency) object (see Table 4.1).
In summary, we expect deletion changes to be detected faster, followed by 
same-category object swaps and finally by colour changes since deletion 
produces a larger “perceptual” upset (and perhaps a semantic upset) than entire 
object swaps, which in turn are likely to be more detectable than a single­
attribute change such as colour. In addition, in same-category swaps, which 
involve swapping a schema-consistent object for another o f the same category 
(or inconsistent for inconsistent), detection performance should be slower than 
swaps involving opposite categories. Changes within the same object category 
maintain the initial schematic configuration o f the scene intact. Disruption 
should increase when a schema-inconsistent object replaces a schema- 
consistent object, since both a perceptual and a semantic change occur.
As outlined before, deletion affects the global configuration of a scene mainly 
on a “spatial” level. Whether it also alters the global semantic configuration of 
the scene is still to be determined. However, we predict that given the 
complexity of the scenes and the number o f object present in them, deletion of
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one object will not affect the general semantic configuration o f the scene. 
Nevertheless, if  this were the case, then differences between change detection 
on consistent and inconsistent items would be emphasised, when compared to 
other low-level visual changes, such as colour, which have no impact on the 
semantics o f the scene (and have a lower impact on its overall visual 
configuration). The a priori schema-inconsistent attentional (and memorial) 
advantage plus the large visual upset should combine and contribute to faster 
detection times for this change, especially for schema-inconsistent objects. On 
the other hand, deletion of a schema-consistent object should not seriously 
disrupt the schematic configuration of the scene provided the remaining objects 
are enough to maintain the action-schema. In light o f these considerations, we 
propose that deletion of schema-inconsistent objects are expected to be faster 
than any other change, since these objects are likely to capture attention and 
deletion creates a especially conspicuous perceptual upset. Conversely, 
changes in colour o f schema-consistent objects are expected to be slower than 
any other change, because they are likely to have the lower impact on both the 
perceptual and semantic levels.
These hypotheses are all tested within a single study using planned 
comparisons. The relevant contrasts are specified below, with a full description 
o f the stimuli.
4.2.2 Method 
Participants
Thirty-four adults, 20 female and 14 male, with a mean age o f 22.4 years 
volunteered to participate in the experiment. All reported normal or corrected 
vision.
Stimuli and materials
The same scenes described in Experiment 1 were used. E-prime 1,1 generated 
the ‘flicker’ and pictures were presented on a 14” Toshiba 4030 CDT/4.3
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laptop computer (75 Hz). Images were displayed at a spatial resolution of 1024 
X 768 pixels (16 bit colour), which subtended 24.1° x 18.6° visual angle.
Changes in both schema-consistent (C) and schema-inconsistent (I) target 
objects included colour (C), deletion (D), and swaps -  swapping with objects 
o f the same category (consistent/consistent (Swap CC) or inconsistent/ 
inconsistent (Swap II)) or o f opposite categories (consistent/inconsistent (swap 
Cl)), adding to a total of 7 changes per action, as illustrated in Table 4.1. In 
total, the experiment involved 36 images consisting of 4 actions, 7 changes per 
action and the respective original unchanged image (totalling 8 scenes per 
action).
Colour changes were produced by digitally altering the original scene using 
Adobe Photoshop 3.0.5. The ‘new’ colour already existed in the scene and it 
did not affect object plausibility. All other changes were created by taking 
different pictures o f the same scene where one target object was either removed 
or swapped by another object depending on the condition. Deletion was made  ^
so that when an object was removed it did not reveal a new object. Object 
swaps involved variations in size within the range of 0.0° and 2.7° (mean =
0.6°, std = 0.7) horizontally and 0.0° and 1.2° vertically (mean = 0.3°, std =
0.4). The shape o f the ‘new’ object was approximately the same as the ‘old’ 
object, even in the inconsistent for consistent swap. Modified pictures were 
taken with a Canon Power20 digital camera. Target object mean eccentricity 
varied from 0.6° to 10.6° for schema-consistent objects (mean = 6.4°, std = 3.2) 
and from 4.9° to 12.1° for schema-inconsistent objects (mean = 9.2°, std =
2.2)'.
An ANOVA carried out on target object eccentricity revealed a marginal main effect o f  
object category (F (l,14) = 4.507, p = .052), with schema-consistent target objects being, on 
average, situated closer to the centre o f  the scene. N o main effect o f  scene or interaction 
between object category and scene were found (both p > .05).
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Table 4.1 Objects involved in the different types o f change in both 
categories o f object, for all four actions. Numbers in brackets correspond to the 
mean relevance ratings obtained in Experiment 1.
Change Cooking Ironing Reading Tea-making
Colour C Utensils jar (5.8) 
Beige to light green
Hanger (5.5) 
White to yellow
Newspaper (6.3) 
White to yellow
Teapot (6.5) 
Green to blue
Colour I Clock (2.9)
White to light blue
Kitchen roll (1.2) 
White to yellow
Watering can (1.0) 
Blue to green
Sellotape (1.0) 
Grey to light pink
Deletion C Sauce bottle (6.5) 
Present to absent
Shirt (6.2) 
Present to absent
Magazine (5.9) 
Present to absent
Milk pack (6.4) 
Present to absent
Deletion I Clock (2.9) 
Present to absent
Kitchen roll (1.2) 
Present to absent
Watering can (1.0) 
Present to absent
Cuddly toy (1.0) 
Present to absent
Swap CC Sieve (5.2) to 
Pan (6.4)
Hanger (5.5) to 
Water jug (4.4)
Reading glasses (6.6) 
to glasses case (4.5)
Mug (6.9) to 
Coffee jar (4.1)
Swap II Candlestick (1.2) to 
Plant (I.O)
Newspaper (1.1) to 
Chopping board (1.0)
Pepper grinder (1.1) 
to Beer bottle (1.2)
Sellotape (1.0) to 
Picture frame (1.0)
Swap Cl Salt (6.5) to 
Vase (1.0)
Starch spray (4,9) to 
Milk pack (1.0)
Newspaper (6.3) to 
Chopping board (1.0)
Teabag Box (6.9) to 
Videotape (1.0)
Procedure
Participants were tested individually. On-screen instructions warned the 
participants that they would view everyday scenes and that something within 
them would change. They were also told that scene display would alternate 
between the original and the modified scenes, with a mid-grey blank slide in 
between scenes, according to the sequence: Original (240 ms) -  blank (80 ms) 
-  Modified (240 ms) -  blank (80 msec) -  Original (240 ms) -  blank (80 ms) 
and so on. The time latencies are consistent with those used in the ‘standard’ 
flicker paradigm, where 240 msec is considered to be sufficient time for a 
scene to be perceived, and 80 msec corresponds to the average saccade 
duration (Aginsky and Tarr, 2000; Rensink et al, 1997). Participants started the 
experiment by pressing a key and a mid-grey slide with a fixation cross in the 
centre was displayed for 3 seconds before the flicker started. Observers were
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requested to watch the flickering display and to press any button o f the mouse 
as soon as they detected the change. To avoid guessing, participants were also 
asked to describe the change and where it was occurring. Verbal descriptions 
o f the changes were recorded by the experimenter and used to determine 
correct and incorrect responses. If no detection occurred after 40 seconds a ‘no 
response’ label was registered. Stimuli presentation and data collection (time to 
detect change) were controlled by E-prime 1.1 and E-DataAid respectively. 
Participants performed a total of 28 trials, which corresponds to seven changes 
per action and four actions. All changes and actions were randomised across 
subjects.
4.2.3 Results
Failures to detect a change (no response) within the available time were 
considered incorrect responses. In total, non-response and incorrect change 
descriptions response added to a total o f 8.9% of all trials. O f these, 4.0% 
occurred in the deletion of an inconsistent object category, 10.0% occurred in 
both the inconsistent colour change and the swap Consistent -  Inconsistent (Cl) 
categories, 14.0% in the swap Inconsistent -  Inconsistent (II) category, 16% in 
the deletion o f a consistent object category, 20.0% in the consistent colour 
change and 26.0% occurred in the swap Consistent -  Consistent (CC) category.
Mean change detection latencies ranged from 5921ms (std = 3098), for when a 
schema-consistent object was swapped by a schema-inconsistent object (Swap 
Consistent - Inconsistent), to 9240 ms (std = 4110), for when a schema- 
consistent object was swapped by another o f the same category (Swap 
Consistent - Consistent) (see Figure 4.1).
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Swap CC Coulour C Deletion C Colour I Swap II Deletion I Swap Cl
Figure 4.1 Mean detection times in decreasing order for all types of 
change, averaged across the four scenes. Error bars represent ± SE.
The predictions identified above were tested using planned comparisons. These 
will be considered in turn.
Object consistency
We first tested the prediction that changes to schema-inconsistent objects 
would be detected faster than changes to schema-consistent objects, regardless 
of the type of change. Results from our analysis provide support for this. 
Detection latency when schema-inconsistent objects were changed averaged 
7247 ms (std = 3636), compared to 8666 ms (std = 4027) when schema- 
consistent objects were changed (F(l,27) = 23.071, p < .001). Overall, 
participants were significantly faster at detecting changes to schema- 
inconsistent objects.
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Deletion
It was hypothesised that deletion changes would be detected faster than colour 
changes and same-category object swaps, however no significant differences 
were found (F(l,30) = 2.149, p > .05 and F(l,29) = 1.620, p > .05, 
respectively).
In support o f our fourth prediction, same-category object swaps were detected 
faster than colour changes, with F(l,29) = 8.289, p > .01.
Overall, for changes involved a “perceptual” upset, deletion does not appear to 
have a particular impact on detection performance. However, this might have 
been caused by the high variability observed in the data for deletion. Swapping 
an entire object for another o f the same category produced faster detection 
times when compared to colour changes.
Object swaps
In addition, participants were faster at detecting different-category swaps (Cl) 
(mean = 5921, std = 3098) than same-category swaps (CC and II) (mean = 
7773, std = 4027), with F(l,31) = 10.124, p < .01. When changes involved an 
alteration of the overall semantic configuration o f the scene, detection 
performance improved.
Fastest and slowest change
Planned comparisons to test the last two hypotheses showed that deletion o f a 
schema-inconsistent object was not detected significantly faster than all other 
changes (F(l,27) = 1.060, p > .05)) and changing the colour o f a schema- 
consistent object did not produce the slowest response times when compared to 
all other changes (F(l,27) = 1.602, p > .05).
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4.2.4 Discussion
The aim of this experiment was to use the change blindness paradigm to 
investigate attentional and representational aspects during the online processing 
of scenes that instantiate schemata. For that purpose we tested the effect of 
different types o f changes on both types o f schematic consistency objects. 
Changes involved only low-level properties of objects (colour), removal of a 
whole object (deletion), which are likely to affect the spatial configuration of 
the scene and may or may not affect the semantic configuration of the scene, 
and object swaps, which equally have “perceptual” impact but are also likely to 
affect the overall semantic content o f the scene.
Changes to items that are not consistent with the scene schema were generally 
detected faster than changes in objects that are relevant to the action depicted 
in the scene (schema-consistent objects). This supports the results obtained in 
Hollingworth and Henderson’s (2000, 2003) studies on detection latency and 
object semantic informativeness. They found that when an object was 
“informative”, i.e. semantically inconsistent with the scene, change detection 
was faster than when objects were semantically consistent or “non- 
informative”. Since visual factors such as object size and complexity were 
controlled, these results suggest that scene processing is sensitive to the 
semantic properties o f objects and that schema-inconsistent objects are likely to 
be represented with richer detail than schema-consistent objects. Moreover, 
although schema-consistent objects were on average closer to the centre o f the 
scene, changes to them were not detected faster, which further supports this 
view.
The perception of change to the level of verbal report requires focused 
attention and areas that define the theme o f a scene are likely to be examined 
for the purpose o f gist abstraction. Furthermore, the level of attention necessary 
for gist extraction may not be enough for change detection. However, once 
they have been examined once, schema-consistent objects are unlikely to be re­
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inspected and visual details about them may be overwritten by the current 
precept, hindering any process of comparison. Conversely, schema-inconsistent 
objects are likely to capture attention because they violate that gist. 
Consequently, online representations about those objects are likely to contain 
more detail. Given that detecting a change may involve comparing two 
representations stored in working memory, change detection of schema- 
inconsistent items may be facilitated due to the same reasons as those which 
support a superior recognition performance with those objects observed in 
Experiment 3c.
Our results conflict, however, with those obtained by Rensink et al (1997) and 
O’Regan et al (2000), who found that change detection for objects in “central 
interest” areas was better, i.e. objects defining the main theme of the scene. 
However, differences may rest of the operational definition of “interesting”. An 
“interesting” object as defined by verbal report may be visited more often and 
earlier since it is likely to be located towards the centre of the scene. Change 
detection as a function of “interestingness” may depend on spatial rather than 
semantic factors (or both). In Experiment 3b we showed that schema-consistent 
objects are in fact visited earlier than schema-inconsistent objects. However, 
fixating on an object does not guarantee that a change to that object will reach 
a level o f awareness necessary for change detection (Hollingworth and 
Henderson, 2000; O’Regan et al, 2000).
As argued by Friedman (1979), as long as the overall scene meaning is 
constant, there is no need to check for visual features of schema-consistent 
objects, since they are likely to have been encoded at early stages during the 
abstraction of the scene gist. Given that most participants viewed the display 
for a long stretch o f time, it seems likely that a visual representation o f the 
scene has developed (Rensink et al, 1997) by the time changes are detected.
The fact that schema-consistent objects have been visited in the past does not 
increase the chances of changes to those objects being detected faster. Because 
these objects belong to the scene’s gist they are unlikely to be revisited. This
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could also be accounted by inhibition o f return (Tipper and Driver, 1988). The 
visual system may not compare views o f the scene because they are consistent 
in meaning (Simons, 2000). The blank screen obscures the low-level motion 
signal caused by a change. Because of this, the faster detection of changes 
involving schema-inconsistent objects result from attention being directed to 
those objects because they are somewhat “interesting” (high-level control). 
Note that here the conceptualisation of “interesting” is rather different from the 
one used by Rensink et al (1997). In the light o f schema theory, if  two scenes 
instantiate the same schema more resources should be required to spot any 
episodic descriptive difference between them, which would reflect in longer 
reaction times. Visual details of schema-consistent objects are likely to be 
replaced by new details without any awareness on the part o f the observer 
(Enns and DiLollo, 1997).
Hollingworth and Henderson (2000) observed the same informative object 
advantage even when eye movements were suppressed by presenting only one 
cycle of the flicker paradigm. In the absence of eye movements to scan the 
scene, participants can only rely on an internal representation o f that scene, 
which is likely to include the scene’s gist. The promptness o f this process is 
likely to be based on the fact that strong associations between consistent 
elements present in the scene already exist in memory. This also demonstrates 
that schemata can be instantiated very quickly and that eye fixations are not a 
necessary condition for change detection. Moreover, given that participants 
could not inspect the scene at will, and that change detection was above 
chance, even for the semantically consistent objects (63.9%), these results 
indicate that some detail must exist in the visual representations developed for 
the scene.
Overall, deletion did not produce reliably faster detection times than colour 
changes or same-category object swaps. This result is somewhat surprising 
since deletions of entire objects intuitively represent larger visual upsets than 
the other two changes. This is in contrast with the findings o f studies
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investigating this type o f change using the flicker paradigm (e.g. Hollingworth 
and Henderson, 2000). The reasons for this are unclear and may rest on the 
visual complexity of the stimuli. Hollingworth and Henderson used simple 
black and white line drawings and the number of objects present in the scenes 
was much lower than in our detailed coloured photographs. Drawings have 
been shown to emphasise global properties (Friedman, 1979). Deleting an 
entire object was more likely to constitute à larger physical change in simple 
scenes than in cluttered ones, since a deletion in the latter is more likely to 
reveal another object than an empty surface. In other words, the sudden 
“appearance” o f a large surface may be more detectable than the sudden 
“appearance” o f an object (or a part of an object) that was occluded by the 
target object.
Same-category object swaps were overall detected faster than colour changes. 
The reasons for this are likely to be linked with the size of the visual change, 
since semantic consistency is maintained in both cases. In view of this, the lack 
of reliability observed for deletion changes remains puzzling. This may be due 
to the fact that swapping objects also involved a conceptual change which can 
be represented at the verbal level (a “pan” is a different object from a “sieve”), 
and this may be more perceptible than deleting an object in a cluttered scene.
One of the main findings of this study was the reliable difference in 
performance obtained for different-category swaps when compared to same- 
category swaps. Overall, participants were faster at detecting changes that 
involved swapping a schema-consistent object with one of the opposite 
category. Different-category swaps not only involve a visual upset by means of 
changing local visual features, but also alter the semantic configuration of the 
scene. Given that local visual features also change in the case of a Consistent - 
Consistent (CC) or Inconsistent - Inconsistent (II) swap, and assuming that the 
local visual upset caused by the three types of change is roughly the same, 
differences are likely to be due to semantic factors. Moreover, Consistent -  
Consistent (CC) swaps and Consistent -  Inconsistent (Cl) swaps were
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respectively the slower and faster of all changes, i.e. the difference in 
performance on both situations is the more pronounced of all. When a schema- 
consistent object was replaced by one with of the same semantic properties 
detection was more than 3 seconds slower than when a schema-consistent 
object was replaced a schema-inconsistent object. This suggests that changes 
that significantly alter the semantic balance o f the scene further emphasise the 
schema-inconsistency advantage.
The results obtained in this experiment support the view that schemata mediate 
dynamic scene processing by means of differential allocation o f attention and 
selective encoding o f specific information. If schemata mediate scene 
perception, then the semantic bond between an object and the scene would take 
processing precedence. This is in accordance with the results fi-om Experiment 
3 c where participants were better at recalling (verbal report about presence of 
items) objects that were related to the action-schema but the visual detail of 
those objects was not as retrievable as the visual detail of inconsistent objects. 
Nevertheless, we are aware that this pattern of results may be due to 
differences in the intensity of the changes per se. That is, in the absence o f a 
systematic way to measure the visual impact of each change type 
(detectability), some care must be taken when inferring from the results.
It should be noted that concerns about the nature o f the flicker paradigm have 
been raised by a few researchers. For example. Shore and Klein (2000), argued 
that the nature o f the flicker might induce stimulus-driven rather than meaning- 
driven searches. In their study, change detection was affected by the 
endogenous meaning of the scenes viewed, but only with non-flickering 
displays. The flicker paradigm is methodologically artificial and incurs the risk 
o f contriving scene viewing in an unpredictable way. In fact, Hollingworth, 
Williams and Henderson (2001) found that eye-movement behaviour is 
different for changed and unchanged scenes, even when participants are 
unaware that a change has occurred. Similarly, Ryan and Cohen (2004) 
reported sensitivity of eye-movement behaviour to scene changes.
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Change detection is an active searching activity. The visual complexity o f the 
stimuli may hinder schema-driven searches since these depend on a parallel 
process of abstraction. Searching for a change is likely to induce a different 
coding strategy and engagement o f attention from that o f normal viewing 
(Rensink et al, 1997). O’Regan et al (2000) reported highly repetitive 
scanpaths, suggesting a serial and effortful scanning method, involving 
multiple comparisons, which could be characteristic of change detection 
paradigms when the primary goal of the participant is to look for a change.
In this experiment we showed that using a paradigm where attention has to be 
allocated to the level o f explicit report, schema-inconsistent objects seem to 
receive more attention and be represented with richer visual detail. However, 
many researchers (e.g. Chun and Nakayama, 2000) argue that the capacity o f 
implicit representations is much larger than paradigms like change detection 
suggest. In Experiment 6, more implicit measures o f attention on an incidental 
memory task were used.
4.3 Experiment 6: Attention-knowledge interactions on memory
4.3.1 Introduction
In Experiment 5 we found that schema-inconsistent objects produce better 
change detection performance. In view of this, we proposed that schemata 
mediate the process of scene perception by managing attentional resources in a 
way that is consistent with scene semantics. Change detection is a paradigm 
that requires that attention be allocated to the level of explicit report and is 
likely to depend on comparison between visual representations. In Experiment 
3, eye movements were measured to determine what type o f information is 
selected for processing, given that scenes instantiate schemata. In this 
experiment we propose to disentangle the roles that attention and long-term
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knowledge play in the process of scene perception, using a different 
experimental paradigm.
Results from Experiment 3 revealed the same pattern of results as a number of 
studies using memory paradigms to assess perception under schematic 
mediation (e.g. Goodman, 1980): objects which are consistent with the context 
o f a scene are usually well recalled but poorly recognised, whereas objects 
which are inconsistent with the context of a scene are usually well recognised 
but poorly recalled. This pattern of results has often been taken to suggest that 
visual attention is asymmetrically deployed with the result that schema- 
inconsistent objects receive more visual scrutiny and processing than their 
schema-consistent counterparts as an information-rich internal representation 
o f the scene is developed (e.g. De Graef et al, 1990; Henderson et al, 1999; 
Palmer, 1975; Friedman, 1979; Goodman 1980; Simons and Levin, 1997; 
Brewer and Treyens, 1981, Pezdek, Whetstone, Reynolds, Askari and 
Dougherty, 1989). Actively attending at an object increases the chances that it 
will prevail in memory for longer and be more accessible for retrieval. 
However, whether differences obtained in the memory tasks can be accounted 
by the differential allocation o f attention is still unresolved.
The purpose of the present experiment is to use eye-movement recordings and 
explicit viewing instructions to dissociate the role of overt attention from the 
underlying effects of memory processes, observed in schematic mediation of 
scene perception. The few studies which have included both eye-movement 
recording and effective measures of subsequent memory for real world scenes 
(e.g. Friedman, 1979) did not constrain the viewing strategy of their observers 
and so it remains unclear whether the memory results do not reflect biases in 
attention deployment at encoding.
One way to separate the different roles played by knowledge and attention 
within this theoretical framework is to ensure that observers divert their 
attention at specified information via task instructions. Subsequent memory
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tests were introduced to provide insight into what information was selected for 
processing. Given that the overt attention allocation is known, we predict that 
the specific roles that attention and knowledge play in scene perception can be 
separated.
Memory for the scene was subsequently assessed by using both verbal recall 
and visual recognition tests as in Experiment 3c. By taking advantage of 
methods which have previously shown that orienting instructions exert a 
considerable influence on how scenes are inspected (e.g. Yarbus, 1967; Marks, 
McFalls and Hopkinson, 1992) we manipulated the allocation of attention to 
information in the scene that was consistent or inconsistent with the action 
depicted. We also included a neutral task that was independent o f scene 
semantics. An important aspect of the design was that participants were not 
forewarned that they would undergo a memory test (or any other type o f test) 
because instructions to remember the content o f a scene may cause different 
viewing behaviour or may alter subsequent memory for that scene (see 
Friedman, 1979; Goodman, 1980; Henderson et al, 1999; Marks et al, 1992; 
see however Brewer and Treyens, 1981; Pezdek et al, 1989). This combination 
of monitoring of viewing, deliberate biasing of attention towards or away from 
schema related information, and testing both verbal recall and visual 
recognition, permitted the assessment of the role that previous knowledge plays 
in the search of and memory for real world scenes. In addition, because a visual 
search task was used, memorisation of object detail occurs incidentally.
4.3.2 Method 
Participants
Thirty-six (23 female and 13 male, with a mean age o f 20.1 years) psychology 
students from the University o f Surrey took part in this experiment, twelve in 
each naming-instruction group. Twenty-nine participants were undergraduates
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and received course credit for participating, while seven postgraduates did so 
without reward. All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Stimuli and materials
A 2-second central fixation cross on a mid-grey background preceded each of 4 
digital colour photographs used in Experiments 3a and 3b. The same target 
objects were selected for this experiment. The same pairs of objects (see 
Appendix E) used in the recognition task in Experiment 3b were used in the 
recognition element o f this experiment, and the presentation o f targets and 
ontologically and size-matched distractors was identical. Images were 
presented at a resolution of 1024 by 768 pixels (16 bit colour), on a 19” VGA 
colour monitor. From the chin rest (positioned 25” away from the screen) used 
to maintain a constant head position during viewing, scenes subtended 
horizontal and vertical viewing angles o f 31.3° and 24.5° o f visual angle 
respectively. Presentations and data collection we controlled by E-Prime 1.1.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually and were told that they would have to 
name as many objects in pictures of everyday scenes as they could in 15 
seconds. In contrast with Experiment 3a, they were not told that their memory 
for these scenes would later be tested. On-screen instructions specified whether 
participants were expected to name (a) objects that were relevant to the action 
portrayed in each scene (biased to consistent), (b) objects that were not relevant 
to the action portrayed in each scene (biased to inconsistent), or (c) objects in 
the scene whose names began with the letter “C” (neutral). Scenes were viewed 
in close succession after which participants’ recall and recognition o f the 
scenes was assessed. Scenes were presented in the same order at initial viewing 
and during cued-recall and recognition. This order was determined by Latin 
Square, and order o f presentation of object pairs during recognition was 
randomised. The order of the recall and recognition tasks was counterbalanced 
across participants, in a repeated measures design.
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4.3.3 Results 
Naming & eye movements
Results clearly confirm that observers complied with the naming instructions 
when required to name schema-consistent (98%) and schema-inconsistent 
(80%) objects. Some 5% of the items named by each group were neither 
schema-consistent nor schema-inconsistent according to the a priori 
classification obtained in Experiment 1.
Dwell time per object and number of fixations per object were calculated for 
each object in each scene by each observer. Four observers were eliminated 
from the analysis because of absence of meaningful scan paths (e.g. failure to 
maintain body position after calibration, etc.).
1.0 1 
0.9 
0.8 
0.7
3^oj
| o . s
Q 0.4 
0.3 - 
0.2  -  
0.1 
0.0
H Schema- 
consistent
□  Schema- 
inconsistent
Biased to schema- 
consistent
Biased to schema- 
inconsistent
Neutral condition
Figure 4.2 Mean total dwell time in seconds for both schema-consistent 
and schema-inconsistent objects, for each of the three task instruction groups 
collapsed across scenes. Error bars represent ± SE.
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Overall, observers looked at schema-consistent and schema-inconsistent 
objects for a similar amount of time, with F(l,29) = 2.318, p > .1, but this 
effect depended on what observers had been instructed to name (F (2,29) = 
14.361, p < .001; see Figure 4.2). Newman-Keuls post hoc tests revealed that 
in the first naming condition, dwell times corresponded with the naming 
requirement. Schema-consistent objects were looked at for longer than 
schema-inconsistent objects (p < .001). Equally, when participants were biased 
to name inconsistent objects, they looked at them for longer although this 
difference failed to reach statistical significance (p = .17). The anticipated 
equal sharing of dwell time between consistent and inconsistent objects when 
observers were required to name objects beginning with “c” was borne out (p > 
.6).
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Figure 4.3 Mean total number of fixations on both schema-consistent and 
schema-inconsistent objects, for each of the task instructions groups collapsed 
across scenes. Error bars represent ± SE.
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Results for analyses of number of fixations yielded similar results. Frequency 
of fixations was unaffected by naming-group or object-consistency (both Fs < 
1) but the number of fixations on schema-consistent and schema-inconsistent 
objects was heavily influenced by the naming instruction (F (2,29) = 15.564, p 
< 0.001; see Figure 4.3).
a) b)
c)
Figure 4.4 Example o f typical scan paths obtained for the cooking scene in 
each naming condition, a) Biased to schema-consistent, b) biased to schema- 
inconsistent, c) unbiased. These figures depict the cooking scene, which 
contains objects of both high and low relevance to the action of cooking. Lines 
correspond to saccades and circles correspond to fixations. The size o f the
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circle is positively correlated with the length o f the fixation and the numbers 
represent fixation order.
Newman-Keuls multiple comparisons revealed that there were more fixations 
on schema-consistent objects when naming such objects (p < 0.001) and more 
fixations on schema-inconsistent objects when naming these (p < 0.05) and 
again, similar numbers o f fixations between both schema-consistency object 
categories in the neutral condition (p > .6).
Typical scan paths obtained for the three different types o f instruction 
conditions are shown in Figures 4.4 a), b) and c). The differences in the 
viewing patterns clearly illustrate the effect o f task instructions in eye- 
movement behaviour. According to the naming task that participants were 
asked to perform during scene viewing, fixations are distributed in different 
parts of the scene. In addition, saccades and fixations also vary in length and 
the general shape of the scan path differs in the three pictures. As clearly seen 
in Figure 4.4a), fixations and saccades are concentrated in the centre o f the 
scene, near the actor, where the objects that are relevant to the action are most 
likely to appear. Fixations on these objects are longer than on irrelevant objects 
and saccades are generally short, due to the likelihood of these objects to be 
found near each other. The rest of the scene, which has a low probability of 
containing object that are likely to be used for the action, is practically ignored. 
The shape of the eye-movement pattern is compact and positioned centrally in 
the scene. In contrast. Figure 4.4b) shows that fixations are distributed away 
from the centre o f the scene (and the actor), covering a much vaster area. 
Saccades are much longer than in the previous condition, which may reflect the 
inherent difficulty o f finding irrelevant items within a scene that contains 
mainly relevant information. The search appears somewhat haphazard, and 
fixations on schema-inconsistent objects are longer than on schema-consistent 
objects. The overall shape of the pattern is spread out and disorganised. Figure 
4.4c) illustrates typical eye-movement behaviour when the task is not related to
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the meaning of the scene or to associations between the objects and the scene. 
Fixations cover a large area of the scene and ignore surfaces where objects are 
not likely to appear. Most fixations are generally brief but their length and 
firequency increase on target objects (e.g. ‘Candlestick’, ‘Colander’, ‘Clock’). 
Saccades are long but they suggest a more systematic search, which is reflected 
in the geometric shape of the overall scan path. This may be a result o f the fact 
that all objects in the scene are potential targets for selection, therefore an 
orderly search would be more efficient for this condition.
These results confirm that when asked to name objects o f a specified type, 
explicit attention was deployed in order to facilitate performance. The critical 
issue for this experiment is whether the scene representations formed in the 
course o f doing so are sufficient to support later remembering, particularly of 
objects inconsistent with the search strategy required by naming instructions.
Memory
The data from the recall and recognition memory tests were analysed as 
follows: for recall, all objects mentioned were classified in terms of whether 
they were consistent with the theme o f the schema, and whether they were 
indeed part o f the original picture. To facilitate integration across scenes and 
contrasts between recall incidences o f schema-consistent and schema- 
inconsistent items (which necessarily were more or less prevalent in scenes) 
scores were converted to percentages o f maximum possible correct recall. In 
each case memory test order was entered into the model of analysis o f variance 
used, but since it featured neither in statistically reliable main effects or 
interactions (all p > .1) test order will not be considered further.
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Figure 4.5 Mean percentage of schema-consistent and schema-inconsistent 
objects correctly recalled by each of the three task instruction groups collapsed 
across scenes. Error bars represent ± SE.
An ANOVA with instruction group as the between-subjects factor and object 
consistency as the within-subjects variable was carried out on percentage 
correct recall. Across all conditions, a higher percentage of schema-consistent 
items (mean = 40.3%, std =12.1 vs. mean = 17.1%, std = 11.6, for schema- 
inconsistent objects) was recalled, with F(l,33) = 170.16, p < 0.001. However, 
the relative recall of schema-consistent and schema-inconsistent objects was 
influenced by naming-instruction, F (2,33) = 29.461, p < 0.001, as illustrated in 
Figure 4.5. Newman-Keuls post hoc tests revealed that the advantage for recall 
of schema-consistent information was statistically reliable when participants 
were biased to name these objects and in the neutral condition (both p < .0005). 
In the biased to schema-inconsistent group this difference just failed statistical 
significance (p = .06). Post hoc tests also revealed that the incidence of recall 
o f schema-consistent objects was greatest in the schema-consistent naming 
group (both p < .0005), and recall of schema-inconsistent objects was reliably 
higher in the schema-inconsistent naming group (both p < .0005).
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As mentioned above, the number of schema-consistent and -inconsistent 
objects named was similar in the neutral condition and thus people were not 
simply remembering what they had previously named. In the recognition task 
results contrasted markedly with those that emerged from the recall task.
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Figure 4.6 Mean percentage of objects correctly recognised in each
category of object consistency, for each of the task instructions groups 
collapsed across scenes. Error bars represent ± SE.
There was no overall advantage for recognition of either type of object (F < 1) 
but a naming-instruction x schema-consisteney interaction was again in 
evidence with F(2,33) = 10.041, p < 0.001 as seen in Figure 4.6. Naming 
instructions dominated recognition memory. Newman-Keuls post hoe tests 
showed that the naming instruction in the neutral condition resulted in equally 
accurate recognition of schema-consistent (mean = 62.5%, std = 15.1) and 
schema-inconsistent objects (mean = 68.2%, std = 15.4) with p > .3, but 
reliably greater recognition of schema-consistent objects (79.2% (std = 9.7) vs. 
58.3% (std = 18.7) for schema-inconsistent objects,) or reliably greater 
recognition of schema-inconsistent objects (77.1% (std = 12.9) vs. 61.5% (std
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= 15.5) for schema-consistent objects), depending on which type of objects 
participants had been instructed to name (both p < .05).
4.3.4 Discussion
This study was designed to address the relative importance of attention and 
memory in the creation o f the well-known asymmetry in the representation and 
memory of schema-consistent and -inconsistent objects. This asymmetry 
emerged in Experiment 3c when observers are tested on recall and recognition 
performance following viewing everyday complex scenes depicting actions. 
The results show that when asked to name objects presented in a scene 
according to a simple rule, observers’ eye movement patterns reflect their 
attempt to do so. Attention was deviated to the objects that participants were 
asked to name and when the task was independent of scene or object meaning, 
attention was equally spread amongst both types o f schema-consistency 
objects.
Controlling for the participants’ viewing/processing strategies was successful 
in providing a starting point for assessing how attention affected memory for 
schema-consistent and schema-inconsistent information in the scenes. The 
result o f constraining viewing in this way is that some objects in a scene are 
better recalled, when they are typical elements of the action depicted in that 
scene. In contrast, recognising specific details about objects from those scenes 
is largely independent of the aetion depicted, but depends almost entirely on 
whether or not the object concerned was fixated / named. The fact that 
observers were unaware that their memory for the scenes they saw would later 
be assessed, it is reasonable to assume that the viewing behaviour we report is 
driven solely by the task of determining whether any object fixated upon is or 
is not related to the action depicted, and naming it as appropriate. The results 
show that the reeall performance of schema-consistent information is better 
irrespective of inspection patters whereas recognition performance was
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dependent to a great extent on the task instruetion. In addition, recall of 
schema-inconsistent objects greatly improved when they were fixated. This 
pattern o f results conflicts with the results of previous studies of memory for 
real world scenes where participants were not aware that their memory was 
going to be tested after scene viewing (Brewer and Treyens, 1981; Pezdek et 
al, 1989). Although these studies are very similar in proeedural terms, only the 
Pezdek et al’s study assessed recognition by showing participants copies of 
objects they had seen earlier. As a result, the Brewer and Treyens’ study could 
not determine whether participants retained specific visual details o f the objects 
for which we found object fixation to be critical. The inconsistency of recall 
results between our study and those reported by Pezdek et al may be 
attributable to the extended time available for viewing the scene (1 minute). 
With more time to inspect the scene, after extracting its gist, confirmed by the 
consistent objects, participants may have concentrated their attention on 
inconsistent objects. Better recall o f inconsistent objects reported by Pezdek et 
al may be accounted by added attention, which was possible due to loosened 
time restrictions. Under self-paced or less time-restricted conditions, memory 
for schema-inconsistent information is likely to increase since those items 
require deeper processing, which in turn benefits from increased study time 
(Sakamoto and Love, 2004). In our experiment, the reduced time (15 seconds) 
and requirement to name particular types o f object would both have reduced 
the scope to more elaborate encoding and repeated viewing which might be 
expected to increase recall memory for information inconsistent with the scene. 
We have assumed here that the process o f scene perception involves the rapid 
creation o f a putative representation of that scene (but see Rensink, O’Regan & 
Clark, 1997) through a combination of memory instantiation and attentional 
deployment (e.g. Biederman, 1981). In trying to remember such scenes, this 
representation enables the generation or regeneration of objects that are 
plausible in terms of the scene’s context and this generation, together with 
whatever residual direct experience remains, forms the basis o f what is 
recognised and recalled. This study shows clearly that, unless a particular 
object is fixated during the course o f this process, the accessible scene
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information in this representation is unlikely to be sufficiently detailed to 
determine which of two versions of an object had actually been present.
Longer and more frequent fixations allow for further processing o f the visual 
features of the object, increasing the chances that they will be subsequently 
retrievable. It should be noted that in this task, participants were performing a 
visual search task, and that memory for detail is incidental. However, attention 
is not critical for the retrieval of objects that are consistent with a scene’s 
schematic content. These objects can be recalled without having previously 
been attended to or fixated. In such circumstances it is the underlying memorial 
proeesses that seem to determine performance and not the generative 
inspection patterns based on them. In recall, schema-consistent information 
benefits from the fact that they are likely to be represented in the knowledge 
instantiated for that scene. In contrast, recall o f schema-inconsistent objects 
requires attention, since labels for these objects are not initially available in the 
active schema.
4.4 G eneral Discussion
The results obtained in the experiments reported here indicate that inconsistent 
objects might have an a priori processing advantage, which is determined by 
semantic characteristics, as would be predicted by schematic mediation. 
Experiment 5 provides support for the hypothesis that schema-inconsistent 
objects are perceived strategically and this is not the direct result o f eye 
movements.
Some criticisms have been raised as to the validity o f such a paradigm in the 
investigation of scene processing since change detection involves explicit 
report, it may reflect information of which the participant is aware, rather than 
the information stored. Studies in the attentional blink (AB) have supported 
this. A typical experiment under this paradigm involves detecting two targets 
within a series of stimuli separated by different stimulus onset asynchronies
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(SOAs). When the SOAs are short (usually between 100 and 500 ms), 
performance on the second target is impaired, suggesting a lack o f attentional 
resourees to process it fully (Shapiro, Raymond and Amell, 1994). However, 
the fact that participants were unable to consciously report the second target 
does not mean that it was not processed in the first place. In order to investigate 
whether this was the case, Shapiro and colleagues devised a second set of 
experiments using a stream of words, in which the semantic similarity o f three 
targets was rnanipulated (Shapiro, Amell and Raymond, 1997). They found 
that performance on later targets improved when there was a semantic link to 
the previously unreported presented word, which suggests that participants 
were able to process the semantic meaning of the “blinked” word, despite the 
fact that hey could not report it. The authors conclude that the meaning of 
stimuli can be eneoded even though it cannot be reported and that attention 
should be thought o f as a “pre-requisite” for verbal report (see also Groeger, 
1984). This has obvious implications for discussions about attention allocation 
within some experimental paradigms, such as change blindness. It could be 
argued that some form of implicit representation o f the visual detail o f schema- 
eonsistent objects may be preserved, and that the explicit nature o f the change 
detection task does not provide enough sensitivity to detect this. However, 
results from Experiment 4, which uses a forced-choice recognition using the 
entire scene for comparison, indicate that this unlikely. It is possible, 
nevertheless that representations exist but are not readily or consciously 
accessible. “Attention is necessary to link perception with awareness”
(Shapiro, 2000, pg. 88), and it seems vital for a paradigm using a change 
deteetion task, however the results reported here suggest that such process may 
be mediated by the instantiation of schemata.
In experiment 6 we showed that eye fixations are important to select 
information that is not supported by the active schema, whether it includes 
perceptual and semantic detail about schema-inconsistent objects or perceptual 
detail about schema-consistent objects. The same argument applies for poor 
change detection and poor recognition performance for schema-consistent
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items: the lack of detailed visual representations about those items, which in 
the first experiment hinders the process of comparison needed to detect a 
change, and in the second experiment makes it impossible to retrieve such 
detail. Given that schema-inconsistent objects revealed better performance on 
both tasks and that attention was preferentially allocated to them, we conclude 
that focused attention is necessary to encode low-level details of objects, and 
that it tends to be preferentially allocated to schema-inconsistent information. 
This was also illustrated by the fact that when participants were biased to look 
at schema-consistent objects, recognition performance increased significantly, 
suggesting better encoding of their low-level properties.
Our limited ability to detect changes across successive views of the same scene 
had been attributed to a resource-limited process of developing dynamic visual 
representations. The same argument has been presented for explaining our 
propensity to process the world using pre-existent knowledge stored in long­
term memory (schemata), which incurs less expenditure o f resources. It seems 
plausible to hypothesise that phenomena such as poorer change detection for 
consistent information within a scene are mediated by schematic processing of 
that scene. Both mechanisms exhibit behaviours that can be considered as 
“incomplete”.
The experiments reported in this chapter provide support for some encoding of 
visual features, provided attention has been allocated to them. However, it is 
known that looking at an object does not ensure that changes to that object will 
be detected (Simons and Levin, 1997). It appears that access to representations 
about elements within a scene may depend on the level of encoding, which in 
turn depends on the stages of dynamic processing o f the scene and on the 
semantic relationship of those elements with the seene. The evidence presented 
here insinuates a compromise between the all (an integrative visual memory 
store or iconic memory', Neisser, 1967) or nothing (the world as an “outside 
memory”; O’Regan, 1992) models of processing o f visual information.
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Both attention and encoding o f information are necessary for change detection 
and for representing information that is not supported by the currently active 
schema. However, in natural conditions, given the enormous amount of 
perceptual information in the environment, people are unlikely to encode 
information that is unnecessary to carry out coherent behaviours within their 
enviromnent, i.e. the visual characteristics o f the objects they interact with. 
Schemata seem to provide the effortless means to perceive the world efficiently 
and economically, leaving the eyes to do their work if  necessary (spot an 
unexpected event, etc.), at the expense of precise representations of that world.
4.5 Conclusions of the Chapter
Experiments 5 and 6 suggest that action-schema driven searches appear to be 
plausible explanations for selective processing of the information encountered 
during search. This finding seems to be robust enough to extend across 
different experimental paradigms. The results obtained in this chapter provide 
further evidence to the evidence presented in Chapter 3 for a schema-driven 
dynamic perception and encoding of complex scenes.
The results presented here indicate that the meaning of a scene can be 
abstracted without focused attention but in order for schema-inconsistent 
objects to be incorporated into the visual representation of the scene, attention 
has to be allocated to those objects. In other words, schema-consistent 
information provides the central theme o f the scene and information that 
violates the overall semantic meaning “captures” attention. This could explain 
better detection performance for changes to schema-inconsistent objects. In 
addition, the visual detail of schema-consistent information does not seem to be 
preserved as well as the visual detail o f schema-inconsistent information after 
disruptions o f the visual transient. It could be the case that only the original 
features from the schema-consistent objects are represented and participants 
fail to make a comparison with the changed visual input. Schema-consistent
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objects provide the gist o f the scene and their visual characteristics are either 
irrelevant or coded only once (Friedman, 1979).
In summary, attention is likely to be alloeated preferentially to schema- 
inconsistent information, as suggested by the results in the experiment using 
the change blindness flicker paradigm. This appears to contradict the results 
obtained in experiment 3b, which shows earlier inspection of schema- 
consistent objects. However, it appears that during this stage deployment of 
attention is likely to be more “superficial” and to serve as means for initial 
scene comprehension, rather than active encoding of local features. When 
participants are biased to examine sehema-consistent objects (as in Experiment 
6), richer visual detail o f those objects is likely to be encoded.
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CHAPTER 5: BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT EFFECTS
5.1 General Introduction
So far, this thesis has investigated the effect o f action-schemata in scene 
perception without looking at the conditions that may be required for action- 
schemata to operate. In this chapter two questions are addressed. The first 
relates to whether scene background is necessary to produce typical schematic 
effects in memory, and if  not, how much schema-consistent information is 
necessary for schema instantiation (and how much schema-inconsistent 
information disrupts that process)? The second issue addressed is whether more 
than one schema may operate in a complex scene where different types of 
information could be evoked.
Given that certain aetions, like the ones used in this research, are likely to 
typically involve the same objects across situations (e.g. iron and ironing), the 
simple co-occurrence of a subset o f those objects may be enough to instantiate 
a schema. This may depend on how closely connected to an action objects are 
(for example, a pencil is consistent with the action of reading but is not 
essential for that action). Furthermore, relationships between objects and 
between objects and the action may be enough to evoke an action-schema 
without the presence of an actor. Scene background has been shown to 
facilitate object identification (e.g. Boyce and Pollatsek, 1992; Palmer, 1975). 
Despite this, if  relationships between objects are well learned, especially in the 
case of actions, then a schema might be instantiated by the objects alone. 
Experiment 7 was carried out to test whether this was the case.
Furthermore, in Experiment 2, action and place information were found to be 
related in two of the scenes used in the empirical work throughout this thesis. 
Background information may lead to the instantiation of other schemata, like 
the knowledge we possess about rooms and their likely contents (e.g. a fridge 
may instantiate the schema for “kitchen” instead of “cooking”). The same may
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happen with objects present in the scenes (e.g. a kettle may instantiate the 
schema “kitchen” instead of “tea-making”). By removing background 
information and the actor, and by changing the participant’s expectations about 
what “scene” they are about to view. Experiment 8 aims to determine whether 
a place-schema, may be grouping the objects in our scenes instead of or with 
an action-schema.
5.2 Experiment 7: Instantiation of an action-schema in the absence of 
scene background
5.2.1 Introduction
Strong evidence for the facilitating effect o f context in object identification 
(Biederman, 1981; Biederman, Mezzanotte and Rabinowitz, 1982; Boyce and 
Pollatsek, 1992; Palmer, 1975) has lead to the view that when objects are 
presented within a scene, their perceptual information can be extracted ^vithout 
much effort. The same argument could be made for groups of objects, as 
suggested by the object-to-object priming effeet (Henderson, Pollatsek and 
Rayner, 1987). Chun and Jiang (1999) have shown that after learning the 
relationships between objects in arrays, participants were able to detect certain 
objects faster when other objects that usually co-occurred with them were 
presented. This suggests that as long as co-occurrence is maintained, a group of 
objects is enough to evoke knowledge from long-term memory about elements 
that share communalities and create a “scene”.
Using a technique (“bubbles”) where only a specific type if  information is 
available to the observer, Gosselin and Schyns (2001) showed that certain 
processes of categorisation of face identity are possible with little access to the 
whole picture. This technique has been applied to scene categorisation tasks 
(McCotter, Gosselin, Sowden and Schyns, 2005), and diagnostic regions were 
found to be category-specific and aid categorisation. Likewise, in order to
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categorise an action scene (thus activate an action-schema), only a subset of 
diagnostic information may be needed, and perhaps this can be achieved with a 
subset of schema-consistent objects.
Research in category learning suggests that even when objects are presented 
without a context, semantic clustering can occur and function in a similar way 
as schemata (Sakamoto and Love, 2004). Any objects that deviate from the 
regularities of those clusters are likely to be encoded with detail. In all the 
experiments reported so far, recognition performance for sehema-inconsistent 
objects has been better than that of schema-consistent objects. This has led us 
to assume that this is caused by the schematic mediation of scene processing 
during viewing. In this experiment recognition was used as the only measure of 
this schematic effect. That is, we assume that if  recognition performance with 
schema-inconsistent objects is better than with schema-consistent objects, then 
a schema has been instantiated and used to guide perception. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, recognition may not depend on contextual support and hence 
produces little ambiguity about the origin of the differences in memory 
performance for both types of objects.
Presenting only a subset of objects further offers the possibility to manipulate 
the order in which those objects are viewed and thereby to investigate whether 
input order influences schematic mediation of memory. In Experiment 3 and in 
accordance with the work of a variety o f studies (e.g. De Graef, Christiaens and 
d’Ydewalle, 1990; Henderson, Weeks and Hollingworth, 1999) schema- 
consistent objects were found to be the likely targets of early saccades. Early 
stages o f scene viewing are likely to involve scene understanding. Based on 
this assumption, presenting schema-consistent information before schema- 
inconsistent information should evoke the appropriate action-knowledge 
(provided objects are rated high in terms of their relevance to the action). In 
addition, a minimum amount of objects is likely to be necessary for this to 
occur. However, it is also possible that the ratio of schema-consistent to 
schema inconsistent objects may determine the conditions for schematic
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mediation to occur. In the experiment reported below, participants viewed 
different amounts o f schema-consistent and inconsistent objects in different 
orders.
In summary. Experiment 7 was designed to address two issues. Firstly, scene 
background and the actor were removed so their importance in the schematic 
mediation of memory could be assessed. Despite the well-known facilitating 
effect o f context on object identification and rapid scene perception, it is 
predicted that recognition memory will produce typical schematic effects even 
in the absence o f background and the actor. This is based on claims that groups 
o f objects (and objects alone) can instantiate general categorical knowledge, 
which can be used to guide perception of those objects. Secondly, the order and 
ratio of presentation of schema-consistent and schema-inconsistent information 
was manipulated and their effects on recognition memory were measured so 
conditions for schema instantiation could be established.
5.2.2 Method 
Participants
Sixty psychology undergraduate students (39 female and 21 male with a mean 
age of 22.2) firom the University of Surrey took part in this study in exchange 
for a course credit. All observers had normal or corrected to normal vision.
Stimuli and materials
The same four colour photographs from Experiment 3 were used. Sixteen 
target objects per scene (eight schema-consistent and eight schema- 
inconsistent) were selected for manipulation (see Table 5.1).
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Table 5.1 List of objects of each schema-consistency category used in
Experiments 6 and 7.
Cooking / Kitchen 1 Tea-making / Kitchen 2
Schema- Schema- Schema- Schema-
consistent inconsistent consistent inconsistent
Colander Candlestick Coffee jar Cleaning spray
Cooker Clock Kettle Cuddly dog
Oil bottle Cuddly dog Milk pack Lectern
Pan Flowers Mug Poster
Salt shaker Lamp Tea towel Sellotape
Sauce bottle Plant leaves Teabag Bag Trophy
Spice rack Picture frame Teabag Box TV
Utensils jar Videotape Teapot Yoghurts
Table 5.1 -
Cont.
Ironing / Lounge 1 Reading / Lounge 2
Schema- Schema- Schema- Schema-
consistent inconsistent consistent inconsistent
Basket Bowl Book Cushion
Hanger Chopping board Bookmark Fire blanket
Iron Hair brush Bookshelf Flour bag
Ironing board Kitchen Roll Folder Pepper grinder
Jumpers Newspaper Magazine Plant
Plug Painting Newspaper Plate
Shirt Plant Pen Speakers
Spray (water) Wooden fish Reading glasses Watering can
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The original photographs were edited usmg Adobe Photoshop CS Version 8.0, 
so that only each target object was visible in its original position, but the rest of 
the picture appeared masked by a mid-grey colour. As in Experiment 5, all 
images were displayed at a 1024 by 768 pixels resolution (16 bit colour) and 
presented on a 19” VGA colour monitor screen at a constant viewing distance 
of 25”, which subtended 31.3° and 24.5° of visual angle. Stimuli presentation 
and data collection were controlled using E-Prime Version 1.1. Participants’ 
viewing position was maintained by a chinrest.
Procedure
As in Experiment 3 a, on-screen instructions told observers that they would be 
asked questions about what they saw at the end o f the presentation. Pictures 
containing the individual objects were presented in rapid succession for 300ms 
each, followed by a 100ms mid-grey blank slide. Participants were divided into 
six groups, with ten participants each. The first group viewed six pictures 
containing a schema-consistent item followed by two pictures containing a 
schema-inconsistent item (60 -  21). The second group viewed two schema- 
inconsistent items followed by six schema-consistent objects (21 -  60). The 
third group viewed four schema-consistent items followed by four schema- 
inconsistent items (40 -  41) and the fourth group viewed four schema- 
inconsistent items followed by four schema-consistent objects (41 -  40). The 
fifth group was presented with two schema-consistent objects followed by six 
schema-inconsistent objects (20 -  61), and group six was presented with six 
schema-inconsistent objects followed by two schema-consistent objects (61 -  
20). See Figure 5.1 for examples of the stimuli.
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Figure 5.1 Example of stimuli used in the task. In this ease only examples 
o f the tea-making scene are shown. In this trial, four sehema-inconsistent 
objects followed four schema-consistent objects (4C-4I).
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Actions were presented in an order defined by a Latin Square and the objects 
were randomised within each consistent and inconsistent object category. As in 
Experiment 3, immediately after presentation o f all the images, observers 
performed a forced-choice recognition task of four pairs o f objects per action, 
two schema-consistent and two schema-inconsistent paired with distractor 
objects. Pairs of objects were separately displayed, and subjects were verbally 
cued with the name of the action (e.g. ‘cooking scene’) before viewing the 
pairs corresponding to that action. Correct answers and time to make a decision 
were recorded by E-prime 7.7. As in previous experiments, number o f correctly 
recognised objects was transformed into mean percentage correct.
5.2.3 Results
Experiment 7 was designed to investigate what happens to recognition 
performance if  scene background and the actor are eliminated from the scene 
and only a subset of objects is viewed by the participants. The order of 
presentation of the objects in that subset was also manipulated so conditions for 
schematic effects in memory could be ascertained. Participants viewed eight 
objects in total per scene and schema-consistent and inconsistent objects varied 
in number an order of presentation. Recognition performance was combined 
across scenes and converted to percentage of maximum correct recognition. 
Results are shown in Figure 5.2.
A 3 X 2 X 2 repeated measures ANOVA with consistent object frequency (6,4 
and 2) and consistent object precedence (consistent object first and consistent 
object second) as between-subjects variables and object consistency (schema- 
consistent and schema-inconsistent) as the within-subjects variable was carried 
out on recognition scores. This revealed a main effect o f schema-consistency 
(F(l,54) = 41.532, p < .001), with schema-inconsistent objects being better 
recognised (mean = 72.1%, std = 14.3) than schema-consistent objects (mean = 
55.6%, std = 14.6). There were no main effects of consistent object frequency
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or consistent object precedence (both F < 1). A significant schema-consistent 
object frequency x object consistency emerged with F(2,54) = 4.516, p < .05. 
Post hoc Newman-Keuls comparisons (see Appendix G) revealed that the 
difference in performance between schema-consistent and inconsistent objects 
(inconsistent object advantage) was reliable when 6 (mean inconsistent object 
advantage = 21.9%) and 4 consistent objeets (mean inconsistent object 
advantage = 21.8%) were presented (both p < .001) but not when 2 consistent 
objects (mean ineonsistent object advantage = 5.7%) were presented (p > .05), 
regardless of whether they appeared first or seeond.
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Figure 5.2 Mean percentage of correct recognition decisions about schema- 
consistent and ineonsistent objects for each presentation order group, collapsed 
across all four action-scenes. Error bars represent ± SE.
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This is illustrated in Figure 5.3. N o  interactions betw een consistent object 
precedence and object consistency or consistent object frequency em erged  
(both F <  1).
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Figure 5.3 M ean percentage o f  correet recognition decisions about schem a- 
consistent and inconsistent objects for each consistent object frequency (6, 4 
and 2), collapsed across all four action-scenes. Error bars represent ±  SE.
5 .2 .4  D iscussion
This experim ent aim ed to investigate the effects o f  presenting on ly  a subset o f  
objects from the original scenes on recognition m em ory. The schem a- 
eonsistent and ineonsistent ratio and order o f  presentation were also exam ined. 
The m ain effect o f  schem a-consistency show ed that even  w hen the actor and 
the rest o f  the scene are not v iew ed , typical schem atic effects on recognition  
m em ory are observed. Schem a-inconsistent objeets were overall better 
recognised  than schem a-inconsistent objects. This w as not true, w hen on ly  tw o
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schema-consistent objects were presented. In this case, the inconsistent 
recognition advantage disappeared. Order o f presentation was not important. 
Provided participants saw at least four schema-consistent objects, regardless of 
whether they appeared first or not, recognition performance of these objects 
was worse than recognition performance o f schema-inconsistent objects. This 
did not occur when participants were presented with more schema-inconsistent 
objects than schema-consistent objects.
From the results obtained in Experiment 3b and previous research (Goodman, 
1980; Friedman, 1979), superior recognition performance o f schema- 
inconsistent information is indicative of schema-mediated scene processing. 
Hence, the results o f this experiment suggest that this effect can occur in the 
absence o f background information, including the actor, when the verbal label 
o f the action is provided at the beginning o f the trial, cueing for context and 
establishing expectations before any stimulus is presented. The results suggest 
that semantic relationship between the objects involved in those actions is 
enough to instantiate a schema or some sort o f semantic clustering based on 
previous knowledge, which produces similar recognition results as schema- 
mediated perception of a complete scene. Presenting a larger amount of 
schema-consistent objects, each reinstating the cued context, preserves the 
general theme of the action leading to schema-inconsistent objects being 
represented in more detail or leaving stronger memory traces. According to 
Mamlberg and Shiffrin (2005), as each item is viewed, a fixed amount o f 
context information is stored together with specific item information. Schema- 
consistent items are semantically associated and will therefore reinstate context 
as each one is encountered, even in the absence o f background information, 
whereas the contexts stored for each inconsistent items do not share 
similarities. This information is likely to be lost and storage will consist o f item 
information only. Equally, presenting an equal amount of schema-consistent 
and schema-inconsistent objects did not mitigate this effect (at least vdth 4 of 
each category). Even when the presentation began with 4 schema-inconsistent 
objects, the subsequent presentation (in block) of a minimum of 4 schema-
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consistent was enough to produce the typical schema-inconsistent advantage in 
recognition performance. This result is somewhat striking in light of what 
happens at early stages o f scene viewing. When the whole scene is presented, 
attention is allocated to schema-consistent objects at very early stages. 
Establishing scene context at early stages allows for rapid scene identification 
because it narrows the possible identities of consistent objects (De Graef, 
1998). Nevertheless, schema-consistent objects share regularities that appear to 
be strong enough at establishing context at a later stage. Overall, these results 
suggest that only a subset of schema-consistent objects is sufficient for 
schematic mediation o f memory. An explanation for this may rely on the fact 
that most scenes of a specific domain will not contain all propositions of that 
domain, so schema instantiation should be possible with only a few schema- 
consistent objects, as long as they are obligatory within that schema (Friedman, 
1979). The more obligatory those objects are, the more likely it is that schema- 
inconsistent objects will produce better recognition performance (Sakamoto 
and Love, 2004).
Furthermore, it is essential that schema-inconsistent objects are semantically 
heterogeneous, where each one deviates from the regularities o f the cluster 
formed by the schema-consistent objects. This was established in Experiment 
2. The instantiation of two separate schemata or semantic clusters o f objects 
would render any differences in recognition performance not attributable to 
schema-mediated processing. Because schema-consistent objects are 
independently deviant with respect to the highly coherent cluster o f schema- 
consistent objects, recognition memory is likely to be good (Sakamoto and 
Love, 2004). However, the effect disappears when more inconsistent 
information is presented. Without enough consistent elements to create a 
‘theme’ around which information can be aggregated, appropriate schemata 
cannot be instantiated and used to mediate encoding. Early research by Koftka 
(1935) using lists o f words demonstrated that memory advantage for deviant 
words decreases as their number increases. More recently Rojahn and 
Pettigrew (1992) reinforced this idea in their meta-analysis of memory for
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schema-consistent information, by proposing that memory for schema- 
inconsistent items weakens as their relative proportion to schema-consistent 
objects increases.
In summary, although background information is important in providing cues 
about the scene context and in facilitating the rapid extraction its gist 
(Biederman, 1981; Biederman, Mezzanotte and Rabinowitz, 1982; Boyce and 
Pollatsek, 1992; Boyce, Pollatsek and Rayner, 1989; Friedman, 1979; Palmer, 
1975.), the results of this experiment suggest that relationships between objects 
alone can produce a typical effect of action-schema mediation of encoding 
(provided those objects are commonly associated with the same action). 
Schemata are built based on repeated experience o f a world where objects 
covary with each other in an invariant manner.
5.3 Experim ent 8: ‘Action’ vs. ‘Place’ cues: is it really action-schema?
5.3.1 Introduction
A loaf o f bread is likely to be found in a kitchen, a TV is likely to be found in a 
living room and a stapler is likely to be found in an office. All these objects are 
not only closely associated with an action (cooking, watching TV and desk- 
working) but also with the place/room they are likely to be found, which 
normally coincides with where that action is likely to be performed. So far, the 
work reported in this thesis was based on the assumption that an appropriate 
action-schema is instantiated at scene onset, given that information is organised 
around an action “theme”. However, the possibility of a place-schema guiding 
perception in the scenes used in our empirical work should be considered. This 
is especially relevant given that in Experiment 2, action and place information 
were found to be correlated in two of the scenes.
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In her experiment on action-schemata, Goodman (1980) provided evidence for 
schematic mediation of memory for cartoon-like scenes depicting everyday 
actions, such as reading. Friedman (1979) showed the same effect with 2- 
dimensional scenes of places, such as a farm, a city, etc. Similarly, but using 
real-world environments. Brewer and Treyens (1981) have shown that place- 
schemata affect memory for objects that occur in everyday environments (e.g. 
office). Actions involve objects and occur in physical spaces. The physical 
places where actions occur contain objects themselves, which may establish the 
scene’s context. Long-term memory knowledge about actions is likely to 
include information about the possible or plausible places where those actions 
usually occur. For example, Neuschatz, Lampinen, Preston, Hawkins, and 
Toglia, (2002) investigated memory for scenes in situations where actions 
depicted in the scenes were consistent or inconsistent with the context where 
they took place. They showed that memory for those scenes depended on 
whether the actions were congruent with the contexts where they took place.
The purpose of experiment 8 was to test whether participants are using an 
action-based or a place-based schema (or both) to guide their perception o f the 
scenes. The two actions that occur in a kitchen are usually associated with that 
room whereas the two actions that occur in a living room have looser 
connections with the space that surrounds them. Taking that into consideration, 
performance in recognition will be compared across scenes. As in Experiment 
7, scene background and the actor were not visible and only a subset o f objects 
was presented. Thus, a typical schema-inconsistent recognition advantage is 
predicted. Action cues are also expected to emphasise this effect, because the 
objects in the scenes pertain more to actions than to the places where those 
actions occur. Given that in the two kitchen scenes (cooking and tea-making) 
place and action are correlated, differences between memory performance 
when expectations about the scene refer to action or place are not expected. In 
contrast, the lounge-based scenes (ironing and reading) are expected to show 
stronger schematic effects in memory when participants are cued to action.
187
5.3.2 Method 
Participants
Thirty-two participants (20 female and 12 male, mean age o f 25.7) from the 
University of Surrey took part in this study. Eleven were undergraduates who 
participated in exchange for course credit. All observers reported normal or 
corrected to normal vision.
Stimuli and materials
The same stimuli and apparatus from Experiment 6 were used.
Procedure
For each action scene, participants viewed 8 individual objects (4 schema- 
consistent and 4 schema-inconsistent) in a predetermined sequence. As in 
Experiment 6, stimuli were presented in rapid succession and for 300ms each, 
followed by a 100ms mid-grey blank slide. However, in this case there were 2 
blocks, i.e. two stimuli presentations. Before each viewing sequence (block), a 
verbal label was displayed for 3 seconds. The label was either meaningless 
(e.g. ‘Scene 1 ’), or it cued for action (e.g. ‘Cooking’) or for place (e.g.
‘Kitchen 1 ’).
Recognition tests, identical to the ones used in all previous experiments, were 
carried out after each block, so each participant performed two tests. The order 
o f these two blocks was counterbalanced so that one group o f participants was 
first cued for action or place before the first stimuli presentation and then 
presented with a meaningless label before the second stimuli presentation, and 
the other group of participants saw the meaningless block first and the cued 
block second. Object consistency order was also counterbalanced. Within one 
presentation sequence (block), half of the participants saw 4 schema-consistent 
objects followed by 4 schema-inconsistent objects and the other half saw 4 
schema-inconsistent objects followed by 4 schema-consistent objects. Half of 
the objects (4) in each object category were used for the first block/presentation
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and the other half (4) was used for the second block/presentation (see Table 
5.1). Objects were randomised within their blocks and across trials. Correct 
answers and time to make a decision were recorded by E-prime 1.1.
5.3.3 Results
This experiment aimed to compare recognition performance for schema- 
consistent objects and schema-inconsistent when participants were cued for 
action or for place before they viewed the four object sequences. In the first set 
o f analyses, performance was combined for the four scenes. Following that, 
separate analysis for kitchen-based and lounge-based scenes will be reported.
A repeated measures ANOVA with 1 between-subjects factor -  type o f cue 
(action/place) and 2 within-subjects factors -  object consistency (schema- 
consistent/schema-inconsistent) and memory test (first/second) -  was carried 
out on recognition performance. A main effect of object consistency (F(l,30) = 
15.009, p < .005) was found where schema-inconsistent objects (mean = 
70.9%, std =15.4) were overall better recognised than schema-consistent 
objects (mean = 59.4%, std = 18.4). No other main effects were found (both F 
<1). However, there was a significant interaction o f object consistency with 
memory test, with F(l,30) = 5.278, p < .05. This showed that recognition 
memory in the second test differed for the two categories o f object consistency. 
More specifically, memory for schema-consistent objects increased in the 
second memory test (from 55.1% to 63.7% of correct recognitions, however 
Newman-Keuls p = .06; see Appendix H for all Newman-Keuls comparisons 
for this experiment), whereas memory for schema-inconsistent objects 
remained approximately the same (73.8% in the first test to 68.0% in the 
second test, Newman-Keuls p > .05). Regardless of the cue, recognition for 
inconsistent objects was better than for consistent objects in the first memory 
test (mean = 73.8%, std = 12.4 for schema-inconsistent objects and mean =
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55.1%, std = 18.5 for schema-consistent objects). In the second memory test, 
the inconsistent object advantage disappeared (Newman-Keuls p > .05).
A type of cue x object consistency interaction, just failed statistical significance 
with F(l,30) = 3.143, p = .086. The descriptive statistics suggest that when 
participants were cued with an action label, the typical recognition superiority 
observed for schema-inconsistent objects was more emphasised (mean = 73.0% 
vs. mean = 56.3% for schema-consistent objects) than when the cue referred to 
place (mean for schema-inconsistent objects = 68.8% and mean for schema- 
consistent objects = 62.5%).
In the analysis just reported, however, the scores for each type of cue included 
the data from the uncued block that occurred prior or after the cued block, 
which might be interfering with the results. In addition, participants may be 
adopting different strategies for each type of object in the second memory test, 
since memory in the latter test changed differentially according to the type of 
object. In order to disentangle these issues, two new separate ANOVAs were 
performed, the first one using only the data from the first memory test, and the 
second one using only the data obtained in the second memory test.
The results of the first ANOVA (first memory test) revealed a main effect of 
object consistency (F(l,14) = 16.735, p < .005) with schema-inconsistent 
objects (mean = 72.7%, std = 9.4) producing more correct recognitions than 
schema-consistent objects (mean = 57.8%, std = 13.6). No main effect o f cue 
was found (F < 1). An interaction consistency x cue was also significant with 
F(l,14) = 5.609, p < .05). When participants where cued for action before 
viewing the four scenes, a typical schematic recognition memory effect 
emerged, where schema-inconsistent objects were better recognised (mean = 
78.1%, std = 8.8) than schema-consistent objects (mean = 54.7%, std = 9.3). 
Newman-Keuls post-hoc comparisons revealed this difference was reliable (p < 
.005). When the cue referred to place this effect disappeared (mean for schema-
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inconsistent objects = 67.2%, std = 6.5, and mean for schema-consistent 
objects = 60.9%, std = 17.0, Newman-Keuls p > .05). Figure 5.4 illustrates this.
o  50.0
U  30.0
Œ Schema- 
consistent
□  Schema- 
inconsistent
Action Place
Figure 5.4 Recognition performance from the first memory test for the two 
types of object consistency in each of the cueing conditions. Error bars depict ± 
SE.
The results from the second ANOVA produced no main effect of consistency 
(F < 1) or type of cue (F < 1), but the same consistency x cue interaction was 
evident, with F(l,14) = 10.939, p < . 01). In the second memory test, presenting 
a verbal label referring to action also produced a superior recognition 
performance for schema-inconsistent objects (mean = 75.0%, std = 16.4, and 
mean = 56.3%, std = 14.9 for schema-consistent objects, Newman-Keuls p < 
.05), but when the cue was place recognition performance did not differ for the 
two types of object (mean = 64.1%, std = 17.0 for schema-inconsistent objects 
and mean = 75.0%, std = 18.9 for schema-consistent objects, Newman-Keuls p 
> .05). This is illustrated in Figure 5.5.
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Figure 5.5 Recognition performance from the second memory test for the 
two types of object consistency in each of the cueing conditions. Error bars 
depict ± SE.
We also wanted to investigate whether a typical schematic recognition result 
(superior recognition performance with schema-inconsistent objects) would 
occur when participants were presented with a meaningless cue. Including the 
meaningless cue trials in the two ANOVAS described above renders both 
consistency x cue interactions statistically unreliable (F(2,29) = 1.735, p > .05) 
for the first memory test, and F(2,29) = 2.672, p > .05 for the second memory 
test). Results are summarised in Table 5.2.
In summary, whether the action cue came on the first or second memory test, 
participants performed better for schema-inconsistent objects than with a place 
cue. However, results from the first ANOVA revealed that performance in the 
second memory test was affected by the first test.
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Table 5.2 Mean percentage of correct recognitions for each schema-
consistency object category, in each memory test, according to the type of cue 
received at the beginning of each block of trials. Standard deviations appear in 
brackets.
Test 1 Test 2
Cue Consistent Inconsistent Consistent Inconsistent
Action 54.7% (9.3) 78.1% (8.8) 56.3% (14.9) 75.0% (16.4)
Place 60.9% (17.0) 67.2% (6.5) 75.0% (18.9) 64.1% (17.0)
Meaningless 52.3% (22.5) 75.0% (15.1) 61.7% (16.1) 66.4% (18.7)
- (after Action) - - 64.1% (8.0) 70.3% (21.1)
- (after Place) - - 59.4% (21.9) 62.5% (16.4)
For this reason, in the next analyses only data obtained in the first block will be 
considered, since it incurred no carry-over effects. Table 5.3 shows the results 
of the recognition test in each of the four action scenes.
Table 5.3 Mean percentage o f correct recognitions for each schema- 
consistency object category, in each o f the action scenes, according to the type 
of cue received in the first block of trials. Standard deviations appear in 
brackets.
Action Place
Consistent Inconsistent Consistent Inconsistent
Cooking
Tea-making
Ironing
Reading
25.0% (18.9) 
31.3% (11.6) 
15.6% (18.6) 
31.3% (17.7)
46.9% (16.0) 
40.6% (12.9) 
37.5% (13.2) 
56.3% (17.7)
21.9% (20.9) 
34.4% (22.9) 
25.0% (13.4) 
31.3% (17.6)
31.3% (17.7) 
50.0% (13.4) 
28.1% (16.0) 
34.4% (22.9)
193
Given that in Experiment 2, action and place information were found to be 
correlated in kitchen-based scenes but not the lounge-based scenes, the data for 
cooking and tea-making was combined and compared with the combined data 
from ironing and reading.
A repeated measures ANOVA with type o f scene (kitchen / lounge) and type of 
cue (place / action) as between-subjects variables and object consistency as the 
within-subjects variable was carried out on recognition scores. There was no 
interaction scene x object consistency (F < 1). A significant cue x object 
consistency interaction (F(l,60) = 5.789, p < .05) revealed that with action cue, 
the recognition advantage for schema-inconsistent objects was more 
pronounced (mean schema-inconsistent = 45.3%, std = 16.2 and mean schema- 
consistent = 25.8%, std = 17.4, Newman-Keuls p < .001) than when the cue 
was place (mean schema-inconsistent = 35.9%, std = 19.0 and mean schema- 
consistent = 28.1%, std = 18.8, Newman-Keuls p < .05). The three-way 
interaction between the two between-subject variables and the within-subjects 
variable was not reliable (F(l, 60) = 3.113, p = .083).
In summary, the typical schematic effect found in recognition memory, which, 
on the basis o f the difference between place- and action-cues, results from 
action-schema mediation, emerged both when place and action information 
were correlated and when they were not. This effect was emphasised when 
expectations about the scene pertained to action. Although not reliable, the 
three-way interaction implies that when the cue place was used, the schema- 
inconsistent recognition advantage could be more pronounced for the kitchen- 
based scenes than for the lounge-based scenes.
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5.3.4 Discussion
Experiment 8 aimed to investigate whether action and/or place schemata were 
mediating perception o f the objects contained in the scenes used in most of the 
empirical work of this thesis. Different expectations (action and place) were 
created before a subset of objects was viewed, and memory performance for 
schema-consistent and inconsistent objects was assessed. Overall, results 
showed that when a meaningful cue was presented, participants’ recognition of 
schema-inconsistent objects was significantly better than recognition of 
schema-consistent objects, which supports the results obtained in Experiment 
7. When participants were cued for place this effect disappeared. Given this 
result and the fact that schematic effects in recognition memory were observed 
with a meaningless cue, the effectiveness o f the action and place cues should 
not be questioned.
Analyses combining the two kitchen-based and the two lounge-based scenes 
revealed a schema-inconsistent superiority effect for both types of cue. 
However, the typical schema-inconsistent recognition advantage was reliably 
more pronounced when the cue referred to action. This suggests that on scene 
onset, information was preferentially organised around the theme of the action, 
which took priority over information about the place where the action occurred, 
and mediated object perception. Nonetheless, the possibility of a place-schema 
operating in the kitchen-based scenes should not be discounted.
Results are in accordance with those reported by Goodman (1980) on action- 
schemata, where schema-inconsistent objects were found to be better 
recognised than schema-consistent objects on a 2-AFC task. In addition, the 
relatedness of those objects to place also produced a similar schematic effect, 
which supports the findings of Pezdek, Whetstone, Reynolds, Askari and 
Dougherty (1989), who provided evidence for room-schemata using the same 
task. However, in the absence of scene background, place information is 
compromised and stronger effects for action cues prevail. In other words.
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elements contained in the scene’s layout (e.g. fridge, sofa, etc) are likely to 
evoke room knowledge, and in the absence of that information, action 
knowledge is more likely to be evoked. This could account for the robustness 
o f action-schemata in this experiment. Alternatively, action-schemata may be 
particularly robust in most situations, even when action and place information 
is correlated. In Friedman’s (1979) words, “the frame for an object may also 
represent what that object does and what kind o f events it can enter into” (pg. 
320). It could be that the connection between objects used for actions are 
stronger than the connections between objects and the places they usually 
occur. There is no doubt that to iron an iron is needed, and that to cook, a pan 
is needed. But a pan is also highly likely to be found in a kitchen. The 
instantiation o f a “kitchen” schema should contain a proposition for “pan”. It 
seems, however, that given the “functional” characteristics o f the object 
(Mainardi Peron, Baroni, Job and Salmaso, 1990), an action-schema for 
“cooking” will be instantiated when the object “pan” is identified, instead o f a 
“kitchen” schema. In the absence of scene layout, action-schemata should 
prevail over place-schemata. When the whole scene is viewed, the congruence 
between the action and the place should facilitate scene perception (Neuschatz, 
2002), especially when the action is somewhat restricted to a place (such as 
cooking and tea-making). In contrast, when scene layout does not provide 
much information about what the scene is about (lounge-based scenes), action- 
schemata are more useful in providing the basis for scene understanding.
5.4 General Discussion
Scene contexts are likely to specify the objects in them (Mandler and Parker, 
1976). Conversely, it is possible that objects that usually co-occur in the world 
may specify a “scene” because they are diagnostic of that scene (a lamp could 
be diagnostic of an office, a bedroom, a living room, etc. however, the 
conjunction of a lamp with a TV set and a sofa is likely to suggest a living 
room). The results presented here demonstrate that this is the case. Schema-
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inconsistent objects were better recognised when only a subset o f objects was 
presented. This is in accordance with the functional isolation model proposed 
by Hollingworth and Henderson (1999). The authors argued that object 
identification can occur without access to information about this object with 
regards to scene contexts. Scene background is likely to facilitate object 
perception (Biederman, 1981, Boyce and Pollatsek, 1992), and scene 
understanding since it narrows the number and identity o f potential objects to 
be found in peripheral vision (De Graef, 1998). However, when background is 
not available, the rapid perception of a group of objects can still occur in 
isolation and be guided by the context created by their co-occurrence. Objects 
alone can provide contextual cueing and prioritise which information is 
relevant to process (Chun and Nakayama, 2000). According to Chun and Jiang 
(1999) the visual system learns how objects covary in the natural world and 
schemata can be applied to different scenes with the same prototypical context. 
Despite the variation in spatial relations within the visual world (a pen and a 
computer can be placed anywhere in an office relative to each other), human 
observers are sensitive to object co-occurrence in the same context. 
Furthermore, Grill-Spector and Kanwisher (2005) argued that general 
categories o f objects can be extracted at the time o f object detection and this 
may occur before image identification.
The results from Experiment 8 further support these considerations. More 
importantly, the experiment demonstrated that in the scenes used, action- 
schemata produce stronger schematic effects in memory than place-schemata. 
This may be particularly true of scenes where action information is more useful 
in providing a context for the scene. Action-schemata may be particularly 
robust perhaps because our everyday lives are made up of successions of 
actions, in which the same action can take place in different physical 
environments. Representations organised around human actions (what is 
happening) may override representations about objects being found in a 
particular place (what is there). This may be particularly true for events which 
are not restricted to a specific place. Yet, these broad questions still remain
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unanswered. We should emphasise that these experiments did not intend to 
prove that place-schema information was not used to process the scene. Rather, 
in the absence o f scene background, action-schemata provide a better basis for 
organising the information being perceived.
5.5 Conclusions of the Chapter
The results obtained in the experiments reported in this chapter provide further 
support for the effect o f schemata in the perception of meaningful information.
Action-schemata effects on recognition memory were observed in the absence 
o f an actor and scene background, which suggests that objects that are strongly 
associated with an action can instantiate the same knowledge as if  the whole 
scene was perceived. As Experiment 7 indicates, it is possible that when co­
occurrence of those objects is almost “obligatory”, schemata can be 
instantiated without any scene context.
When expectations about a scene about to be viewed pertain to action, memory 
for a subset of objects from the original scenes reveals a stronger schematic 
effect than when expectations pertain to place. This was particularly true when 
the subset of objects was taken from scenes where objects are closely related to 
action, and not as much to place. The reasons for that are still unclear. It is 
possible that without access to scene background information, objects that are 
closely related to place may not form a meaningful semantic context, on which 
perception could be based.
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CHAPTER 6: GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
6.1 Overview
The empirical work described in this thesis aimed to address the four core 
questions identified in Chapter 1. Firstly, how do action-schemata influence eye 
movements during scene inspection? Secondly, how do action-schemata affect 
what is subsequently remembered? Thirdly, are schematic effects during scene 
inspection and subsequent remembering independent of each other? Finally, to 
what extent does action-schema instantiation rely on background information?
In order to address these questions, a summary of the main findings that emerged 
from the empirical work will be presented and a discussion on how those findings 
relate to the questions will follow. Finally, suggestions for future work or for 
alternative ways to tackle particular research problems will be presented.
6.2 Summary of the Main Findings
In Chapter 2, two experiments were carried out so meaningful scenes that 
potentially instantiated action-schemata were created. Using knowledge elicitation 
techniques. Experiment 1 was successful at identifying the most salient features of 
a subset of actions to be depicted in the photo-realistic stimuli to be used in the 
experiments that followed. Knowledge about actions was found to be highly 
stereotypical across individuals. Four action scenes were created and schema- 
consistent and inconsistent objects were identified and included in the four scenes, 
together with a centrally positioned actor. These were validated by an independent 
sample of participants and it was concluded that they were likely to instantiate 
action-schemata. Experiment 2 showed that in two of the scenes information about 
the action and the place where the action was occurring was correlated. This was
199
taken into consideration in subsequent experiments, since, as identified in the 
literature review, place-schemata have been shown to affect scene perception is 
similar ways to action-schemata.
Chapter 3 presented new evidence for the influence of schemata in eye movements 
and memory. Analyses of eye-movement patterns show that attention is guided by 
the semantic relationship between the objects present in the scene and the action- 
schema. In Experiment 3a, more refixations and longer dwell times were observed 
for schema-inconsistent objects. Clearly, inconsistent information captures 
attention at some point during scene inspection. This was investigated in 
Experiment 3b using a refined time-course analysis of eye-movement behaviour.
In the first 300 ms of scene viewing, most fixations land on schema-consistent 
objects and the actor (inherently schema-consistent). In other words, at scene 
onset, attention is deployed in a manner to facilitate initial scene comprehension, 
and this is provided by schema-consistent information. Nonetheless, differences 
emerged between the two-lounge based and the two kitchen-based scenes. While 
schema-consistent objects were the most likely targets of saccades in the two 
kitchen-based scenes, the same was not true for the two lounge-based scenes, 
where the actor was the focus of attention. It was suggested that given a looser 
connection between place and action information in the lounge-based scenes, the 
actor is more likely to provide information as to the scene’s main theme. In 
contrast, in the kitchen-based scenes, objects were found to be closely related to 
both the action and the place where the action was occurring, so by fixating on 
them the scene’s context could be extracted rapidly. After a first stage of gathering 
generic information, the eyes move on to inspect schema-inconsistent objects. This 
shift of attention was found to occur in the first 20 fixations in a scene. Experiment 
3c showed that subsequent memory for objects present in the scenes was affected 
by the semantic qualities of the objects. Schema-consistent objects were better 
recalled than schema-consistent objects, and when memory was assessed using a 
2-AFC task, the opposite occurred, with schema-inconsistent objects producing
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better performance. It was argued that free recall and visual recognition are likely 
to extract qualitatively different information and that success on recognition may 
depend on attention, whereas knowledge instantiated from memory could be the 
cause of good recall of expected information. Experiment 4 demonstrated that the 
recognition results obtained in Experiment 3c were not an artefact of 
disembodying the objects from their original scenes at test, and that consistent 
with current literature, re-instatement of background context did not enhance 
recognition memory.
In Chapter 4, scene viewing was constrained in two experiments to answer the 
question of whether the differential eye-movement patterns observed for the two 
types of objects were responsible for the memory results. Results from a change 
detection task used in Experiment 5 showed that schema-inconsistent objects are 
represented with rich visual detail and attention is captured by them. Visual detail 
for these objects is likely to be incorporated into memory in a durable form, and 
this could account for the superior recognition performance observed for those 
objects. A second experiment showed that attending at an object increases the 
chance of being subsequently recognised but this is not true of recall. The results 
from Experiment 6 show that attention supports both the inclusion into memory of 
inconsistent semantic information and visual information for both types of objects. 
Recall of schema-consistent objects appears to occur without the need for focused 
attention (as assessed by fixation patterns). In more natural viewing conditions 
recognition performance of schema-consistent objects is likely to be at chance 
levels. It was suggested that the encoding of perceptual information about these 
objects is irrelevant altogether or that memory traces are weak.
The experiments reported in Chapter 5 examined whether schematic effects in 
recognition memory could be observed in the absence of scene background, 
including the actor. Similar effects on recognition were obtained when only a 
subset of eight objects was displayed, provided participants viewed a minimum of
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four schema-consistent objects. No effect on memory was found when only two 
schema-consistent objects were viewed. Clearly, context can be established and 
can influence what is remembered, provided the objects displayed share enough 
semantic regularities. Experiment 7 also showed that when schema-inconsistent 
objects were presented first, the same schematic effects on recognition memory 
were observed. This suggests that context can be established at later stages of 
viewing as long as the four schema-consistent objects are diagnostic of the whole 
action scene. In Experiment 8, participants expectations about the scene they were 
about to view were manipulated. The results indicate that cueing for action has 
more pronounced effects on memory than for place. The possibility that place- 
schemata may operate when background information is available in scenes where 
action and place information are correlated was suggested. The overall conclusion 
of Chapter 5 was that action-schemata are strong mediators of perception because 
strong functional relationships between the objects and the actions exist.
6.3 Discussion of the Core Questions
Each of the questions identified in the overview will be addressed in turn in light 
of the studies reviewed in Chapter 1 and the findings of the experimental work 
reported throughout this thesis.
6.3.1 How do action-schemata influence eye movements during scene 
inspection?
As outlined in Chapter 1, most studies that used eye movements to investigate the 
effect of semantics on eye-movement behaviour have found a direct relationship 
between the two. Less predictable, harder to process, or implausible words receive 
more fixations and longer fixations and get skipped less often (Ashby, Pollatsek 
and Reichle, 2004; Henderson and Ferreira, 1990; Rayner, Warren, Juhasz and
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Liversedge, 2004; Rayner and Well, 1996). Likewise, highly informative (i.e. 
inconsistent) areas of a scene (De Graef, Christiaens and d’Ydewalle, 1990; Loftus 
and Mackworth, 1978; Friedman, 1979; Henderson, Weeks and Hollingworth, 
1999; Hollingworth and Henderson, 2000) are fixated for longer and more often. 
Inconsistent information is likely to capture attention.
Supporting the findings of these studies. Experiment 3 a showed that schema- 
inconsistent objects received more fixations and dwell time on those objects was 
longer than on schema-consistent objects. Fixation durations for both types of 
objects were the same, but the validity of this measure as an indicator of 
processing was questioned. Average fixation durations may reflect planning of 
subsequent saccades and tend to be homogeneous over the time. Other measures of 
processing difficulty (pupil dilation) and attentional pop-out (saccadic amplitude) 
were not different for both types of objects, which suggests that schema- 
inconsistent objects are not particularly “difficult” to process and do not “stand 
out”. Experiment 3b showed that the duration of the first fixation was similar for 
the two types of objects, suggesting that schema-inconsistent information does not 
attract attention at early stages of scene viewing. In fact, and in accordance with 
most research (e.g. De Graef et al, 1990; Henderson et al, 1999), schema- 
consistent information were the most likely targets for early saccades. How 
schemata affect eye movements over the course of total viewing time was also 
analysed in Experiment 3b. It was shown that initial scene comprehension 
characterised by early fixations on schema-consistent objects is followed by a shift 
of attention to schema-inconsistent objects in the first 20 fixations on the scene. 
This supports the results of De Graef at al (1990) who found that first fixations to 
inconsistent objects occur on average 8 fixations after scene onset.
In summary, the eye-movement pattern in scenes under the influence of action- 
schemata is characterised by early fixations on schema-consistent information 
followed by a shift of attention to schema-inconsistent information. This is likely
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to reflect an initial survey of the scene’s context followed by closer examination of 
objects that violate the action-schema, probably with intention to connect them 
with the rest of the scene. Overall, the eye-movement patterns observed are 
consistent with a schema-driven scene inspection. This thesis has found further 
evidence for the influence of schemata in the way attention is deployed in 
meaningful scenes. A particular contribution of the findings reported here is to 
build on the work by Goodman (1980), in providing an analysis of eye movements 
and showing that they are guided by action-schemata. In addition, a refined time 
course analysis was used to pinpoint the time when attention shifts to particular 
types of information, making an important contribution to the debate surrounding 
the early stages of viewing.
6.3.2 How do action-schemata affect what is subsequently remembered?
Many studies reviewed in Chapter 1 have claimed that scene semantics, and 
consequently the knowledge they instantiate, can affect how elements within a 
scene are encoded (Brewer and Treyens, 1989; Friedman, 1979; Goodman, 1980; 
Lampinen, Copeland and Neuschatz, 2001; Neuschatz, Lampinen, Preston, 
Hawkins and Toglia, 2002; Peron, Baroni, Job and Salmaso, 1990; Pezdek, 
Whetstone, Reynolds, Askari and Dougherty, 1989). In Experiment 3c a free recall 
and a visual recognition test were used to test for this. Action schema-consistent 
objects were better recalled than schema-inconsistent objects, which is in 
accordance with the work by Goodman (1980). It was argued that this result is 
caused by recall’s reliance on relational information (Engelkamp and Zimmer, 
2001) and is therefore assisted by the instantiated schema. In contrast, recognition 
performance was better for action schema-inconsistent objects, as in Goodman’s 
(1980) study. Recognition is likely to be independent of context (Nobel and 
Shiffrin, 2001), and performance depends on encoding of visual attributes into a 
durable form. Longer fixations and refixations on these objects are likely to
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account for the results. More time was spent looking at correctly recalled schema- 
inconsistent objects but there was no difference in eye movement measures for 
correctly recalled and unrecalled schema-consistent objects. Recognition improved 
for both types of objects when they received more fixations. These issues were 
further addressed in Chapter 4.
In summary, action-schemata mediate the way information is encoded during 
scene viewing. Schema-consistent objects are processed spontaneously because 
scenes are meaningful (Castelhano and Henderson, 2005) and are likely to be 
represented without much visual detail (Simons and Levin, 1997). In contrast 
schema-inconsistent objects are represented in detail and attention is likely to be 
necessary for the incorporation of those objects in the scene’s representation.
Schematic mediation may be an efficient way of processing the world, where only 
the necessary information for normal functioning within that world is rapidly 
incorporated in the dynamic representation of that scene/situation, at the expense 
of low-level redundant information. In this process, overt attention would ensure 
the processing of unexpected details, since in real-world situations, they are likely 
to carry important information. In accordance with a few researchers (Ballard, 
Hayhoe and Pelz, 1995; Chun and Nakayama, 2000; Triesch, Ballard, Hayhoe and 
Sullivan, 2003), during perception, the visual system is unlikely to store more 
information than it needs, and the lack of detailed visual representations can be 
interpreted as “affording parsimony” to avoid overload (Chun and Nakayama,
2000, pg. 66). Schemata support the maintenance scene gist across views and 
attention is managed accordingly. Our inability to represent the world with 
veridical detail sounds counterintuitive given our rich phenomenological 
experience of its stability. However, as argued by Simons and Levin (1998), 
encoding visual detail of every percept on any given moment would likely create a 
feeling of chaos rather than stability. Paradoxically, processing the world by 
means of an “incomplete” mechanism supports the rich perceptual experience we
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have of that world. The studies reported in this thesis have provided further 
evidence that the instantiation of a schema affects the specificity of memory for 
elements in a scene. In addition, the results contribute to the debate as to which 
elements within the scene are better remembered, by establishing that differences 
between studies are likely to rest on the nature of information extracted by the 
different memory testes used.
6.3.3 Are schematic effects during scene inspection and subsequent 
remembering independent of each other?
As outlined in Chapter 1, schema-inconsistent objects are, overall, more likely 
targets for saccades and change detection increases when changes are made to 
saccade targets (Currie, McConkie, Carlson-Radvansky and Irwin, 1995). In 
addition, object change detection depends on the success of the comparison 
between the representation of the object in memory and the current visual input of 
that object (Currie, McConkie, Carlson-Radvansky and Irwin, 1995; Irwin, 1991; 
Ryan and Cohen, 2004; Simons, 2000). If schema-consistent objects are 
represented with little detail then in a change detection paradigm, performance 
should be poorer than that of schema-inconsistent objects, which are likely to be 
represented with detail. In addition, if schema-inconsistent objects capture 
attention, performance should be good since change detection depends on attention 
(Rensink, O’Regan and Clark, 1997). In Experiment 5 changes to schema- 
inconsistent objects were detected faster than changes to schema-consistent 
objects. This supports similar work by Hollingworth and Henderson (2000). In 
addition, changes that involved semantic disruption of the scene’s context 
(replacing a schema-consistent object with a schema-inconsistent object) were 
detected faster than changes that maintained the context intact (replacing a 
schema-consistent or inconsistent object with one of the same category). These
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results are in accordance a variety of studies that report a schema-inconsistency 
advantage (Friedman, 1979; Gordon, 2004; Henderson et al, 1999).
However even when they are fixated, changes to objects that are consistent with 
the task at hand are often missed (Treisch, Ballard, Hayhoe and Sullivan, 2003). 
Clearly, looking at an object is not enough to guarantee that its visual detail is 
represented for future comparison with the visual input (O’Regan, Deubel, Clark 
and Rensink, 2000). It was argued that schema-consistent objects appear to be 
surveyed superficially whereas schema-inconsistent objects are likely to receive 
more scrutiny. In the same way that gist extraction can occur without attention (Fei 
Fei, VanRullen, Koch and Petrona, 2005; Lampinen, Copeland and Neuschatz, 
2001), the maintenance of that gist across views of a scene may also take place 
without the need for attention.
In Experiment 6 measures of attention that do not require explicit report were used 
to investigate similarly motivated questions. By biasing participants attention 
towards specific objects and testing subsequent memory, the different roles played 
by memory and attention during scene viewing. Results showed that schema- 
consistent information was better recalled regardless of which objects were looked 
at. Equally, recall of consistent information was not shown to depend on fixation 
position in a study by Fisher and Shebilske (1985), who found that skipped words 
can be recalled, and this can be attributed to both parafoveal vision and 
expectations. In contrast, recall of information that was not supported by the 
schema improved when attention was biased to it. Recognition depended mainly 
on objects being fixated.
In both experiments reported in Chapter 4, memorisation of object detail is 
incidental and the results from those experiments led to the conclusion that 
attention is critical in order to incorporate information that is not supported by the 
currently active schema. These results have reinforced the claim that the process of
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scene perception and the development of representations about those scenes seem 
to rely on the combination of attentional patterns and the existing knowledge that 
is evoked at the time of perception. The studies reported in this thesis have 
provided clear evidence that knowledge instantiated from memory and eye 
movements undertake significant, yet distinct, roles in the efficient perception of 
meaningful scenes, a distinction which hitherto had not been demonstrated.
6.3.4 To what extent does action-schema instantiation rely on background 
information?
As discussed in Chapter 1, although scene context can facilitate objects’ 
identification (Biederman, 1981; Boyce and Pollatsek, 1992; De Graef, Christiaens 
and d’Ydewalle, 1990), objects alone may create a context that can be used to 
influence memory during recognition. According to Henderson, Rayner and 
Pollatsek (1987) an object can prime a second object and facilitate its 
identification. When items share strong contextual/semantic characteristics, this 
context is reinstated every time a related item is found (Malmberg and Shiffrin, 
2005).
Experiment 7, showed that without background information, recognition 
performance after viewing produces the same effect on recognition as if the whole 
scene was present. Similar findings in categorisation tasks have been reported by 
researchers using techniques where only a subset of information is available 
(Gosselin and Schyns, 2001; McCotter, Gosselin, Sowden and Schyns, 2005; 
Sakamoto and Love, 2004). In addition, schematic effects on memory were 
observed when participants viewed four schema-consistent objects and four 
schema-inconsistent objects, regardless of which type they viewed first. This 
reinforces the idea that provided that inconsistent objects cannot be semantically 
clustered (which was demonstrated in Experiment 2), a few schema-related
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(perhaps required) objects can produce schematic effects on memory similar to 
those produced with whole scenes. This process can occur at later stages of 
“scene” processing. Because the schema-consistent objects are “obligatory” in 
their respective action-schemata, recognition for schema-inconsistent objects is 
likely to be emphasised (Sakamoto and Love, 2004). Alternatively, the semantic 
relatedness of objects is sufficient to suggest enough about the action that the 
schema is activated, such that well-defined actions provide robust themes around 
which information can be organised. Because actions are closely linked to certain 
objects, the mere perception of these objects may be enough to facilitate the 
processing of the whole scene.
The issue of whether action schemata are distinct from place schemata was 
directly investigated in Experiment 8. Previous work has provided evidence for the 
operation of both action (Goodman, 1980) and place schemata (Brewer and 
Treyens, 1981; Pezdek, Reynolds, Askari and Dougherty, 1989) on memory. 
However, it was hypothesised that action-schemata are likely to prevail over place- 
schemata because action-object contingencies are stronger than place-object 
contingencies. Cueing participants to action or place before they viewed a subset 
of objects provided evidence for this. Schematic effects on recognition memory 
were stronger when expectations about the “scene” about to be viewed pertained to 
action.
In line with Bartlett (1932) and Piaget’s (1971) claims that knowledge is action- 
oriented and schemata are organised knowledge about past reactions is Grill- 
Spector and Kanwisher’s (2005) assertion that the speed of early object detection 
relies on access to long-term memory acquired from experience of those objects. 
Objects are more likely to evoke “functional familiarity” (familiarity that emerges 
from being used for a specific goal) than “acquaintance familiarity” (familiarity 
that emerges from repeated exposure) (Mainardi, Peron, Baroni and Salmaso,
1990).
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Nonetheless, the possibility of place-schemata being instantiated when scene 
background is available, should not be ruled out. It has been argued that initial 
scene processing may be independent of the objects within the scene (McCotter, 
Gosselin, Sowden and Schyns, 2005; Oliva and Torralba, 2001; Renninger and 
Malik, 2004a; Schyns and Oliva, 1994), and rely on coarse scene layout 
information. In the scenes used in these studies, scene layout is place information, 
and an estimate about the scene’s identity could be based on it. This could well be 
the case, given that this process occurs in the first 30 ms of scene viewing (Schyns 
and Oliva, 1994). However, shortly after (150 ms), people are likely to attend at 
fine edges and objects (or the actor), which may in turn activate an action-schema, 
especially if they are particularly predictive of the action depicted.
In summary, action-schemata appear to be quite robust and this may rely on the 
fact that associations between objects based on their use may be stronger than 
associations between objects based on the likelihood that they can be found in the 
same physical environment. This thesis contributed to the knowledge of schemata 
by suggesting that they may be instantiated without scene background information. 
It also provided the first comparison between action and place schemata, the 
results of which indicated that action-schemata may prevail over place-schemata 
when object-action contingencies are particularly strong. This is likely to be 
attributed to the functional role of objects. Further investigation is required in this 
area.
6.4 Suggestions for Future Research
This section of the thesis will outline some issues that remain unresolved together 
with some problems encountered in the empirical work, and propose further 
investigation in order to clarify and resolve them.
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One of the problems associated with drawing conclusions about the recall of 
schema-consistent information lies on the fact that most real-world scenes are 
highly coherent, that is, they contain mainly consistent information. During the 
development of our stimuli, we made sure that this was the case, in order to ensure 
authenticity. In Lampinen, Copeland and Neuschatz’s (2002) study on room- 
schemata, however, the rooms contained an equal number of consistent and 
inconsistent objects. This not only avoids problems with data analysis (in our 
scenes the number of inconsistent objects differed from scene to scene) and 
averaging across scenes, but also circumvents the alternative explanation for 
superior recall of consistent information based on repeated visual rehearsal and/or 
precedence of gist information during free recall.
The issue of whether people encode information that is not extracted by the usual 
means employed in the studies reported here is still unresolved. In Experiments 4 
and 5 (Chapter 4), attention was found to be critical to incorporate veridical detail 
about objects. Results from the experiments reported in Chapter 4 support the idea 
that during scene perception different “levels” of attention are employed to 
different aspects of the scene. Indirect measures of attention such as memory tests 
showed that some information that is not extracted during a change detection 
paradigm is actually represented in memory. Conversely, direct measures of 
attention, such as eye movements show that fixating on an object does not 
guarantee that veridical detail about that object can be extracted. Future change 
detection type of paradigms should examine the level of processing of unnoticed 
changes using other more implicit measures. Our study would have benefited from 
a forced-choice recognition task as the one used in the previous experiments. Eye 
movement data would also have provided a detailed characterisation of the “level” 
of attention allocated to unreported changed objects (by means of refixations, 
dwell time, etc.) when compared to a reported changed object.
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The issue of whether actions are more important than elements of a place remains 
unanswered. One way to explore this issue further would be to use a change 
detection paradigm where place information would gradually change whilst action 
information remained constant. If information is represented based on action, then 
change detection should be poor or occur after some time elapsed. This could be 
compared with the opposite condition where action information would change 
whilst place information remained the same. Alternatively, testing aspects of 
perception of scenes with different levels of congruence between action and place 
information could provide insight into the robustness of action-schemata in 
guiding perception.
Ultimately, we would like to extend this research to situations where participants 
are actively engaged in an action, rather than just being passive observers of 
scenes depicting actions. Specifically, what level of attention is necessary for 
specific tasks and how that relates to acting in a 3-dimensional real world. Results 
from a study by Triesch, Ballard, Hayhoe and Sullivan (2003) revealed that an 
important variable in change blindness is the point at which information needs to 
be extracted for the performance of a task in natural conditions. Since we engage 
in many purposive actions in our everyday lives, using such a paradigm to 
investigate the level of processing of the objects we use may provide important 
insights into the importance of action-schemata. This becomes particularly 
attractive in the wake of Simons, Mitroff and Franconeri ‘s (2003) proposal that 
our action system may have more detailed representations than the visual system 
and that although transsaccadic integration is poor, the action system is capable of 
more precise representations of objects that are important for action. Furthermore, 
Simons and colleagues hypothesise that the perceived visual stability of the world 
may depend on knowledge and not on perception.
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6.5 Conclusions of the Thesis
This thesis has examined how action-schemata influence the perception of photo- 
naturalistic 2-dimensional scenes where salient actions are depicted. The major 
conclusions of the work presented here can be summarised as follows. First of all, 
schemata affect the way eye movements are distributed during scene viewing. 
Overall, information that is not supported by the action schema is likely to receive 
more attention (longer dwell times and refixations), and this is particularly the case 
after eye movements have afforded an initial scene interpretation. Memory for 
schema-consistent and schema-inconsistent information produced asymmetrical 
results typical of schematic effects. Information that was consistent with the 
instantiated schema was well recalled but poorly recognised and the opposite was 
true of information that was inconsistent with the schema. It was suggested that 
these memory effects reflect attentional patterns during scene inspection. Attention 
appears to be critical to integrate information that is not supported by the schema, 
but not for the recall of schema-consistent information. Finally, action-schemata 
can be instantiated in the absence of scene background and appear to prevail over 
place-schemata. Nonetheless, when places are tightly connected to actions, two 
schemata may operate. Future research should focus on establishing how schemata 
operate, and whether action-schemata are particularly strong facilitators of 
perception, and if so why that is the case. Whether these effects extend to active 
engagement in activities could be the basis for new experiments.
In summary, the experiments reported in this thesis provide further support to the 
notion that both information from memory, which encapsulates the content of a 
scene (i.e. schema), and overt attention (i.e. eye-movements), mediate the process 
of dynamic scene perception, and our subsequent memory. Schema-driven 
perception of the world supports a schema-inconsistent object processing 
advantage, with visual representations for those objects containing a high degree 
of specificity. Although scene context is likely to aid perception, it is not essential.
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given that perceiving a limited amount of objects that are semantically connected 
is enough for a typical schematic effect on recognition performance.
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Appendices 
Appendix A
Questionnaire used in the rating task in Experiment 1
Using the 7-point scale provided, please rate the list of objects in terms of their relevance to 
the actions mentioned on the top of each sheet by circling the appropriate number, where
1 = object is totally irrelevant for the action;
7 = item is very relevant to the action (defines the action).
Thank you very much for your time.
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IRONING
black/white board 1 2
1
3 4 
1 1
6 7 
1 1
OHP 2
1
4 3 6 7
1 I I 1
book 1 2
1
3 4 
1 1
6 7 
1 1
oven gloves 2 4 3 6 7
1 1 I I
bookmark 1 2
1
3 4 
1 1
6 7 
1 1
pan/bowl 2
1
4 3 6 7
brush 1 2 3 4 
1 1
6 7 
1 1
paper 2 4 3 6 7 
1 1 1 1
chair 1 2
1
3 4 
1 1
6 7 
1 1
pen 2
1
4 3 6 7 
1 1 1 1
chalk 1 2 3 4 6 7 
1 1
pencil 2
1
4 3 6 7 
1 1 1 1
chopping board 1 2
1
3 4 
1 1
6 7 
1 1
plate 2 : 4 3 6 7 
1 1 1 1
cloth 1 2
1
3 4 
1 1
6 7 
1 1
plug 2
1
4 3 6 7 
1 1 1 1
clothes 1 2
1
3 4 
1 1
6 7 reading glasses 2
1
4 3 6 7 
1 1 1 1
computer 1 2 3 4 
1 1
6 7 
1 1
ruler 2
1
4 3 6 7
cup 1 2
1
3 4 
1 1
6 7 
1 1
salt/pepper/spices 2
1
4 3 6 7
I I 1 1
desk 1 2 3 4 6 7 
1 1
sauce pan 2 4 3 6 7 
1 1 1 1
dish drainer 1 2
1
3 4 
1 1
6 7 
1 1
saucer 2
1
4 3 6 7
I I 1 1
dishes/plates 1 2
1
3 4 
1 1
6 7 
1 1
shirt 2
1
4 3 6 7 
1 1 1 1
eraser 1 2
1
3 4 
1 1
6 7 sink/basin/bowl 2
1
4 3 6 7 
1 1 1 1
gloves 1 2
1
3 4 
1 1
6 7 
1 1
sponge/scourer 2
1
4 3 6 7
hanger 1 2
1
3 4 
1 1
6 7 
1 1
spoon 2
1
4 3 6 7 
1 1 1 1
iron 1 2
1
3 4 6 7 
1 1
starch (spray) 2
1
4 3 6 7
ironing board 1 2
1
3 4 
1 1
6 7 
1 1
sugar (jar/bowl) 2
1
4 3 6 7 
1 1 1 1
kettle 1 2
1
3 4 
1 1
6 7 table 2
1
4 3 6 7
I I 1 1
knife 1 2
1
3 4 6 7 tap 2 : 4 3 6 7 
1 1 1 1
lamp 1 2
1
3 4 
1 1
6 7 tea bag (box) 2
1
4 3 6 7 
1 1 1 1
lemon 1 2
1
3 4 
1 1
6 7 
1 1
tea pot 2
1
4 3 6 7 
1 1 1 1
magazine 1 2
1
3 4 
1 1
6 7 
1 1
textbook 2
1
4 3 6 7
1 I I 1
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marker pen 
milk (pack/jar) 
mug
newspaper 
note pad
transparencies
utensils
2 3 4
_l L I_
6 7
washing-up liquid 1 2 3 4 3 6
I______I____ J ______I____ J ____ i_
water (jug/spray) 1 2 3 4 3 6 7
I______ I_____ L_____ I___i _ ____ I___-J
READING
black/white board 1 
1_
2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
OHP 2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
book 1 
1_
2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
oven gloves 2
1
4
1
6 7
bookmark 1 
1_
2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
pan/bowl 2 4 6 7 
1 1
brush 1 
1
2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
paper 2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
chair 1 2
1
4 6 7 
1 1
pen 2
1
4
1
6 7
chalk 1
1, „
2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
pencil 2
1
6 7 
1 1
chopping board 1 
1_
2
1
4 6 7 
1 1
plate 2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
cloth 1 
1_
2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
plug 2
1 1
6 7
clothes 1 
1 „
2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
reading glasses 2
I 1
6 7 
1 1
computer 1 
1_
2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
ruler 2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
cup 1 
1_
2
1
4
1
6 7
1 I
salt/pepper/spices 2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
desk 1 
1_
2
1
4
1
6 7 sauce pan 2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
dish drainer 1 
1 ,
2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
saucer 2
1
4
1
6 7
dishes/plates 1 
1_
2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
shirt 2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
eraser 1 
1_
2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
sink/basin/bowl 2
1 1
6 7
gloves 1
I
2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
sponge/scourer 2
1 1
6 7
hanger 1 
1 „
2 4
1
6 7 
1 1
spoon
L
2
1
4
1
6 7 
____1
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iron 1 2 3 4 
1 1 1 1
6 7 
1 1
starch (spray) 2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
ironing board 1 2  3 4 
1 1 1 1
6 7 
1 1
sugar (jar/bowl) 2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
kettle 1 2  3 4 
1 1 1 1
6 7 
1 1
table 2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
knife 1 2  3 4 
1 1 1 1
6 7 
1 1
tap 2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
lamp 1 2 3 4 
1 1 1 1
6 7 
1 1
tea bag (box) 2 4
1
6 7 
1 1
lemon 1 2  3 4
1 1 I I
6 7 
1 1
tea pot 2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
magazine 1 2 3 4 
1 1 1 1
6 7 
1 1
textbook 2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
marker pen 1 2 3 4 
1 1 1 1
6 7 
1 1
transparencies 2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
milk (pack/jar) 1 2  3 4
1 1 I I
6 7 
1 1
utensils 2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
mug 1 2  3 4 
1 1 1 1
6 7 washing-up liquid 2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
newspaper 1 2  3 4 
1 1 1 1
6 7 
1 1
water (jug/spray) 2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
note pad 1 2  3 4
I ' l l
6 7 
1 1
MAKING TEA
black/white board 1 2 3 
1 1
3 6 7 
1 1 1
OHP 1 2 
1 1
3 4 
1 1
3 6 7 
1 1 1
book 1 2 3 
1 1
3 6 7 oven gloves 1 2 
I I
3 4 
1 1
3 6 7 
1 1 1
bookmark 1 2 3 
1 1
3 6 7 
1 1 1
pan/bowl 1 2 
1 1
3 4 
1 1
3 6 7
I I 1
brush 1 2 3 
1 1
3 6 7 
1 1 1
paper 1 2 
1 1
3 4 
1 1
3 6 7 
1 1 1
chair 1 2 3 
1 1
3 6 7 
1 1 1
pen 1 2 
1 1
3 4 
1 1
3 6 7 
1 1 1
chalk 1 2 3 
1 1
3 6 7 
1 1 1
pencil 1 2 
1 1
3 4 
1 1
3 6 7
chopping board 1 2 3 
1 1
3 6 7 
1 1 1
plate 1 2 
1 1
3 4 
1 1
3 6 7 
1 1 1
cloth 1 2 3 
1 1
3 6 7 
1 1 1
plug 1 2 
1 1
3 4 
1 1
3 6 7 
1 1 1
clothes 1 2 3 
1 1
3 6 7 
1 1 1
reading glasses 1 2 3 4 3 6 7 
1 1 1
computer 1 2 3 
1 1
3 6 7 
1 1 1
ruler 1 2 
1 1
3 4 
1 1
3 6 7
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cup 1 2 
1 1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
salt/pepper/spices 1 2 3 4 
1 1 1
6 7 
1 1
desk 1 2 
1 1 1
^ 7 
1 1
sauce pan 1 2 3 4 
1 1 1
6 7
dish drainer 1 2 
1 1 1
6 7 
1 1
saucer 1 2 3 4 
1 1 1
6 7 
1 1
dishes/plates 1 2 4 6 7 shirt 1 2 3 4 
1 1 1
6 7 
1 1
eraser 1 2 
1 1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
sink/basin/bowl 1 2 3 4 
1 1 1
6 7
gloves 1 2 
1 1 1
6 7 
1 1
sponge/scourer 1 2 3 4 
1 1 1
6 7 
1 1
hanger 1 2 
1 1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
spoon 1 2 3 4 
1 1 1
6 7 
1 1
iron 1 2 
1 1
4
1
6 7 starch (spray) 1 2 3 4 6 7 
1 1
ironing board 1 2 
1 1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
sugar (jar/bowl) 1 2 3 4 
1 1 1
6 7
kettle 1 2 
1 1 1
6 7 table 1 2 3 4 
1 1 1
6 7 
1 1
knife 1 2 
1 1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
tap 1 2 3 4 
1 1 1
6 7 
1 1
lamp 1 2 4 6 7 
1 1
tea bag (box) 1 2 3 4
1 I I
6 7
lemon 1 2 4 6 7 
1 1
tea pot 1 2 3 4 
1 1 1
6 7
magazine 1 2 4 6 7 
1 1
textbook 1 2 3 4 6 7 
1 1
marker pen 1 2 
1 1 1
6 7 
1 1
transparencies 1 2 3 4
1 I I
6 7
milk (pack/jar) 1 2 
1 1 1
6 7 utensils 1 2 3 4 
1 1 1
6 7 
1 1
mug 1 2 4 6 7 washing-up liquid 1 2 3 4 
1 1 1
6 7 
1 1
newspaper 1 2 
1 1 1
6 7 
1 1
water (jug/spray) 1 2 3 4 
1 1 1
6 7 
1 1
note pad 1 2 
1 1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
W ASHING DISHES
black/white board 1
book
bookmark 5 6 7
OHP
oven gloves 
pan/bowl
6 7
5 6 7
I I I
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brush
chair
chalk
chopping board
cloth
clothes
computer
cup
desk
dish drainer
dishes/plates
eraser
gloves
hanger
iron
ironing board
kettle
knife
lamp
lemon
magazine
marker pen
milk (pack/jar)
mug
newspaper 
note pad 2 3 4
I I I I L
6J___ I
paper
pen
pencil
plate
plug
reading glasses 
ruler
salt/pepper/spices 
sauce pan 
saucer 
shirt
sink/basin/bowl
sponge/scourer
spoon
starch (spray) 
sugar (jar/bowl) 
table 
tap
tea bag (box) 
tea pot 
textbook 
transparencies 
utensils
washing-up liquid 
water (jug/spray)
5 6
5 6
3 6
3 6
3 6
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WORKING AT DESK
black/white board 1 2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
OHP 2 3 
1 1
3 6 7
book 1 2 4
1
6 7 
1 1
oven gloves 2 3 
1 1
3 6 7 
1 1 1
bookmark 1 2
1 1
6 7 
1 1
pan/bowl 2 3 
1 1
3 6 7 
1 1 1
brush 1 2
1
4 6 7 paper 2 3 
1 1
3 6 7 
1 1 1
chair 1 2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
pen 2 3 
1 1
3 6 7
1 I I
chalk 1 2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
pencil 2 3 
1 1
3 6 7 
1 1 1
chopping board 1 2
1 1
6 7 
1 1
plate 2 3 
1 1
3 6 7 
1 1 1
cloth 1 2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
plug 2 3 
1 1
3 6 7
I I 1
clothes 1 2
1 1
6 7 
1 1
reading glasses 2 3 
1 1
; 3 6 7 
1 1 1
computer 1 2
1
4 6 7 
1 1
ruler 2 3 
1 1
> 3 6 7 
1 1 1
cup 1 2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
salt/pepper/spices 2 3 
1 1
3 6 7
1 I I
desk 1 2
1
4
1
6 7 sauce pan 2 3 
1 1
3 6 7
dish drainer 1 2
1
4
I
6 7 
1 1
saucer 2 3 3 6 7
1 1 I
dishes/plates 1 2
1
4 6 7 
1 1
shirt 2 3 
1 1
■ 3 6 7 
1 1 1
eraser 1 2 6 7 
1 1
sink/basin/bowl 2 3 
1 1
3 6 7
gloves 1 2
1
4
1
6 7 sponge/scourer 2 3 
1 1
3 6 7 
1 1 1
hanger 1 2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
spoon 2 3 
1 1
3 6 7
1 I I
iron 1 2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
starch (spray) 2 3 
1 1
3 6 7 
1 1 1
ironing board 1 2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
sugar (jar/bowl) 2 3 
1 1
3 6 7
1 I I
kettle 1 2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
table 2 3 
1 1
3 6 7 
1 1 1
knife 1 2
1 1
6 7 tap 2 3 
1 1
3 6 7 
1 1 1
lamp 1 2
1 1
6 7 tea bag (box) 2 3 
1 1
3 6 7 
1 1 1
lemon 1 2
1 1
6 7 
1 1
tea pot 2 3 
1 1
3 6 7 
1 1 1
magazine 1 2
1 1
6 7 
1 1
textbook 2 3 
1 1
3 6 7 
1 1 1
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marker pen 
milk (pack/jar) 
mug
newspaper 
note pad
transparencies
utensils
6 7
washing-up liquid 1 Z 3 4 5 6 7
L _______ I_______I_______I_______I_______I______ I
water (jug/spray) 1 2  3 4 5 6 7
I I I I I_______I______I
COOKING
black/white board 2 3 
1 1
5 6 7 
1 1 1
OHP 2 3 
1 1
5 6 7
I I 1
book 2 3 
1 1
5 6 7 oven gloves 2 3 5 6 7 
1 1 1
bookmark 2 3 
1 1
5 6 7 
1 1 1
pan/bowl 2 3 
1 1
5 6 7 
1 1 1
brush 2 3 
1 1
5 6 7 
1 1 1
paper 2 3 
1 1
5 6 7 
1 1 1
chair 2 3 
1 1
5 6 7 
1 1 1
pen 2 3 
1 1
5 6 7
I I 1
chalk 2 3 5 6 7 
1 1 1
pencil 2 3 
1 1
5 6 7
I I 1
chopping board 2 3 
1 1
5 6 7 
1 1 1
plate 2 3
I I
5 6 7 
1 1 1
cloth 2 3 
1 1
3 6 7 
1 1 1
plug 2 3 
1 1
5 6 7 
1 1 1
clothes 2 3 
1 1
5 6 7 
1 1 1
reading glasses 2 3 5 6 7 
1 1 1
computer 2 3 
1 1
5 6 7
I I 1
ruler 2 3 
1 1
5 6 7 
1 1 1
cup 2 3 
1 1
5 6 7 
1 1 1
salt/pepper/spices 2 3 
1 1
5 6 7 
1 1 1
desk 2 3 
1 1
5 6 7 
1 1 1
sauce pan 2 3 
1 1
5 6 7 
1 1 1
dish drainer 2 3 
1 1
5 6 7 
1 1 1
saucer 2 3 
1 1
5 6 7 
1 1 1
dishes/plates 2 3 5 6 7
1 I I
shirt 2 3 
1 1
5 6 7 
1 1 1
eraser 2 3 
1 1
5 6 7 
1 1 1
sink/basin/bowl 2 3 
1 1
5 6 7 
1 1 1
gloves 2 3 
1 1
5 6 7 
1 1 1
sponge/scourer 2 3 
1 1
5 6 7 
1 1 1
hanger 2 3
I 1
5 6 7
1 I 1
spoon 2 3 
1 1
5 6 7 
1 1 1
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iron 1 2 
1 1
4 6 7 
1 1
starch (spray) 1 2
1
4 5 6 7 
1 1 1 1
ironing board 1 2 
1 1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
sugar (jar/bowl) 1 2
1
4 5 6 7 
1 1 1 1
kettle 1 2 
1 1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
table 1 2
1
4 5 6 7
1 1 I I
knife 1 2 
1 1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
tap 1 2
1
4 5 6 7
lamp 1 2 
1 1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
tea bag (box) 1 2
1
4 5 6 7
lemon 1 2 
1 1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
tea pot 1 2
1
4 5 6 7 
1 1 1 1
magazine 1 2 
1 1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
textbook 1 2
1
4 5 6 7
1 1 I I
marker pen 1 2 4 6 7 
1 1
transparencies 1 2
1
4 5 6 7 
1 1 1 1
milk (pack/jar) 1 2 
1 1
4
1
6 7 utensils 1 2
1
4 5 6 7 
1 1 1 1
mug 1 2 
1 1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
washing-up liquid 1 2
1
4 5 6 7
1 I I  1
newspaper 1 2 
1 1
4
1
6 7 water (jug/spray) 1 2 4 5 6 7 
1 1 1 1
note pad 1 2 
1 1
4
1
6 7 
..1 . 1
TEACHING
black/white board 1 2 3 
1 1
5 6 7 OHP 1 2 3 
1 1 1
5 6 7
book 1 2 3 5 6 7 
1 1 1
oven gloves 1 2 3 
1 1 1
5 6 7
1 T 1
bookmark 1 2 3 
1 1
5 6 7 pan/bowl 1 2 3 
1 1 1
5 6 7 
1 1 1
brush 1 2 3 
1 1
5 6 7
1 I I
paper 1 2 3 
1 1 1
5 6 7 
1 1 1
chair 1 2 3 
1 1
5 6 7 
1 1 1
pen 1 2 3 
1 1 1
5 6 7 
1 1 1
chalk 1 2 3 
1 1
5 6 7 pencil 1 2 3 
1 1 1
5 6 7 
1 1 1
chopping board 1 2 3 
1 1
5 6 7 plate 1 2 3 
1 1 1
5 6 7 
1 1 1
cloth 1 2 3. 
1 1
5 6 7 plug 1 2 3 5 6 7 
1 1 1
clothes 1 2 3 
1 1
1 5  6 7 
1 1 1
reading glasses 1 2  3 4 
1 1 1
1 5  6 7 
1 1 1
computer 1 2 3 
1 1
1 5  6 7 
1 1 1
ruler 1 2  3 4 
1 1....... 1
5 6 7 
1 1 1
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cup 1 Z 
1 1
3 4 
1 1
6 7 
1 1
salt/pepper/spices 2 3 
1 1
5 6 
1 1
desk 1 z  
1 1
3 4 
1 1
6 7 sauce pan 2 3 
1 1
5 6 
1 1
dish drainer 1 z  
1 1
3 4 
1 1
6 7 
1 1
saucer 2 3 
1 1
b 6 
1 1
dishes/plates 1 z  
1 1
3 4 
1 1
6 7
I I
shirt 2 3 
1 1
b 6 
1 1
eraser 1 z  
1 1
3 4  
1 1
6 7 
1 1
sink/basin/bowl 2 3 
1 1
b 6 
1 1
gloves 1 z  
1 1
3 4 
1 1
6 7 
1 1
sponge/scourer 2 3 
1 1
b 6 
1 1
hanger 1 z  
1 1
3 4 
1 1
6 7 
1 1
spoon 2 3 
1 1
5 6 
1 1
iron 1 2  
1 1
3 4 
1 1
6 7 
1 1
starch (spray) 2 3 
1 1
5 6 
1 1
ironing board 1 2 
1 1
3 4 6 7 
1 1
sugar (jar/bowl) 2 3 
1 1
b 6 
1 1
kettle 1 2 
1 1
3 4 6 7 
1 1
table 2 3 
1 1
b 6 
1 1
knife 1 2 
1 1
3 4 
1 1
6 7 tap 2 3 
1 1
5 6 
1 1
lamp 1 2  
1 1
3 4 
1 1
6 7 
1 1
tea bag (box) 2 3 
1 1
5 6 
1 1
lemon 1 2 
1 1
3 4 
1 1
6 7 
1 1
tea pot 2 3 
1 1
5 6 
1 1
magazine 1 2  
1 1
3 4 
1 1
6 7 
1 1
textbook 2 3 
1 1
b 6
marker pen 1 2 
1 1
3 4 6 7 
1 1
transparencies 2 3 
1 1
b 6 
1 1
milk (pack/jar) 1 2 
1 1
3 4 
1 1
6 7 
1 1
utensils 2 3 
1 1
5 6 
1 1
mug 1 2 
1 1
3 4 6 7 
1 1
washing-up liquid 2 3 
1 1
b 6
newspaper 1 2 
1 1
3 4 
1 1
6 7 water (jug/spray)
L
2 3 
1 1 1
5 6 
1 1 1
note pad 1 2 
1 1
3 4 
1....  1____
6 7 
1 1
W RITING
black/white board 1
book
bookmark
5 6
5 6 7
O H P
oven gloves 
pan/bowl
b 6 7
6 7
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brush 1 2 
1 1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
paper 1 2
1
4
1
6 7
1 I
chair 1 2 
1 1
4
1
6 7 pen 1 2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
chalk 1 2 
1 1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
pencil 1 2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
chopping board 1 2  
1 1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
plate 1 2
1
4
1
6 7
cloth 1 2 
1 1
4
1
6 7 plug 1 2 4
1
6 7 
1 1
clothes 1 2 4
1
6 7 
1 1
reading glasses 1 2
1
4
1
6 7
computer 1 2 
1 1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
ruler 1 2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
cup 1 2 
1 1
4 6 7 
1 1
salt/pepper/spices 1 2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
desk 1 2 
1 1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
sauce pan 1 2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
dish drainer 1 2 
1 1
4 6 7 
1 1
saucer 1 2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
dishes/plates 1 2 
1 1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
shirt 1 2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
eraser 1 2 
1 1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
sink/basin/bowl 1 2
1
4 6 7 
1 1
gloves 1 2 
1 1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
sponge/scourer 1 2 4
1
6 7 
1 1
hanger 1 2 4
1
6 7 
1 1
spoon 1 2
1
4 6 7 
1 1
iron 1 2 
1 1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
starch (spray) 1 2
1
4
1
6 7
ironing board 1 2 
1 1
4 6 7 
1 1
sugar (jar/bowl) 1 2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
kettle 1 2 
1 1
4 6 7 
1 1
table 1 2
1
4 6 7 
1 1
knife 1 2 
1 1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
tap 1 2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
lamp 1 2 
1 1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
tea bag (box) 1 2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
lemon 1 2 
1 1
4 6 7 
1 1
tea pot 1 2 4
1
6 7 
1 1
magazine 1 2 
1 1
4 6 7 textbook 1 2
1
4
1
6 7
marker pen 1 2 
1 1
4
1
6 7 transparencies 1 2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
milk (pack/jar) 1 2 
1 1
4
I
6 7 
1 1
utensils 1 2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
mug 1 2 
1 1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
washing-up liquid 1 2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
newspaper 1 2 
1 1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
water (jug/spray) 1 2
1
4
1
6 7 
1 1
note pad 1 2 
1 1 ... .
4
.. .
6 7
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Appendix B
Object naming frequencies obtained in the listing task of Experiment 1.
Ironing No. Ss % Reading No. Ss %
iron 37 95.0 book 38 97.0
clothes 36 92.0 bookmark
reading
15 38.0
ironing board 34 87.0 glasses 14 36.0
water (jug/spray) 22 56.0 lamp 9 23.0
plug 8 21.0 magazine 9 23.0
hangers 7 18.0 paper 7 18.0
shirt
ironing board
6 15.0 newspaper 6 15.0
cover 5 13.0 bed 4 10.0
starch (spray) 4 10.0 chair 4 10.0
table 4 10.0 computer 4 10.0
laundry basket 3 8.0 desk 4 10.0
skirt 3 8.0 words 3 0.08
trousers 3 8.0 book cover 2 5.0
iron cord 2 ' 5.0 pages 2 5.0
sheet 2 5.0 pen 2 5.0
socket 2 5.0 book chair 1 3.0
steam 2 5.0 clipmark 1 3.0
bed 1 3.0 cushion 1 3.0
chair 1 3.0 highlighter 1 3.0
electricity 1 3.0 letter 1 3.0
hair remover 3.0 notebook 1 3.0
heat 1 3.0 pencil 1 3.0
mains switch 1 3.0 report 1 3.0
tea towel 1 3.0 sofa
tarot cards
1
1
3.0
3.0
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Making tea No. Ss % Washing dishes No. Ss %
tea bag 37 95.0
washing-up
liquid 34 87.0
kettle 35 90.0 dishes 22 56.0
milk 31 79.0 water 21 54.0
teaspoon 30 77.0 cloth 19 49.0
sugar (jar/bowl) 26 67.0 sink 19 49.0
cup 24 62.0 dish drainer 14 36.0
water 21 54.0 sponge 14 36.0
mug 17 44.0 bowl 11 28.0
tea pot 14 36.0 tap 11 28.0
saucer 9 23.0 tea towel 11 28.0
lemon 5 13.0 gloves 9 23.0
biscuit jar 3 8.0 plate 9 23.0
plug 3 8.0 brush 8 21.0
strainer 3 8.0 scouring pad 7 18.0
tea leaves 3 8.0 cutlery 6 15.0
bin 2 5.0 plug 6 15.0
honey 2 5.0 dish washer 5 15.0
cupboard 1 3.0 basin 4 10.0
electricity 1 3.0 fork 4 10.0
fridge 1 3.0 glass 3 8.0
mains switch 3.0 knife 3 8.0
sink 1 3.0 mug 3 8.0
socket 1 3.0 soap 3 8.0
sugar lumps 1 3.0 spoon 3 8.0
sugar tongs 1 3.0 cup 2 5.0
sweetener 1 3.0 pan 2 5.0
tap 1 3.0 apron 1 3.0
casserole pan 
dish shelf 
sink plug 
utensils
1
1
1
1
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
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Working at desk No. Ss % Cooking No. Ss %
paper 33 85.0 food 27 69.0
pen 33 85.0 pan 19 49.0
chair 28 72.0 oven 17 44.0
desk 26 67.0 sauce pan 14 36.0
computer 25 64.0 utensils 13 33.0
lamp 21 54.0 plate 12 31.0
book 16 41.0 cooker 11 28.0
pencil 6 15.0 microwave 11 28.0
ruler 6 15.0 frying pan 10 26.0
reading glasses 4 10.0 knife 10 26.0
stationary 4 10.0 oil 10 26.0
drawer 3 8.0 hob 9 23.0
file 3 8.0 ingredients 9 23.0
laptop 3 8.0 cutlery 8 21.0
mouse 3 8.0 spoon 8 21.0
mouse mat 3 8.0 chopping board 7 18.0
mug 3 8.0 oven gloves 7 18.0
printer 3 8.0 salt 7 18.0
telephone 3 8.0 grill 6 15.0
eraser 2 5.0 herbs 6 15.0
notes 2 5.0 baking tray 5 13.0
stereo 2 5.0 fridge 5 13.0
bin 1 3.0 pot 5 13.0
calculator 1 3.0 bowl 4 10.0
foot rest 1 3.0 fork 4 10.0
monitor 3.0 pepper 4 10.0
paper clips 1 3.0 cook book 3 8.0
pen pot 1 3.0 dish 3 8.0
picture 1 3.0 gas 3 8.0
scanner 1 3.0 spices 3 8.0
socket 1 3.0 stove 3 8.0
stapler 1 3.0 tea towel 3 8.0
typ-ex 1 3.0 bin 2 5.0
water 1 3.0 blender 2 5.0
casserole pan 2 5.0
cupboard 2 5.0
electricity 2 5.0
freezer 2 5.0
kettle 2 5.0
mixing bowl 2 5.0
rolling pin 2 5.0
timer 2 5.0
tin foil 2 5.0
toaster 2 5.0
water 2 5.0
whisk 2 5.0
wooden spoon 2 5.0
apron 1 3.0
boiler 1 3.0
cake tin 1 3.0
casserole dish 1 3.0
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chopsticks 1
colander 1
glass 1
hand towel 1
ladel 1
matches 1
scales 1
sieve 1
sink 1
steam 1
table 1
ventilator 1
wok 1
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
251
Teaching No. Ss % Writing No. Ss %
textbook 22 56.0 pen 39 100.0
blackboard 20 51.0 paper 35 90.0
pen 19 49.0 pencil 27 69.0
chalk 14 36.0 computer 10 26.0
OHP 13 33.0 eraser 7 18.0
paper 12 31.0 book 5 13.0
desk 11 28.0 desk 5 13.0
chair 8 21.0 ruler 5 13.0
notes(pad) 7 18.0 note pad 4 10.0
computer 6 15.0 chair 3 8.0
pencil 6 15.0 essay 3 8.0
board 5 13.0 ink 3 8.0
whiteboard 5 13.0 printer 2 5.0
table 4 10.0 sharpener 2 5.0
transparencies 4 10.0 typewriter 2 5.0
video 4 10.0 dictionary 1 3.0
board whiper 3 8.0 disk 1 3.0
handouts 3 8.0 laptop 1 3.0
pointer 3 8.0 letter 1 3.0
stationary 3 8.0 pencil case 1 3.0
calculator 2 5.0 reading glasses 1 3.0
marker pen 2 5.0 report 1 3.0
reading glasses 2 5.0 spellchecker 1 3.0
tape 2 5.0 table 1 3.0
tape recorder 2 5.0 thesaurus 1 3.0
TV 2 5.0 typ-ex 1 3.0
apple 1 3.0
cards (number) 1 3.0
CD 1 3.0
globe 1 3.0
ruler 1 3.0
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Appendix C
Post hoc Newman-Keuls multiple comparisons for Experiment 2. 
Cue X Scene
{1}
4.084375
{2}
4.818750
{3}
3.77500
{4}
3.175000
Scene Relevance Cue
Cooking Action {1} .055444 .689611 .165962
Cooking Place {2} .055444 .036075* .001097*
Ironing Action {3} .689611 .036075* .387601
Ironing Place {4} .165962 .001097* .387601
Cue X  Scene (cont.)
{1} {2} {3} {4}
3.765625 4.075000 3.678125 5.031125
Scene Relevance Cue
Reading • ■■■ Action {1} .689611 .816576 .013872*
Reading Place {2} .689611 .716484 .055302
Tea-Making Action {3} .816576 .716484 .009468*
Tea-Making Place {4} .013872* .055302 .009468*
Cue X  Relevance
{1} {2} {3} {4}
6.245313 5.339063 1.406250 3.221875
Scene Relevance Cue
High Action {1} .001310* .000158* .000119*
High Place {2} .001310* .000119* .000111*
Low Action {3} .000158* .000119* .000111*
Low Place {4} .000119* .000111* .000111*
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Scene x Relevance
{1}
6.643750
{2}
2.259375
{3}
4.568750
{4}
2.381250
Scene Relevance Cue
Cooking High •• {1} .000131* .000467* .000128*
Cooking Low {2} .000131* .000223* .994159
Ironing High {3} .000467* .000223* .000134*
Ironing Low {4} .000128* .994159 .000134*
Scene x Relevance (cont.)
{1} {2} {3} {4}
5.493750 2.346875 6.462500 2.268750
Scene Relevance Cue
Reading High {1} .000158* .047188* .000128*
Reading Low {2} .000158* .000128* .870638
Tea-Making High {3} .047188* .000128* .000136*
Tea-Making Low {4} .000128* .870638 .000136*
Cue X  Scene x  Relevance
{1}
6.412500
{2}
6.875000
{3}
1.756250
{4}
2.762500
Scene Relevance Cue
Cooking High Action {1} .387340 .000172* .000147*
Cooking High Place {2} .387340 .000120* .000172*
Cooking Low Action {3} .000172* .000120* .063207
Cooking Low Place {4} .000147* .000172* .063207
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Cue X Scene x  Relevance (cont.)
{1}
6.93750
{2}
2.843750
{3}
1.256250
{4}
3.506250
Scene Relevance Cue
Ironing High Action {1} .000132* .000126* .000153*
Ironing High Place {2} .000132* .045187* .599214
Ironing Low Action {3} .000126* .045187* .002650*
Ironing Low Place {4} .000153* .599214 .002650*
Cue X  Scene x Relevance (cont.)
{1} {2} {3} {4}
6.275000 4.712500 1.256250 3.437500
Scene Relevance Cue
Reading High Action {1} .012962* .000172* .000147*
Reading High Place {2} .012962* .000144* .050667
Reading Low Action {3} .000172* .000144* .002466*
Reading Low Place {4} .000147* .050667 .002466*
Cue X  Scene x Relevance (cont.)
{1} {2} {3} {4}
6.00000 6.925000 1.356250 3.181250
Scene Relevance Cue
Tea-making High Action {1} .510093 .000144* .000149*
Tea-making High Place {2} .510093 .000133* .000147*
Tea-making Low Action {3} .000144* .000133* .009515*
Tea-making Low Place {4} .000149* .000147* .009515*
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Appendix D
Data from associative ratings for Experiment 2. 
Cooking
Sub Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair
Sieve- Leaves- Spices- Dog- Oil- Candlst- Sieve- Video-
Sauce Dog Sieve Lamp Cooker Clock Utensils Candls!
1 4 4 4 4 6 3 4 4
2 5 1 6 1 6 4 6 5
3 7 1 7 1 7 4 7 4
4 4 1 5 1 4 3 5 2
5 5 1 5 1 4 2 3 1
6 6 1 6 4 7 1 7 1
7 5 1 2 2 7 3 7 2
8 7 1 7 2 5 5 6 2
9 6 1 7 1 7 1 6 1
10 7 1 4 1 7 1 3 1
11 1 1 6 3 4 1 4 1
12 5 1 7 2 3 1 5 1
13 1 1 3 1 4 1 5 1
14 7 1 7 1 7 1 6 1
15 7 1 7 1 7 5 7 1
16 6 2 6 4 3 2 5 5
17 3 1 3 1 7 1 4 2
18 6 4 6 5 7 4 5 4
19 7 2 7 2 7 1 3 1
20 7 2 7 2 7 4 7 6
Mean 5.30 1.45 5.60 2.00 5.80 2.40 5.25 2.30
Sub Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair
Clock- Picture- Pan- Sauce- Flowers- Lamp- Utensils- Pan-
Flowers Video Salt Salt Leaves Picture Spices Cooker
1 3 4 6 5 7 4 5 7
2 4 5 6 6 6 3 6 7
3 4 1 7 7 7 5 7 7
4 4 5 7 7 6 2 6 7
5 1 3 7 7 7 1 1 7
6 1 2 7 7 6 4 7 7
7 1 2 7 6 6 5 7 7
8 1 7 7 7 5 6 7
9 1 1 7 7 6 1 6 7
10 1 1 7 7 1 1 7 7
11 1 1 7 6 6 5 6 7
12 1 1 7 7 5 1 5 7
13 1 1 7 5 6 1 1 5
14 1 1 7 7 1 1 6 7
15 1 4 7 7 7 1 6 7
16 3 3 6 6 6 6 6 6
17 3 1 7 7 4 4 7 7
18 4 5 7 5 6 5 6 7
19 2 1 7 7 7 5 6 6
20 1 5 7 7 7 6 7 ^ 5 6
Mean 2.10 2.40 6.85 6.50 5.70 3.30 5.70 6 %
Ironing
Sub Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair
Plug- Hanger- Fish- Basket- Painting- Chop- Jumpers- Shirt-
ChopB Iron Bowl Shirt KitRoll Hair Spray IroBoard
1 1 6 2 6 1 1 4 7
2 3 5 1 5 4 1 6 6
3 3 7 1 6 5 1 6 7
4 3 6 1 5 5 1 4 5
5 4 6 1 5 1 1 2 5
6 1 5 1 7 2 1 6 7
7 2 7 1 7 1 1 7 7
8 1 6 5 4 2 1 6 7
9 2 7 2 7 1 1 4 7
10 3 7 1 6 1 1 7 7
11 1 5 1 7 1 1 5 7
12 1 6 1 3 1 1 6 3
13 1 6 4 7 3 1 1 7
14 1 6 1 6 1 1 4 7
15 5 5 1 7 2 1 7 7
16 5 6 2 6 2 6 6
17 2 7 1 7 1 1 7 7
18 5 6 1 5 3 1 5 6
19 3 7 4 7 1 1 7 7
20 1 4 1 6 1 1 4 3
Mean 2.40 6.00 1.65 5.95 1.95 1.05 5.20 6.25
Sub Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair
IroB- HairB- Plant- Spray- Bowl- KitRoll- IroB- Paper-
Painting Fish Basket Hanger Jumpers Paper Plug Plant
1 1 1 1 5 2 2 6 1
2 3 1 1 5 5 6 5 4
3 1 1 1 6 1 1 7 1
4 1 1 2 4 1 2 5 1
5 1 1 2 2 1 1 7 2
6 1 1 1 4 1 3 6 1
7 1 1 1 7 1 1 6 2
8 1 1 2 6 1 7 1
9 1 1 1 4 1 2 6 1
10 1 1 1 6 1 1 7 1
11 1 1 1 3 1 1 7 1
12 1 1 1 6 1 1 7 1
13 1 1 1 3 1 1 7 1
14 1 1 1 5 1 3 3 1
15 1 1 2 6 1 2 7 4
16 2 6 2 6 2
17 1 1 1 7 1 1 7 1
18 1 2 5 6 7 3
19 1 1 1 7 1 1 7 1
20 1 1 1 4 1 1 5 1
Mean 1.25 1.05 1.30 5.05 1.45 1.95 6.25 1.55
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Reading
Sub Pair
Newsp-
Mark
Pair
Plant-
Plate
Pair
Glasses-
Magaz
Pair
Flour-
WatCan
Pair
Pen-
Folder
Pair
Books-
Mark
Pair
Book-
Pen
Pair
FireB-
Cushion
1 4 2 6 1 6 7 6 5
2 7 2 7 2 7 7 7 3
3 5 1 7 1 7 7 6 5
4 4 1 7 1 5 7 2 1
5 5 1 7 1 7 7 6 1
6 5 1 7 1 7 7 6 1
7 4 3 7 5 7 6 1
8 5 2 7 1 5 7 4
9 6 1 7 1 6 7 5 1
10 4 1 7 7 7 6
11 4 1 7 1 7 7 5 1
12 4 1 5 1 6 7 5
13 3 1 4 1 7 7 4
14 6 1 7 1 4 7 1 1
15 7 1 7 1 7 7 7 1
16 6 2 7 6 7 4
17 4 2 7 1 7 7 4 1
18 6 4 6 5 6 5
19 6 1 7 1 7 7 7 1
20 5 1 5 1 4 4 4 1
Mean 5.00 1.50 6.55 1.30 6.10 6.80 5.00 2.00
Sub Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair
Plant- Magaz- Pepper- Folder- Book- Cushion- WatCan Speakers
FireB Books Speakers News Glasses Flour -Pepper -Mant
1 2 7 1 2 6 6 1 1
2 2 6 2 5 7 2 2 5
3 1 5 1 3 7 3 1 2
4 1 6 1 5 7 1 1 2
5 1 7 1 6 7 1 1 1
6 1 5 7 1 1 5
7 1 7 1 5 7 1 1 1
8 1 7 1 6 7 5 1 1
9 1 7 1 7 7 1 1 1
10 1 5 1 3 7 2 1 1
11 1 7 1 7 7 1 1 1
12 1 7 1 5 6 1 1 1
13 1 5 1 5 5 2 1 1
14 1 7 1 6 7 3 1 1
15 1 7 1 7 7 3 1 1
16 6 6 7 2
17 1 7 1 7 7 1 1 1
18 5 1 6 4 1
19 1 7 1 7 7 4 1 1
20 1 7 1 7 4 1 1
Mean 1.40 6.15 1.30 5.25 6.60 2.25 1.10 1.90
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Tea-making
Sub Pair
Coffee-
TeaBag
Pair
Poster-
Yoghurts
Pair
Milk-
TeaBox
Pair
IV -
Lectern
Pair Pair 
Mug-Milk Sellotape- 
CleanSpr
Pair
Pot-
Towel
Pair
Trophy-
TV
1 6 5 7 7 7 2 6 2
2 7 3 7 6 7 4 6 5
3 6 2 7 2 7 1 5 2
4 6 1 7 2 7 1 5 1
5 5 6 7 7 7 1 7 1
6 6 1 7 3 7 1 6 1
7 7 1 7 7 7 1 6 1
8 5 1 7 7 7 3 3
9 5 1 7 7 7 1 4 4
10 7 1 7 1 7 1 5 1
11 7 1 7 7 6 1 6 1
12 1 1 7 3 7 1 3 1
13 5 1 7 5 7 1 5 1
14 2 1 7 1 7 1 4 1
15 1 1 7 1 1 1 5 1
16 6 6 7 7 5 6
17 7 1 7 7 7 1 4 3
18 6 1 7 1 7 1 5 1
19 6 1 6 2 6 1 5 1
20 1 1 6 6 6 1 5 1
Mean 5.10 1.65 6.85 4.45 6.55 1.30 5.00 1.90
Sub Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair
Yoghurts Towel- Lectern- Kettle- TaeBox- CleanSpr- Dog- TeaBag-
-Sellotap Coffee Dog Mug Pot Trophy Poster Kettle
1 3 6 2 7 7 3 4 5
2 1 5 1 7 7 1 1 7
3 2 4 1 4 6 2 1 6
4 1 6 1 7 7 1 1 7
5 1 5 5 7 5 1 3
6 1 6 1 7 7 2 2 7
7 1 6 1 7 7 1 1 7
8 5 1 7 7 1 1 7
9 1 4 1 7 7 5 1 7
10 1 5 1 7 7 1 1 7
11 1 6 1 7 7 1 1 7
12 1 4 1 6 7 1 1 6
13 1 4 1 7 7 1 2 7
14 1 6 1 6 6 1 1 6
15 1 6 1 7 7 5 1 5
16 4 2 5 7 2 2 4
17 1 4 2 7 7 1 1 7
18 1 5 1 7 7 1 3 7
19 1 5 4 7 7 1 5 7
20 1 4 1 4 4 1 1 5
Mean 1.25 5.00 1.40 6.40 6.75 1.85 1.60 6.20
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Kitchen 1
Sub Pair Pair Pair
Leaves- Pan- Clock-
Dog______ Cooker Flowers
Pair Pair
Sauce- Lamp- 
Salt Picture
Pair Pair Pair
Spices- Video- Cooker-Oil
Sieve Candlest
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20 
Mean
3
4
5 
1 
3
3
4 
3
5 
5 
1 
1 
3 
1
3 
1 
2
4 
2
5
2.95
7
6
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
4
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
6.80
5
4
5 
1
3
5
4
5
6
6
3 
1 
5
4
4
5
5
3
4
6
4.20
7
6
7
7
6
6
7
7
7
7
6
6
6
7
7
7
7
7
5
7
6.60
7
6
7
5
4 
2 
7
6 
7 
7 
6 
3 
6
5 
7
6 
7 
5 
5 
7
5.75
7
6
6
7
7
4
7
7
7
7
6
6
7
6
7
7
7
7
6
7
6.55
3
4
4
5 
3 
3 
5 
3
3
4
3 
1
5 
2
6
4 
1 
3
5 
7
3.70
7
5 
7 
7
6 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
6 
6 
3 
7 
6 
6 
7 
7 
5 
7
6.35
Sub Pair Pair
Flowers- Sieve- 
Leaves Sauce
Pair Pair Pair Pair
Utensils- Picture- Salt-Pan Dog-
Spices_____ Video__________  Lamp
Pair Pair
Oil- Candlest-
Utensils Clock
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20 
Mean
7
6
6
2
5 
7
6 
7 
7 
7
3 
7 
5
4 
7
5 
7
6
5
6
5.75
7
6
6
7
6
6
7
7
7
7
6
7
5 
7 
7
6 
7 
7 
5 
7
6.50
7
6
6
7
7
4 
7 
7 
7 
7 
6 
7
5
5 
7 
7 
7
6 
6 
7
6.40
6
3
5 
2
3
4 
2
6
5
6 
1 
6 
5
3
4
5 
3 
3 
1 
5
3.90
7
6
7
7
7
6
7
7
7
7
7
5
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
6.80
2
4
5 
1 
5 
3 
1 
3
3 
5
4
5 
5
4 
1
5 
5 
3 
5 
7
3.80
7
5
6 
7 
6 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7
4
5 
7 
7 
7 
7 
5 
7
6.45
4
4
5
6
3 
6
4
5
5
6 
3 
2 
5 
5 
5 
5 
3 
3
5
6
4.50
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Lounge 1
Sub Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair
Hanger- Fish-Bowl Shirt- ChopB- Painting - Basket- Plant- Plug-
Iron IroningB Brush KitRoll Shirt ChopB Jumpers
1 7 3 7 2 5 7 3 3
2 5 3 6 2 2 6 2 6
3 6 2 6 2 4 7 5 5
4 2 2 6 1 2 6 2 2
5 6 2 6 1 3 6 2 3
6 6 1 6 1 2 6 1 6
7 2 1 3 1 1 4 2 5
8 3 1 2 1 3 2 4 5
9 4 1 5 1 2 7 1 3
10 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 5
11 5 3 6 2 2 6 2 3
12 4 3 6 1 2 6 1 5
13 7 3 7 1 3 7 4 3
14 7 3 5 3 5 5 4 4
15 7 1 7 1 6 7 1 1
16 3 5 3 2 2 6 2 3
17 6 1 6 1 1 6 2 4
18 7 5 7 1 1 7 5 2
19 6 4 6 4 5 6 5 5
20 3 2 3 1 1 3 1 5
Mean 5.05 2.35 5.20 1.50 2.65 5.55 2.50 3.90
Sub Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair
Iron- Bowl- Spray- Paper- Brush- IroningB- Jumpers- KitRoll-
Basket Painting Hanger Plant Fish Plug Spray Paper
1 7 3 5 6 2 6 4 4
2 5 2 3 5 2 6 4 3
3 7 5 5 5 3 7 7 4
4 3 1 4 3 1 7 6 1
5 6 2 6 5 2 5 2 4
6 7 1 2 4 1 6 2 2
7 5 1 6 6 2 7 5 1
8 5 1 4 4 1 6 1 1
9 7 1 2 1 1 6 4 1
10 7 1 5 5 1 7 6 1
11 6 2 4 5 2 6 3 4
12 6 2 6 2 1 6 5 2
13 7 2 7 6 4 7 7 4
14 6 4 6 5 4 4 5 4
15 7 2 7 3 1 6 2 1
16 4 2 6 5 2 6 2 4
17 5 1 5 5 1 6 6 2
18 7 1 7 6 1 7 2 1
19 7 1 7 5 4 7 6 5
20 4 2 4 4 2 5 4 1
Mean 5.90 1.85 5.05 4.50 1.90 6.15 4.15 2.50
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Lounge 2
Sub Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair
Folder- Flour- 
Newspap WatCan
Pepper- Pen-Folder Plant 
Speakers Plate
Magaz-
Books
FireB- Mark- 
Cushion Books
1 6 2 3 6 4 7 4 7
2 6 2 2 6 2 6 4 6
3 7 4 3 7 5 6 4 7
4 2 2 2 6 6 6 2 7
5 5 2 3 5 3 5 6 7
6 5 1 1 6 1 6 2 7
7 7 3 5 5 5 7 5 7
8 5 2 1 7 2 7 2 7
9 7 4 6 7 6 7 2 7
10 5 5 1 5 5 5 1 7
11 6 2 1 7 5 7 1 7
12 6 1 1 6 1 6 5 7
13 6 1 1 7 1 6 1 7
14 5 4 3 6 4 6 3 5
15 1 1 1 7 5 7 1 7
16 6 2 3 3 2 6 2 5
17 3 1 2 5 2 5 1 5
18 5 3 5 6 5 5 4 6
19 7 4 6 6 5 6 5 5
20 5 2 2 3 2 5 1 5
Mean 5.25 2.40 2.60 5.80 3.55 6.05 2.80 6.40
Sub Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair
Book-Pen Newspap- 
Mark
Glasses-
Magaz
Speakers- Plate- 
Plant FireB
Book-
Glasses
Cushion- WatCan- 
Flour Pepper
1 6 6 6 6 4 6 4 3
2 5 4 6 5 6 6 6 3
3 6 6 7 6 5 6 3 3
4 6 5 6 5 1 6 1 1
5 4 5 6 5 2 6 1 2
6 5 5 7 5 2 7 1 1
7 7 7 7 6 4 7 2 1
8 3 3 5 6 6 4 1 2
9 6 4 7 7 5 7 1 6
10 5 6 7 5 7 7 1 5
11 6 6 7 6 5 7 1 4
12 5 6 7 1 1 7 4 1
13 4 5 7 4 6 7 1 1
14 5 4 5 6 2 6 2 3
15 7 5 7 7 1 7 4 1
16 4 4 5 6 6 6 6 1
17 2 3 4 5 5 4 1 1
18 5 5 5 6 6 6 4 3
19 7 6 6 5 4 6 2 5
20 5 5 5 4 2 5 2 2
Mean 5.15 5.00 6.10 5.30 4.00 6.15 2.40 2.45
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Kitchen 2
Sub Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair
Yoghurt- Kettle- TeaBox- CleanSpr- Coffee- Trophy- Mug-Milk TV-
Sellotape Mug Pot_______ Trophy TeaBag TV__________________ Lectern
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20 
Mean
4
3
1
1
2
2
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
3
1
2
1
1
1
1
1.60
7
6
7
7
5 
7 
7 
7 
7
6 
7 
5
5
6 
7 
6 
6 
6 
7 
3
6.20
7
7
7
7
6
7
7
7
7
7
7
6
7
7
7
6
6
7
7
5
6.70
4
3
4 
1 
1 
2 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
3 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1
1.75
5
6 
7 
7 
6 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
6 
7 
6 
1 
4 
7 
6 
7 
1
5.90
6
2
5
6 
2 
6 
6 
6 
7 
1 
6
3
5 
2
6 
6
4 
6 
7 
1
4.65
7
5 
7 
7 
7 
7
6 
6 
7 
7 
7
5 
7
6 
7 
6 
6 
7 
7 
5
6.45
7
6
7
6
2
2
4
6
4 
7 
7
5 
7
5 
7
6 
4 
7 
1 
6
5.30
Sub Pair Pair Pair Pair
Poster- Towel- Dog- Milk-
Yoghurts Coffee Poster TeaBox
Pair Pair Pair Pair
TeaBag- Sellotape- Lectern- Pot-
Kettle CleanSpr Dog Towel
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20 
Mean
3 
3 
3 
2 
1 
1 
■ 1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
6 
1 
2 
1 
3 
1 
1
1.85
7
6
7
3
3
7
7
6
6
6
7
3 
7 
6 
7 
6
5
6 
7
4
5.80
3
4 
1 
1 
2 
1 
4 
4 
4
3 
2
4 
2 
6 
2 
4 
2 
3 
7 
1
3.00
7
6
7
6
6
7
7
7
7
7
7
5 
7
6 
7 
6 
6 
7 
7 
5
6.50
5
6 
7 
6 
6 
7 
7 
7 
7 
6 
7 
6 
7 
6 
7 
2 
6 
5 
7 
1
5.90
4 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
3 
1
5 
1 
1 
1 
1
1.95
2
4
2
1
2
1
1
3 
1 
1 
2
4 
4
3 
1
4 
2 
4 
1 
1
2.20
6
6
7
6
5 
7
6 
7 
6
4 
7
5
6 
6 
6 
6 
4 
7 
7 
3
5.85
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Appendix E
Pairs of targets and distractors used in the recognition task.
Scene Object Original Target Object Distractor Object
Cooking Schema-consistent Steel colander 
Chinese soy sauce
Mesh sieve 
Japanese vinegar
Schema-inconsistent Candlestick 
Brown-rim clock
Tea-light holder 
White-rim clock
Ironing Schema-consistent White hanger 
F e b r e e z e  spray
Y ellow  hanger 
Kitchen spray
Schema-inconsistent H i g h e r  E d u c a t i o n  newspaper 
Kitchen roll with tree leaves
T h e  S u n  newspaper 
Kitchen roll with seashells
Reading Schema-consistent TV Guide
Thick-rim reading glasses
C u r r y ’s  pamphlet 
Rimless reading glasses
Schema-inconsistent Light-brown pepper grinder 
Blue watering can
Dark-brown pepper grinder 
Yellow  watering can
Tea-making Schema-consistent Green mug
1/2 pint milk carton
Blue mug
1/2 pint milk plastic bottle
Schema-inconsistent Cuddly dog 
Sellotape holder with 
Sellotape
Cuddly cat
Sellotape holder without 
Sellotape
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Appendix F
Post hoc Newman-Keuls multiple comparisons for Experiment 3b.
Quartile x Consistency
{1}
34.42916
{2}
21.35750
{3}
26.35417
{4}
31.96917
Quartile Consistency
First High {1} .051189* .438951 .548378
First Low {2} .051189* .226708 .153651
Second High {3} .438951 .226708 .735670
Second Low {4} .548378 .153651 .735670
Quartile x Consistency (cont.)
{1} {2} {3} {4}
29.62083 28.88667 29.35250 26.96167
Quartile Consistency
Third High {1} .982192 .947719 .912841
Third Low {2} .982192 .909344 .638251
Fourth High {3} .947719 .909344 .826712
Fourth Low {4} .912841 .638251 .826712
Quartile (1 and 2) x Consistency
{1}
34.42916
{2}
21.35750
{3}
26.35417
{4}
31.96917
Quartile Consistency
First High {1} .025414* .132998 .533559
First Low {2} .025414* .218325 .044290*
Second High {3} .132998 .218325 .170351
Second Low {4} .533559 .044290* .170351
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Appendix G
Post hoc Newman-Keuls multiple comparisons for Experiment 7.
Schema-consistent object frequency x Object consistency
{1}
51.25000
{2}
73.12500
{3}
54.82100
{4}
76.87500
{5}
60.62500
{6}
66.25000
Frequency Consistency
6 SC Objects Consistent {1} .000207* .424846 .000142* .096997 .007312*
6 SC Objects Inconsistent {2} .000207* .000856* .402154 .018430* .127245
4 SC Objects Consistent {3} .424846 .000856* .000198* .196720 .033842*
4 SC Objects Inconsistent {4} .000142* .402154 .000198* .003239* .052065
2 SC Objects Consistent {5} .018430* .196720 .003239* .210663
2 SC Objects Inconsistent {6} .127425 .033842* .052065 .210663
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Appendix H
Post hoc Newman-Keuls multiple comparisons for Experiment 8.
Consistency x Memory test
{1}
55.07813
{2}
73.82813
{3}
63.67188
{4}
67.96875
Memory Consistency
First Consistent {1} .001264* .063013 .018623*
First Inconsistent {2} .001264* .073875 .197899
Second Consistent {3} .063013 .073875 .341969
Second Inconsistent {4} .018623* .197899 .341969
First memory test: Cue x Consistency
{1}
54.68750
{2}
78.12500
{3}
60.93750
{4}
67.18750
Cue Consistency
Action Consistent {1} .0002325* .243484 .069806
Action Inconsistent {2} .002325* .012533* .051382
Place Consistent {3} .243284 .012533* .243484
Place Inconsistent {4} .069806 .051382 .243484
Second memory test: Cue x Consistency
{1}
56.25000
{2}
75.00000
{3}
75.00000
{4}
64.06250
Cue Consistency
Action Consistent {1} .026639* .045901* .238754
Action Inconsistent {2} .026639* 1.00000 .106972
Place Consistent {3} .045901* 1.00000 .231468
Place Inconsistent {4} .238754 .106972 .231468
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Kitchen vs. Lounge: Cue x Consistency
{1}
25.78125
{2}
45.31250
{3}
28.12500
{4}
35.93750
Cue Consistency
Action Consistent {1} .000157* .498921 .012534*
Action Inconsistent {2} .000157* .000130* .008599*
Place Consistent {3} .498921 .000130* .027013*
Place Inconsistent {4} .012534* .008599* .027013*
Cue X Scene (Kitchen vs. Lounge) x Consistency
{1}
31.25000
{2}
31.25000
{3}
23.43750
{4}
46.87500
Cue Scene Consistency
Action Kitchen High {1} 1.000000 .304770 .046547*
Action Kitchen Low {2} 1.000000 .452086 .033323*
Action Lounge High {3} .304770 .452086 .001015*
Action Lounge Low {4} .046547* .033323* .001015*
Cue X Scene (Kitchen Lounge) x Consistency
{1}
32.81250
{2}
35.93750
{3}
28.12500
{4}
31.25000
Cue Scene Consistency
Place Kitchen High {1} .554515 .898899 .767420
Place Kitchen Low {2} .554515 .674209 .647618
Place Lounge High {3} .898899 .674209 .933437
Place Lounge Low {4} .767420 .647618 .933437
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